# Fem IR Aff

# 1AC - Toxic Techulinity

#### NATO is fundamentally a system built on the protection racket. The concept of aggression vs “rouge” entities such as Russia and China as threats to our security because they have nukes begins this endless development of toxic masculinity that ends up with the destruction of human.

Padmi, 2021 (Made Fitri Maya Padmi, IR Scholar, Lecturer at University Jakarta, Master of Science focused in International Security Studies from University of Bristol. “Redifining Gender Role During Wartime: Power Relations, Disparities and Impacts,” *Global Insight Journal* v. 6 no. 1, <http://journal.uta45jakarta.ac.id/index.php/GIJ/article/view/4438>; spp)

In the traditional perspective of international relations, especially the realist one, human behaviour is seen as a reflection of the state’s behaviour. To cope with the anarchic world where competition is the main characteristic, the state has to act rationally and aggressively, and possess great economic and military power in order to survive. While the realists argue that the state is free from gender attributes, feminists challenge this idea by arguing if the state was a human, gender attributes are attached to it. In the realist view of the state’s behaviour, the state represents the value of masculinity. Hobbes’s description in Leviathan emphasises conflict: ‘so that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory’ (Tuck, 1996 cited in Nabulsi, 1999, p.85). In the realist view, the state possesses threats to other state, and to overcome the threats, the state should act rationally in taking action or use aggression if necessary. The state seems to be playing the role of the man in a patriarchal culture by taking up a position as protector from foreign dangers. The state’s performance can be a reflection of the masculine model. Stiehm (1982 cited in Wadley, 2010, p.51) argues that ‘An exposition of the gendered logic of masculine role of protector in relation to women and children illuminates the meaning and effective appeal of a security state that wages war abroad and expects obedience and loyalty at home. In this patriarchal logic, the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’. Using militarisation as a means to protect state survival, the state comes up with a rational, defence-offence strategy, one in which war is a legitimate instrument of this strategy. Feminists argue that war and militarisation are products of the masculine and, at the same time, means of masculinizing people. In her book, J. Ann Tickner (2001, cited in Wadley, 2010, p.44) stated that through war, “power is valorised and identified with heroic kind of masculinity”. Agressive character attached to men made them more involve in war, and through their position in politics and military to declare war (Wilcox, 2010). During wartime, men carry the moral responsibilities of nationalism and protection of the country, both of which are portrayals of masculine traits. In the name of protection, using offensive action is often justifiable to be conducted. During World War I and World War II, states were reacting to dangers that were often coming from outside sources. Sjoberg (2006, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.74) argued that chivalric masculinity is not solely about men; the just narrative involves ‘good guys’ or ‘just warriors’ who fight against ‘bad guys’ for just and valorous reasons. Elshtain (1995, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.74) added that in order to produce the chivalric masculinity of the ‘just warriors’, a ‘beautiful soul’ and a malevolent other are needed. During World War I the British military engaged in offensive strategies and the cult of offensive to defend civilisation or impose civilising values on the barbarity of Germany (Wilcox, 2010). The notion of protection has become a moral obligation to provide security in domestic environment and international communities. Globalisation has introduced human security as a new agenda for international security. Protecting human rights is a responsibility shared by international communities. When states are unable or unwilling to protect their own citizens, the responsibilities will be shifted to the broader international community. In September 2005, all United Nations member states agreed to accept the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’. In some cases the responsibility to protect has triggered new wars called humanitarian wars. Feminists view this as an attempt to expand the scope of masculine protection. Anne Orford (1999, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.76) stated that the various humanitarian wars of the 1990s can be read as a narrative in which NATO and other actors re-invent themselves as masculine, heroic rescuers of weak and passive victims. After the tragedy of September 11, 2001, a series of United States invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq had more of an agenda than simply being a ‘War on Terror’. Invasion also served the image of United States as ‘liberator’ for the weak. The mission of ‘liberating’ Afghan women was used to stoke public opinions to support the invasion of Afghanistan, and served also to reduce feminist protest against the war (Wilcox, 2010; Eisenstein, 2002; Charlesworth and Chinki, 2002). Highlighting the Taliban discrimination of women in Afghanistan has become the justification of the invasion. The mission of ‘liberating’ people also showed up in United States invasion of Iraq. The story of rescuing a defenceless Iraqi people from the evil tyranny and oppression of Saddam Hussein underpinned the heroic quest for protection. Identity, boundaries, ideology, and nationalism are all reasons for men to go for war. For a long time, serving one’s country was seen as a chivalric way to gain honour. Society has an important role in shaping what a man should be and must do. By joining the army and fighting on the battlefield, a man has been understood to be defending his honour and his home. Wilcox (2010) said that the military serves as an important site for the creation and maintenance of gender identity in society. Military training emphasises physical exercise to build up strength, offensive and aggressive techniques, and an ability to cope under stressful conditions on the battlefield. During wartime, the state becomes a citizen-warrior that endorses the value of the warrior’s masculinity. Military training has the aim to create or build the individual characteristics of men. And indeed the military is an institution in which masculine characteristics are the basic requirements, and individuals who want to enter this institution must adjust to its prerequisites. Barry Posen (1984, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.70) described the attractiveness of offensive doctrines to militaries as resulting from the military as an organisation driven to increase its own autonomy and self-image. Similarly, David Englander (1997, cited in Wilcox, 2010, p.70) argued that the offensive spirit in the British military leading up to World War I expressed the military’s position as the vanguard of a virile, manly nation. Military power has been examined as gender symbolic to show the manliness of a state or decision-makers. A military parade, usually performed during a state’s Independence Day, is an opportunity to exhibit the masculinity of the state. In wartime the construction of a hyper-masculine of state is a necessity to undermine the enemy and characterise them as effeminate objects. As Cohn, Hill and Ruddick (2005) wrote, the using of masculine propaganda, such as ‘We had to prove that we are not eunuchs’ and ‘Made with Viagra’, are frequently used when India exploded five nuclear devices in May 1998. Maruska (2010) stated that the U.S.–led ‘war on terror’ after the 9/11 bombing, was a desire to establish a hyper-masculine image of George H. Bush and the United States.

#### The topic’s proposal of cooperation among the NATO allies positions the “great powers” as a genderless-agents, obfuscating the state as a site of gendered performativity creating a situation of masculine powers vs masculine powers while those who don’t have a nuclear arsenal are left on the side lines to obey and be the “submissive” citizen to the nuclear overlords.

Wadley, 2010. (Jonathan, PhD in IR from Florida and currently professor of IR and sexual politics at San Diego. “Gendering the State: Performativity and Protection in International Security,” in *Gender and International Security* edited by Laura Sjoberg, pp. 40-41 - spp)

The analysis presented here challenges the discipline’s tendency to treat states as genderless persons by exploring the role of gender in the security performances of states. In doing so, it draws upon the concept of performativity – the idea that, in the words of Judith Butler, “identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expression’ that are said to be its results.” It argues that performances within the field of security, much like performances within the daily lives of people, carry no intrinsic meaning, but must be made sense of through “a system of symbolic meaning” that cannot be but gendered. Through such performances, identities become salient, and masculine and feminine subjects are created. While this process is less palpable for states than it is for humans, it is nonetheless observable in broad patterns. States can be observed reifying themselves through performances of security, particularly through those which establish them as stable and masculine protectors. Recent work on the politics of protection, particularly that done by Didier Bigo, suggests the constitutive effects that protection has upon both providers and recipients. It stops short, however, of recognizing that these effects may be enabled by the gendered meaning that different forms of protection carry. When such meanings are considered, it becomes evident that by “being” masculine protectors, states can position themselves favorably in relation to other international actors and gain legitimacy from their domestic audiences. This means that states are gendered, and are gendered in much the same way as people are: through repeated performances. When state identity is viewed in this light, the anthropomorphic assumption, as it is commonly used, appears woefully inadequate. To be clear, it is not being suggested that drawing parallels between human subjects and state subjects is bad in-and-of-itself. Indeed, useful parallels can be drawn, despite (or, perhaps, because of) the notion that “both states and persons are fuzzy sets.” The trouble lies in assuming that states, or people, are constituted outside processes of interaction, and that either can be made sense of without considering the relational identities they take on through the systems of symbolic meaning through which they operate. Anthropomorphic assumptions tend to treat the state as a genderless, unitary actor – often, one that is ontologically primitive to its interactions – while neglecting the ways that the “actor-ness” and “unity” of the state are an effect of iterated, gendered performances, particularly in the realm of security. By viewing security performances with an eye toward their constitutive effects, and by moving gender to the center of that analysis, one gains not only a richer understanding of how states reproduce themselves (i.e. where their person-like “identities” come from), but a clearer picture of the hierarchical relations that exist among states and between states and domestic populations. This chapter begins with a consideration of how the state has been conceived of a person throughout the discipline, arguing that such practices almost always import an inadequate understanding of how people are constituted. In both cases, conceptualizing states and conceptualizing humans – this is a result, largely, of substance-oriented, as opposed to process-oriented, approaches. It argues that by making processes, rather than substances, the core of research, scholars will be able to more fully explain how states reproduce themselves as actors in world politics, how they garner power for themselves (in relation to other international actors, particularly states), and how they gain legitimacy from their subjects. Following that, the chapter argues that a theory of performativity can fill this need, especially in the realm of Security Studies. Moreover, such a theory would facilitate the study of gender within these processes and shed light on the incentives states have to behave as masculine actors. The final section of the chapter offers, tentatively, a way for empirical research to bear on the theoretical sketches presented here. It submits that “the rational protector model” may be examined as a type of dominant masculinity for states, one which allows them to “do” security ways that cast them as unitary, masculine actors.

#### Gender is the core concept of the protection racket – the idea of “saving women from men” is the justification of the violence. This is why masculine qualities are to have hypermilitarized compounds that are ready to fight and “save” the feminized subjects. There is no problem, they were the ones who are insecure about other nations and want to perfect them by securing them.

Peterson 07 Peterson, V. S. (2007). THINKING THROUGH INTERSECTIONALITY AND WAR. Race, Gender & Class, 14(3), 10-27. Retrieved from ttp://search.proquest.com/docview/218850466?accountid=14709 rishi

INTERSECTIONALITY AND "FEMINIZATION AS DEVALORIZATION" For a variety of reasons elaborated elsewhere (Peterson, 2005), I find the theory/practice emerging from feminist and critical race scholarship particularly fruitful for analyzing intersectionality. On the one hand, feminisms have transdisciplinary and complex analytical resources for investigating and theorizing about identity, difference, and structural hierarchies. On the other hand, differences among women have forced feminists (too often reluctantly and always uncomfortably) to reflect critically on the meaning of feminism, operations of power among women, the politics of representation, and the dangers of overgeneralizing. As one consequence, feminist scholarship has contributed to a richer understanding of analytics and politics, or theory and practice, as interdependent. Key to this development is understanding gender as both an empirical and analytical category. The former refers to the embodied and ostensibly biological binary of male-female sex difference. Understood empirically, gender can be deployed as a variable to investigate, for example, how women and men are differently affected by, and differently participate in, political and economic practices. This is the more familiar use of gender in contemporary research, especially in the social sciences. Analytical gender is less familiar; it refers to the signifying system of masculine-feminine differentiations that constitutes a governing code. The claim here is that gender pervades language and culture, systemically shaping not only who we are but how we think and what we do. As historically constituted, the dichotomy of gender codes masculine qualities as oppositional to and more highly valued than feminine qualities. Understanding gender analytically then generates a crucial and transformative feminist insight: the (symbolic, discursive) cultural privileging of that which is identified with masculinity is key to naturalizing the (symbolic, discursive, cultural, corporeal, material, economic) power relations that constitute multiple forms of subjection. This knowledge allows for more adequately theorizing, and hence politicizing, intersectionality. More specifically, feminist research documents the contingent and historical "normalization" of gender as a systemic code valorizing that which is characterized and privileged as masculine (reason, agency, control, objectivity, etc.) at the expense of that which is stigmatized as feminine (emotion, passivity, uncertainty, subjectivity, etc.). Two points are key. First, gender is relational, so that privileging who and what is masculinized is inextricable from devaluing who and what is feminized. Recognizing the interdependence of masculinity and femininity-one "requires" the other-provides particular analytical leverage. It displaces the prevailing tendency to think gender is primarily about women, insisting instead that gender necessarily and invariably involves masculinity as much as femininity. Similarly, it reminds us that gender is systemic, so that manifestations of gender are less individual "choices" than effects of codes, institutionalized norms, and rules. second, the privileging of masculinity does not privilege all men or only men. The claim is rather that gender-with its lauded masculinity and denigrated femininity-pervades language and culture and devalorizes all feminized statuses, including those occupied by subordinated men. Romanticism notwithstanding, the more an individual or a social category is feminized, the more likely (not invariably) that its devaluation is assumed, or presumed to be "explained." In short, diverse hierarchies are linked and ideologically "naturalized" by feminizing those who are subordinated. I understand this insight as key to advancing intersectional analysis. The insight involves several interactive "moves." In one sense, casting the subordinated as feminine devalorizes not only the empirical gender category of women but also sexually, racially, culturally, and economically marginalized men (e.g., "lazy migrants," 'primitive natives," "effeminate gays"). Underpinning this claim is the observation that, while structural hierarchies vary by reference to the "difference" emphasized and modalities of power involved, they typically share a common feature: the denigration of feminized qualities attributed to those who are subordinated (lacking reason, agency, control, etc.). Invoking the "natural" inferiority of the feminine plays a powerful, though not exhaustive, role in legitimating these hierarchies. In a second sense, and understanding gender analytically, not only subjects (women and marginalized men), but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, "ways of knowing," cultural expressions (art, music), roles, practices, work, and nature, etc., can be feminized-with the effect of reducing their legitimacy, status, and value. Importantly, this devalorization is simultaneously ideological (discursive, cultural) and material (structural, economic). Consider how "women's work"-whether done by women or marginalized men-is typically under paid, or frequently not paid at all; and we hardly notice, in part because the depreciation of feminized activities is so taken for granted. This devalorization normalizes-with the effect of "legitimating"-the marginalization, subordination, and exploitation of feminized practices and persons. Oppressions differ, as do attempts to explain and/or justify them. As Wendy Brown (1997:86-7) states, "not simply the content but the modalities of power producing gender, race, or caste are specific to each production," even though "these powers of subject formation are not separable in the subject itself." Because oppressions take various structural forms, feminization is not the only "normalizing" ideology in operation. I argue, however, that what distinguishes feminization and renders it so ideologically powerful is the unique extent to which it invokes a deeply internalized and naturalized binary-the essentialized concept of sex difference-which is then "available" to naturalize diverse forms of structural oppression. This warrants clarification. Even as sex and gender are increasingly ambiguous to some, most people most of the time take a categorical, essentialized distinction between male and female completely for granted: as biologically "given," reproductively necessary, and psycho-socially "obvious." Yet constructionists argue not only that sex difference itself is produced-through contingent, historical practices and institutionalizations-but also that sex difference as an essentialized binary and masculinism as a system of asymmetrical power are co-constituted. In other words, the deeply sedimented concept of sex difference and historically institutionalized practices of gender hierarchy are mutually constituted. As one effect, the "naturalness" of sex difference is generalized to the "naturalness" of masculine (not necessarily male) privilege, so that both aspects come to be taken-for-granted "givens" of social life. The given cultural code of reason, control, agency, etc., as masculine, and irrationality, weakness, passivity, etc., as feminine is then ideologically available for legitimating other forms of domination as well. Common sense becomes a two-pronged justification of hierarchy. On the one hand, subordinated individuals or groups are devalorized by feminization; depictions range from lack of capacity and being weak or irrational, to being offensive or posing a danger. On the other hand, responding appropriately to such individuals or groups "requires" masculinized practices; these range from patronizing and protectionist behaviors to disciplinary measures and violent coercion. In short, not only are the subordinated devalorized by feminization, but the qualities they "lack" are typically just what the dominating (masculinized) group has to offer, or is "compelled" to practice. This conveniently justifies both the "necessity" of rule and who should rule. The common sense of privileging the masculine and devaluing the feminine is culturally and collectively internalized to such an extent that we are all variously complicit in its reproduction. And it is also implicitly and explicitly manipulated to reproduce inequalities as if this were natural and inevitable, thus making critique and resistance difficult. In short, devalorizing the feminine produces even as it obscures vast inequalities of power, authority, and resource distribution. Exposing how this power operates must be one objective of a critical political agenda. With these points in mind, I argue that the transformative potential of feminist critique lies in exposing and subverting all hierarchies that rely on denigration of "the feminine" to normalize and depoliticize subjection. I am not arguing that gender hierarchy is the "primary" oppression overshadowing race or class or sexuality. The point is rather that gender hierarchy and its elevation of "masculinity" is a historically contingent structural feature of social relations, that the subordination of women is not reducible to other structural oppressions (or vice versa), and that the dichotomy of gender underpins-as the denigration of the feminine naturalizes-hierarchies of gender, class, race, sexualities and geopolitical "difference." Because forms of subjection differ structurally, systematic and comparative analyses of RGCS require attention to "different histories, different mechanisms and sites of power, different discursive formations, different regulatory schemes" (Brown, 1997:86). In this essay, however, my focus is less on the production of subjection than exposing the political work that collective and internalized gender coding does across multiple forms of subjection. I am not presuming that sexist oppression is the most salient or powerful hierarchy in any particular context; I am arguing that investigating feminization as devalorization allows a broader understanding of how racial, sexual, class, and other oppressions are naturalized and provides us with greater analytical/political leverage. While this is only one among a number of critical insights to be expanded and applied,31 consider it a particularly productive vantage point, and especially in relation to militarization and war.INTERSECTIONALITY IN MILITARIZATION AND WARS In a recent volume, Hunt and Rygiel (2006:3) develop the concept of "(en)gendering" war to "disrupt and make visible the masculinized,militarized, racialized, sexualized, and classed dynamics through which war operates." They argue that official "war stories" do political work: they camouflage interests, agendas and politics that underpin war for the purpose of legitimating and gaining support for militarization. A crucial aspect of their effectiveness is the extent to which they depend on gendered ideologies (masculinization and feminization) that are naturalized and therefore go "unnoticed" (2006:5). By going unnoticed ideologies are depoliticized even as the identities and practices they mobilize profoundly affect politics. In the remainder of the paper I use triad analytics to explore how feminization accomplishes typically unnoticed political work in war stories. In other words, how does the valorization of masculinized identities, ideologies, and actions operate in contexts of militarism and war? The most familiar theme in war stories involves constructing the "enemy" as "other": to distinguish "us" from "them," render "others" in some sense inferior, and thereby justify war's violence against "them." The specifics of othering vary by history and context, but invariably involve some form of objectification so that "they" become objects to which norms of respect and non-violation need not be extended. Historical othering ranges from early Greeks characterizing Persians as effeminate, to Christians casting non-believers as immoral, to Europeans depicting "natives" as uncivilized. Thinking through how othering occurs in nationalist, colonial, and contemporary war stories reveals gendered identity investments and ideologies in operation. Critics of European imperialism have produced a wealth of research documenting the manipulation of ideologies to justify colonial wars and obscure their racist, economic, and heteronormative dynamics (Said, 1979; 1993; Spivak, 1987;Chatterjee, 1989; Stoler, 1991;McClintock, 1995). What surface repeatedly are characterizations of the colonized as feminine: weak, passive, irrational, disorderly, unpredictable, lacking self-control, economically and politically incompetent. European power-wielders (not only men or all men) could then justify military interventions by casting themselves in favorable masculinist terms: as uniquely rational, sexually and morally respectable, and more advanced economically and politically. In colonial wars and geopolitical maneuvering, "civilization" became a code word for European superiority, and the identity of "Europeans" was valorized. Through this lens, military interventions were perhaps a regrettable but nonetheless a necessary component of "enlightening" and "civilizing" primitive, unruly (feminized) "others." As Eisenstein (2004:75) observes, while they extolled the virtues of reason as a progressive force, Europeans positioned rationality "against savagery (natives), emotionality (women), and sexuality (racialized others)." At the same time-and complicating simplistic models of gender-the development of European nationalisms and normalization of bourgeois respectability produced an idealized model of femininity, pure, dutiful, maternal. This superficial valorization of femininity is contradicted by the practices it invoked. Women were expected to think and act in feminine ways, and to feel good about their feminine identity. But romanticizing the "maternal feminine" did less to empower women than render them perpetual dependents. Feminine virtue and morality were best assured by confining these qualities-and (bourgeois) women-to a private sphere of domesticity and assigning men the public sphere responsibility of defending and protecting feminized dependents. Rather than empowering European women, the idealization of bourgeois (heteronormative) femininity became a tool for disempowering non-European men. The patronizing and protectionist logic of bourgeois norms provided imperial governments a moral, as well as rational, justification for militarized colonization. In this war story, the barbarity of "other" men was proven by their (allegedly) oppressive treatment of women, and this demanded the rescue of victimized females by honorable, civilized men. In short, the protection of idealized femininity (to paraphrase Spivak's (1987) apt analysis) justified wars by white men to "save" brown women from brown men. The crusading rhetoric and protectionist logic obscured colonial government agendas, and it resurfaces with particular vengeance and new complexities in contemporary militarism and war.4 The US-led "war on terror" exemplifies how the triad of identity investments, ideological commitments, and militarized practices interact. Some argue that George W. Bush's "forceful" response to the 9/11 bombings involved not only his outrage and claim to military leadership, but also his desire to establish a hypermasculine image of himself and the United States. It is well-known that Bush had personal reasons for enhancing his militarist (manly) identity. He had avoided serving in Vietnam, was invested in the image of being a "guy's guy," and arguably hoped to redeem his father's failure to oust Saddam in the first Gulf War. For many Americans, the identity and power of the US had been feminized by its defeat in Vietnam, made more humiliating by losing to a people stereotyped as ethnically/racially inferior. Feminization anxiety was also fueled by the increasing visibility of women in politics and the workplace and the growing strength of LGBT political movements. A yearning to remasculinize the nation ( Jeffords 1989) was already present and readily tapped by Bush and his advisors as the nation responded to 9/11 and its spectacular demonstration of US vulnerability to "penetration" by foreign men. The war story the Bush administration immediately cultivated featured fanatical terrorists inexplicably committed to destroying freedom, democracy, and (implicitly Western) civilization by any means. Enemies this irrational and unpredictable could only be defeated by drawing an absolute line between "good" and "evil" and adopting the strongest possible measures to eliminate those deemed evil. Feminization operates here to construct enemies as so absolutely different from "us" that the only viable strategy is their annihilation. Those who were fearful, skeptical, or who actively opposed Bush's strategies were rendered unequivocally suspect-unpatriotic, anti-American, naively (irrationally) out-of-touch, or quite simply unmanly (lacking the guts to do what must be done). In this instance, feminization operates to deny absolutely the rationality of dissenters or any cogent reasons for critique. It also denied any positive identification with dissent or resistance. Dissenters are simply and irredeemably discredited: unwilling to stand up for their country, ungratefully abandoning the US and free-loading on its military power, and/or failing to grasp "real world politics." Those seeking debate and diplomacy were feminized-cast as behaving like cowardly women and undermining US interests by wimping out of military action. In effect, dissidents become a less stark but ultimately an equally threatening enemy: "If you're not with us you're against us." And as enemies, those who are against us lose any claim to inclusion, respect or (apparently) rights. There is yet another angle to 'notice.' Bush used the logic of crusading protectionism to justify his warring agenda and disable feminist critiques.5 Like earlier imperial powers, as it embarked on its post-9/11 military actions, the US claimed to be liberating women of Afghanistan and Iraq: rescuing "other" women from the "barbaric" conditions of their subjection to the Taliban and Islamic fundamentalists. Zine (2007:34) captures succinctly the political work of this war story: "the archetypal image of the deprived and debased Muslim woman was resurrected to perform her duty as a signifier of the abject difference of Muslims; the barbarity and anti-modernism of Islam and its essential repression of women; and most importantly as camouflage for US military interventions." These were not the only "official" stories told to justify the "war on terror." But the political -work that they did was crucial. They constructed an "enemy" who was unpredictable, religiously (irrationally) motivated, indiscriminately violent, and bent on destroying (Western) civilization. This foreclosed any "reasoned" engagement and legitimated a strategy of annihilation. In conjunction with other factors and forces, these stories worked to build a modicum of "consent" and a modest "coalition of the willing" that enabled the US to proceed with its war and claim it was not acting unilaterally. These stories rendered critique and opposition not just suspect but dangerously treasonous and capable of imperiling the project of saving civilization. Through variously feminizing diverse sets of actors, the Bush administration's war stories undercut dissent and legitimated extremes of surveillance and containment, quickly implemented against those the ruling regime deemed suspect. In short, these official war stories worked powerfully to justify the "war on terror" and gain at least the appearance of consent. The US government and its coalition partners invaded Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq. Investments in gendered identities and commitments to masculinist ideologies mattered for initiating the "war on terror," and they also matter within processes of militarization. Militaries, of course, are quintessential sites of hypermasculinity. Success in war is presumed to demand a constellation of qualities long considered the exclusive province of men: superior physical strength, incomparable male bonding, heroic risk-taking, extremes of violence, and readiness to sacrifice one's life for the cause. Historically, military service afforded decisive proof of manhood and constituted a claim to citizenship. The valorized identities and ideals of military service continue to fuel recruitment and enlistment activities, with the increasingly crucial addition of economic incentives. Masculinist qualities remain key to military life but are complicated in today's services by a variety of differences among men (by ethnicity, race, religion, class, skills) as well as by the inclusion of women. Within militaries, multiple masculinities and their emotional investments are differently mobilized in pursuit of warring objectives.6 More physically powerful and hypermasculine men are valued but subordinated to orders from above; commanding officers, with their presumed leadership competence, enjoy higher prestige and less ambivalent valorization. Increasing reliance on advanced technologies prompts new masculinities. While desk jobs that distance soldiers from the battle front were previously feminized, computer specialists and high-tech operators today are increasingly valorized (Blanchard, 2003). If we consider the education and training required for these positions, classed and raced dimensions of masculinities come into view. Indeed, the techno-war paradigm of the US military presents a new version of western superiority: high tech sophistication, efficiency, and "awesome" power. Intersectional analysis is particularly complicated by the increasing numbers of women in military service, who face conflicting expectations and manipulations of their femininity, masculinity, and sexuality.7 The effects of women's inclusion are variously interpreted, with no easy conclusions. Some analysts argue that women's presence humanizes and democratizes militaries-perhaps even rendering them less masculinist. Others are less optimistic. Given traditional expectations of virile, aggressive hypermasculinity, militaries are treacherous places for anyone who is feminized. Women especially-but not exclusively-are at risk. Through a triadic lens, however much female soldiers struggle to "prove" and sustain their identification as sufficiently masculine, ideologies of male supremacy and practices of sexual violence undermine their efforts. Lack of structural equality (and respect) between men and women in everyday life, enduring stereotypes of female dependence and physical inferiority, the embodiment of sex difference (menstruation, pregnancy), and the objectification of women as sexual targets interact to pose multiple threats to military women.8 These are in addition to the dangers they face as soldiers in war zones. Whether or not the presence of women humanizes militaries, the presumed femininity of women soldiers (contradicting the masculinism demanded of them) is variously manipulated in support of military objectives. The US-led "Operation Iraqi Freedom" provides stunning examples of how the femininity, masculinity, and sexuality of female soldiers can be mobilized. The images from these war stories are familiar, but the gender, racial, and geopolitical politics underpinning them have largely gone unnoticed in public discourse. For instance, soon after the invasion of Iraq, the March 2003 capture of US Army Private Jessica Lynch and her subsequent rescue was a major media event. While initial reports praised her soldiering in the face of enemy fire, these were quickly overshadowed by feminizing her plight: a white woman subject to "rape by Arab men" had to be spectacularly rescued. The story worked to reproduce the virtue and vulnerability of (white) womanhood, the demonization of Iraqi men, and the heroic efforts of US Special Forces to "save" her from presumed abuse. Equally important, the story also served Bush's military agenda by diverting attention from the increasingly visible Iraqi resistance, the flaws in US policy and preparedness, and the larger questions these raised. When accounts of abuse, rape, and torture of prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison surfaced in late 2003, European and American audiences especially were "shocked" by the photos that were broadcast worldwide. There was the shock of viewing graphic abuse and the shame of coalition ("civilized") soldiers as perpetrators. But most disturbing were photos of American women torturing Arab men. The official war story blamed "a few bad apples," thus avoiding more critical interrogation of behaviors cultivated by militarism, valorized masculinism, and deteriorating security conditions in Iraq. Blaming the few was apparently persuasive to many in the US, where identification as the "good guys" carries deep emotional investments and encourages collective amnesia about US racism and military atrocities. The initial outrage and political furor were quickly eclipsed by the (Western) media's focus not on the implications of torture and the reality of failing military policies, but on the sensational photos. These were both an easier story to "sell" and could serve multiple purposes. Several points warrant our notice. Fascination with the photos derived from many sources and tapped feelings of both repulsion and attraction. The pictures recalled images of Nazi concentration camps for some, and white voyeurism at racial lynchings for others. Even as they depicted abuse, the sexualized poses also eroticized domination. Goldstein (in Brittain, 2006) observes that viewing a pyramid of exposed buttocks invited homoerotic arousal, while the presence of a grinning woman allayed any homosexual anxiety about that arousal. As critiques of US policies and calls for secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's resignation intensified, the media focus shifted. At least 1600 photos were made available for Congressional screening. Presumably there were more numerous images of men abusing men, yet these were displaced by a few photos featuring Lynndie England-a (white) woman-sexually humiliating (brown) men. England quickly became the focal point of condemnation. Details of England's personal life (early divorce, out-of-wedlock pregnancy, romance with an accused wife-beater) effectively constructed her as a very "improper" woman who appeared to revel in doing "improper" things (Brittain, 2006:88). For critics of the US, the Abu Ghraib photos, and especially those of England, confirmed the moral hypocrisy of American righteousness. The US-not alone but most blatantly-was prosecuting a deadly war in the absence of (rational?) foresight and planning, and on the basis of "faulty intelligence" that was increasingly exposed as willful misrepresentations. It was snubbing its nose at (civilized?) international law and human rights conventions, while claiming moral superiority and a crusading protectionist commitment to freedom and democracy. And the arrogance displayed in the photos was demoralizing to all who identified with the Islamic faith and/or sympathized with embattled Iraqis. The damage to US credibility and national interests-including the security of its soldiers and the safety of its homeland-was inestimable. Some feared, others hoped, that the scandal of Abu Ghraib would bring down the Bush administration and prompt a reassessment of the war in Iraq. Instead, Bush staunchly defended Rumsfeld, the war raged on, and the President was re-elected in November. Without denying the enormous complexity of how this transpired, I want to insist that we "notice" the media's complicity and what the official war stories obscured. The most telling point is the timing of these stories and hence their political effects. The shift to sensationalist Abu Ghraib abuse photos and their feminized depravity diverted attention from the implications of the US government's expanding detention activities, engaging in torture, and disregarding international conventions. Pornographic images of a "bad girl" did the political work of side-lining the issue of rights and suppressing debate about the war's objectives and operational practices. A second point is how the gendered and racialized messages in the images camouflaged neo-imperialist interests. Casting England as the ultimate "bad apple" positioned her as the problem, rather than the predominately male power wielders and the policies of the US government. England and a very few others paid with demotions and prison sentences while Bush and his regime escaped blame and accountability. Spoiled femininity took the rap for imperial masculinity. We might also notice how casting England as the depraved figure of femininity avoided all interrogation of privileged (white)masculinity and its arguably "depraved" history of violence. The most obvious examples include racial lynchings, torture and death of detainees, rape as a weapon of war, fire bombings, nuclear weapons, environmental warfare, use of land mines, and the indiscriminate maiming and killing of civilians. In addition, the England story completely diverted attention from the violence cultivated within militaries by hypermasculinist norms-violence which is practiced not only against external enemies but against all who are feminized, including service women themselves. Major media rarely turn their notice to the repetitive incidents of sexual harassment, rape and other forms of violence against women (and gays) in US military organizations. These incidents are now extensively documented, though the accused are rarely prosecuted and-like detention and torture practices-even more rarely punished. Finally, and in spite of the incalculable damage done to individual lives and American reputation by the abuses at Abu Ghraib, the official war stories focused attention in ways that still managed to serve an imperialist agenda: "The images of Arab men being broken, subdued, shamed, and disciplined by a white woman allow for the realization of the 'American dream' of the total demasculinization and humiliation of Arab men" (Brittain, 2006:89), assuring the American public that "they are still on 'top' in terms of their ability to inflict sexual humiliation and violence on the Iraqi enemy" (Brittain, 2006:91). INTERSECTIONALITIES OF MASCULINISM, MILITARISM, AND IMPERIALISM I introduced triad analytics as a tool for improving our analyses of social relations, arguing that emotional investments and cultural productions are inextricable from material practices. I used this framing to explore RGC and S in contexts of militarism and war, and to demonstrate how feminization devalorizes. To conclude, I review how gendered identities, ideologies, and activities are mutually constituted and operate to normalize domination and violence. No one escapes gender socialization and its historically sedimented norms of heterosexism. We cannot help but be invested in identities that our culture deems appropriate, "necessary," and worthy of esteem. While we are not locked into unchanging or monological scripts, following paths of least resistance is easier than not conforming-much less actively criticizing "the way things are." Because the naturalized "given" of binary sex difference is coded into gender identities and ideologies, it gives the status quo inordinate power to obstruct critique and transformation. Females are typically cast as, and socialized into, subjectivities and roles that feature dependence, accommodation, lack of personal autonomy and power, and "consent" to male domination. The effects of conformity "invite" ideologies of protection, if not contempt. Women who defy the stereotypes are deemed suspect, social problems and "unnatural" (African American "matriarchs," "antifamily" career women, "man-hating" feminists, "depraved" torturers). Males are no less-and in important respects, more abusively-socialized into subjectivities and roles that feature aggression, being "in control" (emotionally, physically, politically, economically), and denying anxiety, ambivalence, and vulnerability. Conforming to gender expectations costs men-and women and societies-dearly. As "compensation," men are accorded a sense of entitlement: to autonomy, power, and sexual access. Objectified and subordinate "others" may require protection but are also "at the disposal" of their superiors. This is the central dilemma constituted by gendering: the specific qualities of (weak, agentless) femininity "demand" a corollary exercise of (powerful, entitled) masculinity (see Stiehm, 1982; Brown, 1992; and Young, 2003). Not surprisingly, most men attempt to comply, often at high personal cost. Because the edifice of masculinity is a mythic construction, the pressure to "prove" one's manhood is relentless. However much individual males struggle to sustain their identification as sufficiently masculine, it is perpetually subject to challenge. One can be "unmanned" (feminized) by any evidence, or worse yet, simply the accusation of "gayness," weakness, or lack of control. Potential failure, and the despised vulnerability it invokes, is ever present. This is true for all masculinities, no matter race or class. This relentless pressure is particularly acute on the stage of political and military power. The stakes are high, especially in the context of impending or ongoing war. Leaders and soldiers respond accordingly-with displays of hypermasculinism: President Bush "must" prove himself and US invincibility, civilized nations "must" assert cultural superiority, soldiers "must" torture to secure intelligence, suspect others "must" be detained, civilians "must" be patriotic, critics "must" be silenced, deeper questions "must" be postponed. Official war stories not only camouflage the agenda of power-wielders during war; they also obscure the reproduction of hierarchies in everyday life. Their tacit (and sometimes explicit) manipulation of gender coding does the political work of normalizing, hence, depoliticizing how gender operates to perpetuate inequalities and the violence that attends them. The core dilemma of gender plays throughout: constructing women and feminized others in ways that demand masculinized identities and action. This is so taken for granted that alternative-to say nothing of structurally "equal"-arrangements are rendered unthinkable. In the "war on terror," gender coding reproduces feminized others who must be protected, controlled, detained, or eliminated by masculinized agents of ruling states. Like advocates of neoliberal capitalism are forever telling us: "there is no alternative." The systemic effects constitute a triadic tragedy of global proportions: hypermasculinized identity investments, arrogant ideological claims, and excessive-arguably depraved-military practices. Critics of imperialism have exposed how the idealization of (Western) femininity has been manipulated to justify western wars to "save" "other" women. Understanding feminization as devalorization affords an additional insight: that marginalized men more generally are subject to this crusading and protectionist "logic"-in colonial wars to "modernize" gender relations, nationalist wars to promote idealized families, invasions to "liberate" oppressed groups, wars on terror to eliminate the "irrational religious," wars on poverty that demoralize the (racialized) underclass, and battles against HIV/AIDs that demonize gay men. In sum, official war stories not only camouflage political agendas but also suppress critical thinking about institutionalized racism, sexism, classism, and homophobia. By obscuring the reciprocal constitution of valorized masculinity and vilified femininity these stories avoid critique of gender itself, with the effect of reproducing multiple forms of subjection and violence. My "thinking through" intersectionality tells a different story. It too is limited by its perspective, commitments, erasures, and generalizations. Framed by triad analytics, my story casts emotional commitments, cultural productions, and material practices as mutually constitutive. It foregrounds investments in gendered identities and gender ideologies not to privilege them but to explore how militarism and war-making depend on them. I do not claim that mine is the "superior" story though I believe it is an urgent one. I do claim that gender matters, and especially for "thinking through" militarism and war. More pointedly, I am arguing that we can neither adequately analyze violence, nor effectively advance intersectional analyses, if we ignore how feminization devalorizes.

#### Emerging technology is only meant to bolster Hegemony. That increases the likelihood of conflict, and justifies sustained structural violence that outweighs the small risk of great power war. The US and the “enemy” will strut their nuclear arsenal until violence finally occurs and collapses humanity.

Sjoberg, 2010 (Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science at U Florida, PhD in IR and Gender Studies and a law degree specializing in IR. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” in Gender and International Security edited by Sjoberg, p. 90-93 - spp)

Feminist evaluations of power transition hypotheses A feminist analysis of PTT needs to reformulate the PTT hypotheses. This section applies the feminist critiques of the mechanism (power), the object (great states), and the variables (power parity and dissatisfaction) that PTT uses to explain international conflict to the reformulation of the major PTT hypotheses. It posits alternative explanations and alternative possible solutions and futures (Table 5.1). Relative position, state hegemonic masculinity, and bellicosity: Power transition theorists found that "occupation of a high position in the international hierarchy is associated with war involvement, irrespective of other attributes (ideology, etc.) of the state occupying that position. "88 Even if those states at the top of the international hierarchy are more likely to be involved in wars, 89 feminists question the assumption that this is because nations with the capacity to fight wars are necessarily more likely to fight. Feminist reformulation (R1) (see Table 5.1) posits that the content and salience of a state's hegemonic masculinity will be a factor in its bellicosity. The feminist argument is that the more competitive a state's hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war; this risk is compounded by high salience. In World War II Germany, a competitive form of masculinity was very salient. George Mosse's study of the ideal German man90 in the 1930s reveals him as: Tall and muscular, he has no fat on his body and no hair anywhere but on his head. His broad, contoured shoulders narrow to a thin waist. He has a fine colorless chiseled face with a strong prominent square jaw. He is the flawless man . . . , not only did he embody the older aristocratic vlues of bravery, courage, and chivarly, but mirroring bourgeois values, he was also disciplined, orderly, and restrained ... The perfect man, therefore, was committed to sacrifice and heroism, in other words, soldierly values that put the nation ahead of the individual.91 This German masculinity "increasingly came to be linked to ideas about nationalism."92 This idea of masculinity became increasingly salient as "the nationalist press often portrayed Jewish men as the exact opposite of the manly ideal in looks and behavior ... jittery, restless, greedy, selfish, and ... ugly-nearly deformed."93 In the 1930s, "German fascists ... took the notion of masculinity to its awful, ghastly, and seemingly logical extreme."94 Perhaps this can be contrasted with the case of a rising China. Kam Louie, a scholar of Chinese masculinities, explains' that while “Western stereotypes of the 'real man' have described the Occidental male as forming his notion of male-self within images of toughness, courageousness, and decisiveness, ... in the Chinese case, the cerebral male model tends to dominate the macho, brawny male."95 The Communist Revolution in China has further demilitarized Chinese masculinity, since, while "the core meaning of wen-wu still revolves around cultural attainment and martial valour ... [ideal-types of masculinity have been shaped by] Communist insistence that able-bodied citizens work [which] ... has generated idealized images of workers and peasants" rather than soldiers98 Louie suggests that the current Chinese hegemonic masculinity is less aggressive and militaristic, and that it is both more open and less salient now than it has been previously.99 Given these two examples, the feminist reformulation (R 1) would expect bellicosity from 1930s Germany rather than contemporary China. The same empirical evidence that PTT uses could instead support a feminist argument that Germany's level of interest in aggressive masculinity made Germany a belligerent state, and that a dissatisfied China would have less interest in war than the 1930s Germany. A feminist reinterpretation would expect that Germans’ hypercompetitive hegemonic masculinity in the 1930s would motivate German leaders and citizens to try to subordinate other masculinities, while the Chinese government, following their more cerebral hegemonic masculinity, would place less priority on competition with other states.\ Hegemony and Peace: PTT claims that the greater and more stable the concentration of power, the more peaceful that system will be. PIT associates peace with the absence of armed conflict between great powers. As such, the world can still be "at peace" if dozens of civil wars are going on in countries outside of the class of "great powers." The dominant/challenger dichotomy means that PTT ignores all but the most powerful states. Instead of limiting the discourse on security to the concerns of the dominant global power and the (few or even only one) challenger(s), feminists pay attention to the entire global political community. The PTT understanding of "peace" obscures terrible atrocities and conceals a crucial and contradictory effect of the concentration of power in the international arena. Feminist work has consistently shown that, as the powerful wield more power, the weak feel more pressure. This pressure is manifested not only in the form of interstate war, but also in civil war and structural violence. Feminists' interrogation of state centrism suggests that lack of war between great states does not automatically create peace within them, and that the marginalized citizens of great states should be a topic of concern in global politics. Feminists' interest in gender subordination shows that women's security and their lives are constantly at risk. As such, the feminist reformulation (R2) predicts that concentrated power is a net negative, empirically, normatively, and epistemologically. Empirically, it is likely to increase international conflicts and internal unrest outside of the center of power, and to draw attention away from the world's worst humanitarian disasters. As Ann Tickner notes, much of the violence in the world is outside of great power war and, as theorists, "we in the west can no longer afford to privilege a tradition of scholarship that focuses on the concerns and ambitions of great powers." Feminists reject the dominance of the strong over the weak as a mechanism of control in favor of empathy and connectedness. Epistemologically, feminists note different social experience produces different knowledges. A theory of international security that excludes most people also leaves out important knowledge. An empathetic approach might increase the inclusiveness of knowledge about global politics. These insights mean that a feminist perspective would draw attention to the security of the people on the margins rather than focusing on an improbable conflict between the US and China. Feminist insights suggest it is important to recognize that in a world where the US and China compete for dominance, more than four billion other people neither compete nor dominate. Decisions made by states with the preponderance of power-over reverberate around the world. If the US and China decided to fight a nuclear war, their decision would be felt around the world. Even less severe decisions by powerful states have wide-ranging impacts on individuals' lives. For example, the US government’s decision to condition continued military presence in South Korea on mandatory STD testing in Korean prostitution villages impacted the social and economic dynamic between Korean prostitutes. Neither the US nor China provides its poorest citizens adequate humanitarian aid to avoid death from starvation or preventable disease. Yet the US and China are the two biggest military spenders in the world. In real terms, the most marginalized citizens of each nation lose when strategic posturing inspires them to focus on military readiness. Feminists have documented how militarization of women's lives decreases freedoms and changes economic and social patterns.109 Because of the these threats, feminists problematize the assumption that entities called the US and China legitimately merit more consideration than the most marginal citizens within those states or the citizens of states that their dominance subordinates.

#### Thus, we advocate for vulnerability. Only a recognition and embodiment of vulnerability can reshape the manner in which we approach IR and foreign policy that does not replicate the hierarchical logic of the protection racket that dooms us to extinction. Vulnerability gives agency to the oppressed bodies – which allows for the destruction of hierarchal patriotism.

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” *Peacebuilding*, 7:2, 146-159, SPP)

As outlined above, early feminist peace and conflict researchers, such as Elise Boulding and Sara Ruddick, insisted on the importance of the relational body when studying peace. I also argued above that local turn scholarship is limited in its understanding of the everyday and mundane practices of peace. In my view, both the relational body and mundane practices require a more nuanced reading of power, governance and the vulnerabilities that practices of power produce, since the body is always both ‘active and acted upon’.35 In short, practices of governance that are targeted at the body also produce the body.36 Yet the fleshy living body also has agency, which makes it an ‘engaged body-subject’.37 In other words, the body is never a passive target of practices of governance: it also has a capacity to escape these practices.38 Eighty-year-old Kaisu told her story in a Finnish documentary film in 2010.39 She was among the Finnish women accused of having fraternised with German soldiers during the Second World War. She moved to Germany with the withdrawing German troops and was repatriated to Finland after the war. The following is my description of Kaisu’s narrative: VIGNETTE 2 Kaisu was among the women whose bodies were securitised and transferred to the camp immediately on their arrival on the Finnish soil. She calls it the ‘quarantine camp’ as if there had been something contagious in her body that needed purification. Hence medicalisation also takes hold of her body even in her most intimate memories. Her young body had been securitised and medicalised as it was seen to constitute the contagious risk of knowing too much. In the documentary, her body is stiff, but strong when she sits on the porch of the barracks, in which she thinks she was incarcerated sixty years ago. She is smoking a cigarette with a firm hand. Her body and her solemn voice convey her strength. Kaisu recalls how the Security Police had suspected her of being a German mole. She is very proud of the fact that she did not cry during the interrogations: ‘In front of Hautojärvi [the interrogation officer] I did not cry’. In the narrative, her resistance is not just geared towards the interrogation officer, but also towards the Finnish state, whose security apparatus suspected and humiliated her. In her upright body, she resists the forces that sought to silence her.40 When considering mundane peace, Judith Butler’s observation that one way of managing populations is to distribute vulnerability among people unequally is crucial.41 Biopower – power that is about managing the births, deaths, reproduction and illnesses of a population and which is ultimately utilised by the state ostensibly in the protection of life – establishes a norm that allows for measurement, evaluation and hierarchical ranking. As such, it constitutes a mechanism of control and distributes vulnerability and invulnerability among the population.42 In Kaisu’s case, her body was rendered vulnerable – shaped as that of an outcast – through the mechanisms of governance in the post-war Finnish national order. The vignette demonstrates that power is multiple and relational, as it establishes socio-historical relationships that render some bodies more vulnerable than others. Biopower increases efficiency and capacity at the level of individual bodies and whole populations, yet it also distributes vulnerability and invulnerability. This is particularly acute during times of economic, social and political transformation, such as peacebuilding and reconstruction, when social relations must be re-imagined and re-structured. Butler theorises peace and argues that peace is a way of indicating one’s dependency on others and being acknowledged. She not only theorises peace as individual vulnerability but says that it needs to be institutionalised: I think that peace is the active and difficult resistance to the temptation of war; it is the prerogative and the obligation of the injured. Peace is something that has to be vigilantly maintained; it is a vigilance, and it involves temptation, and it does not mean we as human beings are not aggressive. It does not mean that we do not have murderous impulses. This is a mistaken way of understanding non-violence. . . . Peace is a certain resistance to the terrible satisfactions of war. It’s a commitment to living with a certain kind of vulnerability to others and susceptibility to being wounded that actually gives our individual lives meaning. . . I think it needs to be institutionalised. It needs to be part of a community ethos. I think in fact it needs to be part of an entire foreign policy.43 For Butler, therefore, the recognition of vulnerability can lead to more adequate, peaceful responses to different forms of violence and can counter the tendency to react to violence with more violence.44 Alyson Cole has noted that Butler’s view on vulnerability paves the way to ‘nonviolent interaffectivity’.45 Vulnerability does not, in this view, imply weakness or inferiority; rather, it is a human condition, ‘a basic kind of openness to being affected and affecting in both positive and negative ways, which can take diverse forms in different social situations (for example, bodily, psychological, economic, emotional, and legal vulnerabilities)’, as Erin Gilson summarises Butler’s views.46 Understanding oneself as vulnerable involves an understanding of the self as shaped by its relationships to others, the world, power and its environs. This has, in my view, implications for the everyday, as our embodiment and vulnerability are embedded in the everyday – in its historicity, forms of power, materiality and concreteness. Vulnerability is not just a way of referring to the capacity to be wounded, however. It is also a ‘way of indicating one’s dependency on another, a set of institutions, or a circumambient world to be well, to be safe, to be acknowledged’, argues Butler, in the spirit of early feminist peace and conflict researchers’ work.47 While the vulnerable body is often thought to be private and non-political, when in contact with other bodies, the politics of vulnerability comes to the fore – firstly, in the form of the unequal distribution of vulnerabilities, and secondly, in the form of accountability, recognition and acknowledgement. In other words, the way in which vulnerability is recognised, accounted for, acknowledged and responded to is at the core of the political. ‘The political’ is hence an existential relation that we all live out, on a daily basis, in ways that create, re-produce, transcend and challenge differences, hierarchies, discriminations and vulnerabilities between subjectivities and political positions. Furthermore, vulnerable bodies are agentic, as receptivity, accountability and vulnerability are actually the presuppositions of agency, not its opposites.48 In short, vulnerability is enabling for our being in the world; that is, vulnerability is a ‘condition of potential that makes possible other conditions’, including peace. It can be argued that Kaisu’s bold appearance in the documentary film was a political event of claiming back her silenced body and evoking recognition of the existence of the bodies of her kind. Her vulnerable body thereby carried an agentic capacity capable of challenging the existing hierarchies, discriminations and differences. Although vulnerability can be seen as a shared human condition, it is lived and experienced in different ways, as well as distributed unequally, as argued above. The ways in which we live and are affected can be understood only in light of the particularity of embodied, social and mundane experiences. It is in this way that feminist and critical theorising of the body, the everyday and vulnerability open up new pathways to re-theorise peace. Peace is something that becomes expressed and takes place through acts and points of everyday contact between variously situated and variously vulnerable bodies – namely, in corporeal events where accountability, response-ability, recognition and acknowledgement emerge. The pluralistic and critical approaches indicated in my agenda are more sensitive to the changing patterns and dynamics of peace than many abstract, ontologically solid or violence-dependent approaches.

#### Our method of embodied politics is what sets the Framework for the topic and the debates that are to be had. WE control the fairness debate and the ground debate – The World of IR determines if ground is valuable or if it is not; this is why Afghanistan was fought to save the women from the men and costed several thousands of lives.

Vaittinen, 2018 (Tiina, Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Global Health and Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Finland. “Embodied In/Security as Care Needs,” a chapter published in Carol Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd & Laura Sjoberg (eds.) Routledge Handbook in Gender and Security, SPP)

In (neo)liberal political discourses, the ideal subject is an independent *homo oeconomicus,* that is, a masculine, disembodied being, who is self-sufficient and self-caring, while knowingly making rational, utilitarian, and abstracted ethical choices for the common good of all. The liberal subject is an invulnerable individual, or at least well secured against any risks in life. He is never ill; he does not leak of bodily fluids (because he seems not to have a body); and he never ages. Or, in case he does age, he does so actively and “successfully”, in ways that his body’s care needs would never gain control of *his* life: the life of a subjective, rational Self. Feminist social and political theory argues that these conceptions of political subjectivity are non-realistic: Such disembodied subjects simply do not exist (cf. Bacchi and Beasley 2002; Beattie and Schick 2013; Cohn 2014; Fineman 2008; Grosz 1994; Hoppania and Vaittinen 2015; Robinson 1999; 2011; Ruddick 1990; Shildrick 2002; 2012; Tronto 1993; Vaittinen 2015; forthcoming) While vulnerable embodiment is discursively associated merely with women, children, and the weak, the truth is that as human beings we all *are* bodies, and as such vulnerable, relational and dependent. As political subjects we are perhaps meant to “own” our bodies, to be in control of them and our lives. Yet, the bodies that our subjectivity inhabits may in fact both pre-exist and outlive the subjective “I”. We are intercorporeal: conceived, born, raised, and sustained by other bodies. We live \_and die \_in concrete relations with others. Thus, as opposed to being the self-caring ideal subjects of (neo)liberal politics, as bodies we are dependent, fleshy, and irrational. We are vulnerable, sometimes sick and dis/abled, every day in contact with our own bodily fluids  \_and frequently also with those of others. We are made of and sometimes governed by the fluids, bacteria and hormones that move within, without, and between our bodies (cf. Fishel 2015; Irni 2013; Preciado 2013). Our lives are inherently frail. We start ageing and decaying the moment we are born. In other words, the fact of embodiment makes the liberal understanding of subjectivity ultimately an illusion. Nevertheless, global politics and its security policies and practices continue to build on the liberal conceptions of life. In other words, the contemporary security policies and practices tend to build on an illusion. In this chapter, I challenge these illusionary yet prevailing understandings of security through different accounts of embodied in/security. I begin the chapter with a discussion of feminist analysis of vulnerability. Here, I rely on accounts that emerge from the feminist ethics of care tradition (e.g. Robinson 1999; 2011), as well as Carol Cohn’s (2014) recent interrogation of vulnerability in international security discourses. Feminist conceptions of vulnerability and care challenge conventional security practices, and reveal them as unrealistic, by foregrounding the human beings’ existential dependency on each other for survival (e.g. Robinson 2011; Beattie and Schick 2013; Butler 2004). Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (Vaittinen 2015), they also rarely explicitly engage with the body organism and its materiality, which need be recognised if embodied in/security is to be taken seriously. In this chapter, I interrogate the body in more concrete terms. Here, I first show how embodied realities of human life have always been central in feminist security studies, albeit usually in contexts of direct violence and hence in/securities external to the body. I then introduce the concept of the lowest common denominator of embodiment, which emphasises the body’s need of care from other bodies and, while defying essentialism, is applicable to all living bodies at all times (Vaittinen, forthcoming). Unlike in the usual security frames that begin with direct violence, in this conception, embodied in/security becomes defined through to the body’s most basic needs, which necessitate care relations with other bodies at times when we are corporeally incapable of being the liberal individual subjects that we are meant to be. In the concluding section, I juxtapose my conception of embodied in/security with the conceptions that seem to predominate security discourses more generally. I argue that, sometimes also in feminist security studies, the empirical contexts of direct violence, war, and militarism easily (re)produce perceptions of embodied in/security that begin with the threats that bodies pose to other bodies. Here, in/secure bodies are primarily present as subjects and objects of violence, rather than as caring and in need of care. Consequently, the threats that the body, as an organism, poses to itself remain unaddressed. I argue that ultimately at stake here are two contending gendered ontologies of human relatedness through which security policies can be shaped: feminised dependency on other bodies’ care against masculine perceptions of the bodies of others as primarily threatening. Both the conceptions of embodied in/vulnerability are profoundly relational, yet the security practices that they (re)produce are fundamentally different. Existential vulnerability and the ethics of care Feminist literature (e.g. Fineman 2008; Beattie and Schick 2013) has emphasised the necessity to put vulnerability instead of liberal individualism at the centre of political discourses and practices, since vulnerability describes the condition of human life much more realistically than individual, rational autonomy does. This way of thinking is particularly present in the feminist ethics of care tradition, which provides a powerful alternative to liberal individualistic thinking about ethics, morality, and politics. Foregrounding the existential dependency of every human being on each other’s care for survival, feminist accounts of care can also forcefully challenge the conventional security thinking, by presenting the lack of care as a threat to human security (Robinson 2011). Feminist ethics of care argues that practices of care give rise to an alternative moral thinking, which is capable of realistically accounting for the situatedness of the moral subject (see, for example, Tronto 1993; Robinson 1999; 2011; Ruddick 1990). Feminist care ethicists show how moral decisions are never made in a political void or behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, as in the Kantian tradition, but in concrete relations with particular others. Importantly, emphasising practices of care as a source of moral and political relatedness, feminist ethics of care demonstrates how human existential vulnerability - that is, our dependency on care as well as our capacity to respond caringly - is a powerful site and source of politics rather than a realm external to it (Tronto 1993; Robinson 1999; 2011; Vaittinen 2015).

#### **Revisionism, either ontological or epistemological, essential to disrupting toxic masculinity in IR – vulnerability is a prerequisite to any ethical FIAT in the international arena, we lay the foundation for ethical policy debates.**

Youngs 04 (Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in\*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

#### **The resolution relies on the creation of fake scenarios to try and “strut their stuff” rely on the creation of a crisis which requires a masculine hero to urgently address the impact – results in the creation of self-fulfilling prophecies that will result in serial policy failure that does more destruction than is helps. Emerging tech relies within the realm of fantasy – reject it, as it pushes feminist criticism to the periphery**

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in *feminist review* 109: 49-72, spp)

While globally it seems that ‘we are more or less permanently suspended in states of crisis’ (Otto, 2011: 76), crucially for feminist analyses, accounts that abstract moments of crisis as ‘exceptional’ events dislocate crisis from the nuanced thinking that would challenge the extreme measures that distort human rights and welfare (such as austerity measures and welfare cuts). Crises embody the power to shape our conceptions of world politics but also, crucially, have the capacity to construct and govern our most intimate and everyday practices. They are significant mechanisms of everyday, contemporary governance because they generate discourses of ‘emergency’, ‘speedy diagnosis’ and ‘robust response’, authorising ‘the operation of a more hegemonic legal order’ and reducing (but not eliminating) ‘the space for political contestation and critique’ (ibid.: 80). An alternative way of reading ‘crisis’ (and not something governance mechanisms and actors are likely to countenance) is, however, to concentrate on its fictive content, with ‘the crisis’ understood as a fictive imagining of everyday events that serves particular discursive purposes. Found in media and official portrayals that have represented the crisis in terms of shock, devastation, anxiety, fear, anger and shame (see, e.g., Widmaier, 2010), the neo-liberal governance of crisis has relied intensively on the language of trauma to generate ‘urgent’, wide-ranging but surreptitious social reforms, including the rewriting of institutional power arrangements and the dismantling of protective welfare systems. The reproduction of tropes of urgency, immediacy and muscularity (what we might call neo-liberalism’s ‘conventional’ responses to crisis), mobilised through metaphors of catastrophe and disaster, has, in particular, allowed for ‘a set of otherwise controversial “responses” to receive widespread legitimation’ (Brassett and Clarke, 2012: 5). The extent to which financial risk management has been cast over the course of the twentieth century as ‘a domain of technical expertise’, removed from public debate and placed firmly in the hands of an elite cadre of fiscal ‘experts’ (De Goede, 2004: 200–207), has rendered such decisive interventions yet more realisable. Despite interesting, and critical, engagements with the use of visuality and metaphor in dominant representations of the crisis, how the use of visual and narrative metaphors of enormity, shock and devastation, and the ensuing repetition of the need for robust, or ‘muscular’, interventions, has been gendered has been little discussed. Key financial publications, including, for example, The Financial Times, The Economist and Time magazine, have regularly deployed representational practices that discriminate actively and often between identifi- able and sexed bodies as symbolic of economic success, regulation and recovery in the global political economy. Men appear across these publications in power, holding the power, bearing the burden of responsibility for crisis and resolving crisis, reaffirming the meaning of the global financial system and its practices as symbolic of white, masculine corporate power (Griffin, 2015). This is particularly important with regard to feminism’s attention to governance in its everyday forms and practices, since, by immersing the financial crisis in images of masculinity, popular and policy sources provide a subtle, but thoroughly gendered, grounding for the ideas, methods and practices instituted by instruments of governance in response to the crisis (such as the measures of austerity considered below). The below analysis thus considers how, as everyday practices of global governance, ‘crisis management’ techniques have reproduced the dismissal of ill-fitting feminist critique and co-opted more sympathetic feminist knowledges. This, the paper argues, simply confirms the longevity of neo-liberal, capitalist, imperatives in the global political economy, entrenching the power of existing economic orders and constraining the possibilities, and space, for contestation and critique based on the masculinised reproduction of financial privilege. crisis governance discourse (1): the dismissal of feminism and the social costs of austerity[:] One way to read feminism’s position vis-a`-vis crisis is to note the damaging blow that contemporary governance reactions to ‘crisis’ have dealt feminism. Crises everywhere ‘are a particularly dangerous time for feminism, and indeed for all progressive ways of thinking’ (Otto, 2011: 78). The ‘emergency’ measures initiated by the announcement of ‘crisis’ represent a shift in power away from inclusive law and policy-making towards so-called ‘expertise’ in ‘crisis management’, ‘muscular’ law-making and the entrenchment of executive power, all of which effectively push feminism ‘off the map’ (ibid.: 76–79). Governments in the developed and developing world have further entrenched the reactionary, ‘hard’ law politics of crisis management, using the rhetoric of urgency to adopt far-reaching and increasingly invasive crisis management measures. Under the guise of ‘austerity’, the IMF has even been recalibrated as an institution of worldly fiscal expertise, a notable departure from the derided figure of cookie-cutter policy-making it struck in the aftermath of the Asian and Argentinean financial crises.

# 1AC - Fem IR

#### Vulnerability is not a weakness, a passing indisposition, or something we can arrange to do without, vulnerability is not a choice, vulnerability is the underlying, ever present and abiding undercurrent of our natural state. To run from vulnerability is to run from the essence of our nature, the attempt to be invulnerable is the vain attempt to become something we are not and most especially, to close off our understanding of the grief of others. More seriously, in refusing our vulnerability we refuse the help needed at every turn of our existence and immobilize the essential, tidal and conversational foundations of our identity. [[1]](#footnote-1)

**Vulnerability in the status quo is gendered. It is assigned unequally as a means of establishing power hierarchies. Masculinity is strong, dominant, and invulnerable, while femininity is weak, subordinate, and vulnerable. Vulnerability is especially evident as it applies to security and masculine Nation States attempting to secure feminized “Others.”**

**Vaittinen, 2018** (Tiina, Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Global Health and Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Finland. “Embodied In/Security as Care Needs,” a chapter published in Carol Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd & Laura Sjoberg (eds.) Routledge Handbook in Gender and Security, SPP)

For Cohn (2014, 53) “the most important piece of the puzzle” is “the ways in which vulnerability is intensely gendered at the symbolic level”. This is particularly so in the predominant international security theory and practice, where human vulnerability is perceived as a matter of “vulnerable groups” only and thus “displaced onto a subset of humans”. Drawing on her empirical work at the UN Security Council (SC) as an observer of discussions on the SC Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security, Cohn demonstrates that vulnerability is frequently discussed at the SC, yet always with a reference to some Others. In these discussions, vulnerability is never attached to those responsible for gendered security practices. The same, of course, applies to much of liberal politics today, where decision makers and state officials are presumed to be invulnerable, rational minds. In security practices, however, the implications of such othering are far-reaching, since they fundamentally shape our gendered understandings of whose in/security is recognised and recognisable. First, not only is the concept of ‘vulnerable groups’ deeply gendered in practices of security, but it is also *heteronormatively* gendered to apply to (cis)women, who are inherently connected to the infantilised mass of womenandchildren-and-thedisabledrest. This shows in the framework of UNSCR 1325 (Cohn 2014, 61), but also in the racialised development agendas in the Global South, where campaigns to invest in a girl for women’s financial empowerment are promoted as projects of global justice, even if they may in fact commodify women’s (re)productive bodies for the expansion of neoliberal capitalism (Wilson 2011; Roberts 2015). Such limited conceptions of gendered vulnerability also direct research and activism, as politically motivated funding instruments often require that researchers and NGOs focus their activities on ‘vulnerable groups’ that are explicitly defined as womenandchildren (and the disabled rest). Furthermore, when vulnerability is allowed for some but not others, only certain kinds of bodies’ vulnerability *makes sense*. Consequently, those who *cannot* – because of their sexed and racialised bodies for instance – appear as vulnerable in the predominant security discourses, seem suspicious and emerge as a threat. The wrong kind of vulnerable bodies appear as incomprehensible, and the ethical responsibility to secure needs of these “other others” becomes blurred and denied (Ahmed 2010; see also Ahmed 2004). Here, the recent European political representations of young refugee men make a conspicuous example. Especially in the social media, but often also in the yellow press, male refugees are recurrently portrayed as terrorists’ and lazy aliens, who forge asylum claims and come after a better social security instead of staying in the conflict-zones to defend ‘their’ womenandchildren at home. Simultaneously, they are represented as sexual predators and pathological rapists, and hence a threat to ‘our’ womenandgirls (Rettberg and Gajjala 2015). In security politics throughout Europe, such portrayals have been indirectly and post-factually used as justifications to curb migration and increase security measures at the borders and in public spaces – which further adds to the embodied *in*security of those identified as racial Others.

#### USFG action can never solve gendered violence and war -- NATO will always been framed as the savoir and “righteous defender” of vulnerable feminine bodies in order to justify violence against other countries. In Kosovo, the media did exactly this, they strove to “protect” the “victims” there only so they could remain these feminized, vulnerable, victims that NATO can use to promote their own invulnerability agendas

(Kozol 04, Wendy. , Wendy Kozol is a professor in the American Studies department at Oberlin College , “Domesticating NATO’s War in Kosovo/a: (In) Visible Bodies and the Dilemma of Photojournalism.” Meridians, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 1–38. JSTOR, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/40338878. Accessed 22 Jun. 2022](http://www.jstor.org/stable/40338878.%20Accessed%2022%20Jun.%202022).) // RB

Media Coverage of NATO Bombings Throughout the 1990s, the American news media represented the Balkans as a violent region rocked by ethnic cleansing following the collapse of communist regimes at the end of the Cold War. Reports on concentration camps, torture, mass murder, and expulsion of thousands from their homes reinforced a narrative about the failure of democracies rather than the failure of market economies to emerge. Moreover, by mid-decade, reporters began to discuss the extraordinarily high levels of sexual violence by Serbian and Yugoslav forces in this region, especially in Bosnia. Feminist analyses foreground the associations between Serbian national- ism, rape warfare, and ethnic cleansing in order to understand rape as a military and political tool (Milic 1993; B. Allen 1996; Rejali 1998). Lynda Boose, for instance, argues that the sexual sadism of Serbian brutality was crucial to this "orgy of nationalism" (2002, 74). Statistics vary widely but conservative estimates of women raped in Bosnia range from twenty thousand to fifty thousand. (Boose 2002) U.S. media attention turned to Kosovo/a in the late 1990s as violence escalated against Albanian Muslim populations. The moment of most intense interest in the region came during the NATO bombings when the United States was directly involved in the conflict through its military presence. NATO operations never achieved the popular support of the Gulf War, coming as they did shortly after the impeachment hearings of President Clinton. Instead, the bomb- ings provoked intense debates about appropriate methods of humanitarian intervention as well as exposed the problematic nature of NATO's very existence after 1991. Television, newspapers, and the major newsmagazines all provided extensive coverage of the war. Even with the pervasiveness of television, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News continue to influence a wide variety of Americans because "nearly every high school, public and academic library" purchases them (Ulrich's Periodical Directory 2003). Major media con- glomerates that own Time (Time-Warner) and Newsweek (Washington Post, Inc.) - U.S. News is independently published - are part of the powerful network of American and European news media that control "what much of the world reads, watches, and hears in its foreign news ..." (Shulman 1994, 108). Crucially, these newsmagazines frame global economic, political, and social conflicts through racial and gender categories that in turn justify the U.S. government's encroaching and imperialist notions of globalization. The first two weeks of the bombings in April 1999 were a crucial period during which the news magazines established narrative conventions for reporting the bombings. The first week's coverage featured lengthy discussions of U.S. military and political strategies, as well as articles on Milosevic as the locus of nationalist violence and reports on ethnic cleansing. Photographs show U.S. military and political leaders, Milosevic, maps of the region that depict US/NATO strategies for attack, and some pictures of refugees. Coverage in the second week focused more exten- sively on the refugees with numerous photographs of people walking along roads or railroad tracks and in the camps, photographs of military and political leaders, as well as more maps and pictures of U.S. soldiers. Articles continued to focus primarily on U.S. and NATO policies and military strategies, although reporters included more discussion of Albanian Kosovars' experiences of Serbian brutality. Visual culture scholars are increasingly exploring the power of the visual to shape and mediate knowledge beyond simplistic models of propaganda or image manipulation (Liss 1998, xviii). Frequently reproduced and revered photographs of war, like Robert Capa's "Death of a Loyalist Soldier" (1936) or Nick Ut's "Terror of War" (the 1973 photograph of a young Vietnamese girl running naked from a Napalm attack) are not those with the most detail but those with the greatest symbolic value (Griffin 1999). As Liss writes, "At stake are the ways in which photographs are set in motion, how they are employed to stand in for wrenching, almost unrepresentable events" (1998, xii). This study provides detailed visual analyses of news photographs in Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report to examine which photographs "stand in" or represent the bombing campaign. Because of publishing deadlines, weekly news- magazines function like a "news digest" that recapitulates television and newspaper reports on events of the previous week, using photographs as visual "highlights" (Griffin and Lee 1995, 814). These visual highlights are less important as factual reportage than they are for their symbolic function. I will analyze the similarities in topics of coverage, narrative strategies, and visual conventions, including some repetition of specific photographs.7 This article, however, does not address the interpretive audiences of these news reports, whose readings, of course, will always be plural.8 All three magazines promoted a narrative of American rescue of victims in a dangerous and unstable region.9 An April 12 photograph from US News, for instance, shows a white American soldier in full combat gear in the extreme foreground. He frames the picture so that the viewer looks with him into the background at several cars on a desolate road. The viewer thus "sees" what the soldier is there to protect (presumably these are civilian refugees although the people in the cars remain unidentified). Above the photograph, the headline "Can the Cavalry Ride to the Rescue?" aligns a racial ideal of hegemonic masculinity with U.S. military efforts in this visual rescue narrative. Although the question mark suggest ambiguity in the situation, the exclusive focus in the article on the relative merits of different military strategies raises questions about policy rather than social or ethical concerns. This tag line, moreover, invokes American narratives of the frontier, referencing the imperialist imaginary of the U.S. cavalry protecting white settlers from dangerous Indians. Here, the picture and the tag line connect whiteness and masculinity to the rescue narrative through a mythic temporality in which social actors enact historically defined roles (Fabian 1983). The three newsmagazines reported on U.S. military and political leaders, military technology and strategies, and the political debates over the utility of air strikes. Other NATO political leaders were rarely dis- cussed, with only occasional references to the military capabilities of the allied countries.10 Reporters paid little attention to the reasons for the conflict, except to blame the violence on the nationalist ambitions of Milosevic, whom one U.S. official referred to as the "tinhorn dictator of Serbia" (Time April 5, 40). Like discussions of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War (Shohat 1994), the U.S. news media focused almost exclusively on the national leader, turning this conflict into a personalized fight against the excessive evils of nationalism. News reports described him as a dictator, a thug, a communist party hack, and a man of no political convictions except to stay in power. Feminist scholars have challenged representations of the Balkan conflicts that focus solely on individual leaders through documentation of the collective and localized dimensions of ethnic/political violence. Mertus (1999a) and Boose (2002), for instance, offer analyses of how the gender and sexual rhetorics of Serbian national- ism played into and exacerbated local ethnic tensions and conflicts. Instead of more complex historical analyses, news narratives typically provide American viewers with an easily identified enemy, a narrative of us/ them frequently structured on racial logics. This news strategy is apparent once again in George W. Bush's "war on terrorism," which initially focused almost exclusively on Osama bin Laden as the leader of Al Qaeda. When the U.S. military failed to capture him, the Bush administration then turned to Saddam Hussein. Milosevic's European and white identities precluded the racial logic that characterize representations of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. Rather, the media demonized the Serbian leader through references to World War II, associating ethnic cleansing with the Holocaust and Milosevic with Hitler.11 Drawing these parallels provides the symbolic connection to a historical genocide that in turn locates the Serbian leader, and by extension Serbia itself, as outside of civilized nationhood. Individualizing this violence, furthermore, dehistori- cizes the complexities of the situation (including European and U.S. historical involvement in this conflict). As Fabian (1983) argues, this symbolic association positions the other, in this case Milosevic, in a past distinct from the temporal space of the viewer. In the second week, for instance, all three magazines published the same photograph of a long train filled to overflowing with refugees, many of whom are hanging out of the windows. Extending across the entire frame of the composition from the left foreground into the right background, the train effectively blocks any view of the city behind. This keeps the gaze in the foreground where hundreds of people stand on the train platform. Pictures like this one accentuate the cultural and geographical distance from the United States to Kosovo/a. As other analysts of American news practices have noted, the media typically represent distant places, espe- cially outside of the West, as a "world of trouble" where disasters, wars, and the breakdown of the social order occur (Morley 2000, 183). The train photograph explicitly historicizes the scene through the visual allusion to the trains used by the Nazis to bring the Jews to the death camps. Such references (and there are many in these reports) render the scene familiar, and presumably sympathetic, to Americans who have at least a popular understanding of the Holocaust. Written texts further link ethnic cleansing to a historical narrative of fascism and ethnic hatred through references to Neville Chamberlain and Czechoslovakia. Using the historical specter of appeasement as a plea for intervention, reporters quoted political leaders who spoke of the possibility of violence spreading to the rest of Europe. Western commentators supportive of the NATO air strikes often warned of the dangers of appeasement as part of a larger appeal on behalf of human rights. The problem, however, is that "this purely humanitarian-ethical legitimization . . . depoliticizes the military intervention" (Zizek 2000, 57). I2 Specifically, the narrative of "humanitarian" military intervention depoliticizes the racial selectivity that determines such intervention. A racialized narrative is evident in the photographs in which Albanian Muslims look white, like the presumed reader, if a little backward. Critical commentators at the time identified NATO's racial selectivity in contrast to the lack of international military campaigns to stop the genocide in Rwanda, or other sites of ethnic/political conflict such as Sierra Leone and Palestine (Chomsky 1999; Haynes 1999). Throughout the 1990s, American news media extensively reported on genocidal acts of ethnic cleansing and other forms of oppression by Serbian nationalists against ethnic populations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Beginning in 1998, Serbian and Yugoslav forces began an increasingly escalated campaign against Alba- nians in Kosovo. According to some critics, however, mass expulsions and killings associated with ethnic cleansing did not occur until after the bombings started on March 24. In the words of NATO Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark, it was "entirely predictable" that Serbian violence would escalate once the bombings started (Chomsky 1999, 37). Critics have charged that NATO and the United States did not wait to exhaust diplomatic and economic options, but instead retrospectively used evidence of ethnic cleansing to justify the bombings (Chomsky 1999; Haynes 1999). While humanitarian issues were of concern to many, NATO prestige was also on the line. Since the end of the Cold War, to reconfigure its legitimacy as an international institution. Interventions in the Balkans were part of a larger effort by NATO to extend its reach to a wider geopolitical arena than the original purpose of the European Alliance. As British Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain explained, "To walk away now would destroy NATO's credibility" (Chomsky 1999, 40). Arguments about humanitarian intervention also ignore the substantial material interests at stake for NATO and the United States. These interests include investments by arms manufactures and Western businesses, oil companies' efforts to secure pipelines across the Balkans, and the role of the IMF-World Bank in the region. In the late 1980s and 1990s, for in- stance, IMF-World Bank policies that demanded austerity programs to secure debt repayment increased the economic instabilities of the region. Moreover, as the former Yugoslavia broke up, recognition or non-recogni- tion of states by Western countries had a significant and unequal impact on their political economies. Pressure on the Clinton administration also came from expatriate groups in the United States as well as businesses advocating international policies that increased their access to global markets (Haynes 1999). Penezic argues that Western news depictions of nationalist conflict in post-communist states reproduce a Cold War paradigm that blames ethnic violence and the rise of economic disasters on the former communist regimes and on nationalist overreactions. "Whether or not this was true for the Eastern Bloc, Yugoslavia's situation was not quite that simple. The country has been decentered and federal, with multilingual education, publishing, press, television, and so forth. While this regulated and strictly controlled ethnic tolerance might not have been enough to assuage nationalist hungers, reducing the causes of war to nationalism only is, in my opinion, overly simplistic" (Penezic 1995, 63). None of the news coverage of the NATO bombings discussed the unstable economic and political conditions in the post-communist period, especially the region's relationship to the West and to global economic forces. Instead, all three magazines displayed a U.S. -centered analysis that reproduced a familiar narrative of Western rescue of victims in a dangerously unstable region. As Koshy points out, the American media "still remains primarily oriented to a national context and is thus unable to generate a transnational frame- work of understanding adequate to the complex problems of globaliza- tion" (1999, 20). Rescue narratives emphasized the vulnerability of Kosovars and the humanitarianism of military intervention. Crucially, the newsmagazines characterized the Balkans as an agricultural area that still relies on primi- tive farming techniques and a place of historic ethnic rivalries. Pictures show people fleeing in primitive modes of transportation, walking in single file on railroad tracks to avoid land mines or walking in desolate landscapes. In Newsweek, for instance, an April 12 photograph shows a man in the foreground pushing a wheelbarrow in which sits an elderly woman wrapped in a headscarf, winter coat, and blanket. Behind them another man also pushes an elderly person in a wheelbarrow and two others walk along the road. This primitive mode of transportation underscores the refugees' vulnerable status while the desolate landscape offers no clues to specific geographical, temporal, or cultural locations. Old helpless women, cared for by men, all of whom appear white, with limited re- sources (wheelbarrows) create a sympathetic portrait. It also renders men solely within a subordinate masculinity that depends on the protection of outside forces while women are visualized as vulnerable and needy because of their age, race, and gender. The exclusive gaze at peasants in a pre- modern setting, of course, also erases the range of material resources and cultural experiences of the Albanian Kosovars.13 Physically locating the conflict in this nightmarish space, pictures like this one and the one of the train station participate in creating what Zizek refers to as the "imagined cartography" of the Balkans that depicts this region as a "terrain of ethnic horrors" still fighting centuries-old battles presumably in contrast to the advanced democratic status of the West (Zizek 2000, 4-5). While this perhaps raises the question of what is the West, it also resecures a cultural map that defines Europe as the countries of Western Europe while the Balkans remain somewhere on the fringes of civilization. These images also play into Cold War narratives that visualize socialism as a failure of modernity. Such narratives deny how transnational dependencies and determinations shape the region's economy. Hyper- inflation, austerity measures, and other economic constraints since the collapse of communist regimes in the region have intensified social and political unrest. Escalating debt increasingly weakened the region's economies, led to worker protests, and fostered the prestige of nationalist solutions by Milosevic and his supporters (Haynes 1999). Yet, news media ignored or minimized local, regional, and transnational factors that have shaped ethnic conflict in the Balkans in favor of representations of NATO heroics. The lack of references to Albanian politics ignores the complicated and hybrid nature of Albanian identities and political activisms. Moreover, it promotes American national interests at the expense of local and regional factors. The only coverage of Albanian responses to Serbian violence was reports on the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a small militant group. None of the magazines, for instance, discussed the nonviolent agenda of the Albanian intellectual and political leader Ibrahim Rugova (Chomsky 1999; Mertus 1999a, 6). Photographs instead featured male soldiers of the KLA in combat uniforms, yet there are no signs of actual combat.14 Compared with detailed discussions of American military equipment, strategy, and personnel, reports on the KLA emphasized the lack of equipment, training, and even incompetence of these fighters. This contrast further eliminates political alternatives to the spectacle of victim- ization. Zizek argues that NATO intervened to protect Kosovar victims while making sure they would remain victims; that is, no international support backed the Albanians to become full political agents, or to sustain an armed resistance. He describes this as the "paradox of victimization: the Other to be protected is good in so Jar as it remains a victim" (2000, 59, 60). News coverage of victims waiting to be rescued erases U.S. and European nations' complicity in the economic and political instabilities in the region. Petras further argues that innocent victimization also ignores the violence perpetrated by the KLA. He writes that the "triumphal returns and euphoric rhetoric of the NATO leaders covers up the brutal reality of massive ethnic cleansing, systematic assassinations, pillage and destruc- tion of churches, houses, farms, and businesses by NATO-backed Alba- nian KLA terrorists and their paramilitary supporters" (1999, 13). As important as it is to publicize the horrors of war and ethnic cleans- ing, these photographs elide any representations of the subjectivity and agency of the Albanians. Cameras do not depict the diversity of experiences and cultures in Kosovo/a (Mertus 1999a). No pictures show people working in an urban setting or creating a makeshift home or treating the injured.15 Nor do readers encounter photographs of Albanian doctors, social workers, community leaders, etc. Instead, photographs depict fearful and/or exhausted refugees.16 In a half-page picture featured in U.S. News on April 12, for instance, the photographer used a high angle shot of a group of refugees. The high angle makes the crowd appear very large as people spread out to the very edges of the background. In the center foreground, a woman holds out her hands in a supplicant pose with the , "Pleading. A woman from Kosovo asks Macedonian police officers to let her cross the border. Thousands waited without food or water." As the focal point of the composition, the female supplicant stands as the representative of the "waiting" group. Women such as the suppli- cant become, in Zizek's words, the "ideal subject-victim in aid" (2000, 57- 58) who do not struggle for their own survival or fight back but remain the feminized object of the Western gaze. These pictures provide the visual alibi for U.S. and NATO intervention by establishing a national narrative about U.S. power and political good in contrast to Milosevic and his Serbian forces. The racial logic is here reinforced because few signs recognizable to Western viewers would identify the refugees as Muslim. Racial and religious differences are elided in this portrayal of Albanians as allies. Instead, gender is foregrounded through prominently featured photographs of mothers with small chil- dren, namely on two magazine covers and as the opening two-page spread in all three magazines the second week. Collapsing the body with experi- ence and identity, photojournalism relies on the bodies of mothers and babies to function as metonyms for the Kosovo/a crisis. Recent feminist scholarship on embodiment has explored with great insight how identity, especially sexual, gender, and racial identities are produced and repro- duced through visible bodies.17 In the news coverage of the NATO bomb- ings, the visual embodiment of white motherhood, however, does not so much produce knowledge or understanding of trauma as it turns subjects into spectacles of suffering. As metonyms for victimization, photographs of women and children collapse motherhood with the home (Morley 2000, 65) and in so doing become the visible symbol of what is being threatened and what needs to be saved. For instance, a tightly framed photograph in U.S. News from April 12 shows a group of refugees enclosed in an space that appears to be surrounded by barbed wire (the caption explains that the wire is part of the back of a truck) (fig. 2). In the center of the composition, a woman throws her head back in anguish while a child next to her stares soberly at the camera. This highly emotional expression of innocence and vulnerability establishes the face of suffering for the viewer. In such pictures, sub- jectivities are elided as visible bodies rearticulate racialized gender ideals of domesticity familiar to American audiences (Williams 1994). Despite late twentieth-century social developments that include post-communism, globalization, and new technologies, idealized domesticity continues to {{Fig.2 ommited}} Fig. 2. Photograph by Santiago Lyon. Courtesy of AP/Wide World Photos. have enormous ideological resonance (Morley 2000, 56). Since the Cold War period, the American media have aligned an ideal of the white middle class family with national interests and desires (Kozol 1994). These pictures of refugees from Kosovo/a reveal the powerful place that the racialized mother-child ideal continues to hold in the U.S. cognitive grid. Whiteness, furthermore, contains the otherness of Albanian Kosovars who, like this anguished Albanian mother, lack racial, ethnic or religious markers of difference. If class, racial, gender, and heteronormative ideals shape the cultural alignment of family and nation, what happens when domesticity, that powerful sign of stability and tradition, is figured as the sign of social disorder or breakdown? Media portrayals of the ideal family typically establish boundaries of identity that exclude all those who do not fit these racial, sexual, and class categorizations. Morley, however, compellingly argues that not all representations of domesticity are so intentionally exclusive. Instead, he writes, "it is not the presence of otherness per se which is problematic but only that of undomesticated otherness," pointing out examples of the incorpo- ration of Others, or what he calls, "domesticating alterity" (2000, 223). In other words, the logics of racialization are often dependent upon incorpo- rating otherness within "the relation of domination" (Taguieff 2001, 121). News photographs of Kosovar refugees foreground racialized gender ideals of domesticity in this moment of profound crisis and social disor- der. Narratives about conflicts in the Balkans have historically been mapped onto ethnic rivalries and hostilities that stereotype populations as violent and backward. During the Cold War, for instance, the American media typically collapsed ethnicity and communism in characterizations of Albania as one of the most repressive communist regimes. In contrast, news coverage of refugees in 1999 turned the camera's gaze to mothers and children to figure Albanians as the innocent victims of Serbian aggression. Ideals of domesticity that feature attractive, white looking, mothers elide differences to establish instead the moral position of the refugees. The cover photograph in U.S. News for April 12 exemplifies the process of domesticating alterity. Above the headline, "Balkan Hell," three figures in the center of the composition look out at the camera. With a somber but calm gaze, a young attractive woman holds a small child while an older son leans against her. Although the caption does not identify her religious affiliation, the coverage repeatedly characterized the violence in Kosovo/a as an ethnic conflict between Serbian Christians and Albanian Muslims. That this woman is not specifically identified as a Muslim reinforces the process of incorporation within an American ideal of domesticity. Even more than other mother and child images, this photograph evokes the Western Christian art historical tradition of the Madonna and child flanked by one or more saints. In the extreme foreground a woman with her head covered in a white cloth moves toward the picture plane. Her forward posture suggests movement outside of the camera's frame and into the viewer's space. The triangular position of the main figure group creates a stability that counterbalances the dynamic movement of this foreground figure. The compositional and iconographic stability signified by this Madonna and children, as Morley suggests, domesticates the refugees' alterity. This process occurs through foregrounding heteronormativity, albeit normativity at risk. During the Balkans wars, reporters often told of Serbian detention and killings of fathers and husbands. To see the family without the male figure underscores the social crisis and reinforces the call to rescue the mothers and children. Even as this woman is incorporated within an American cognitive ideal of domesticity, however, she remains other in her (unlabeled) ethnicity and in her state of crisis. She is thus both like and unlike the viewer. Looking at how photographs mobilize domes- ticity reveals the ways in which narratives of war incorporate alterity as part of justifications for military intervention. In the newsmagazines, scenes of destroyed houses, rather than pictures of military battles, further configure the Albanians visually within the private sphere. In American hegemonic culture, the private sphere signifies the privileges of privacy, intimacy, and protection from the external world. On April 5, both Time and Newsweek featured a photograph of a Serbian army tank in front of a destroyed house with signs of still smoldering fires. A Serbian soldier holding a rifle, caught mid-stride in profile, looks defiantly at the camera. Masculinity and militarism foreground the threat to private life and to the vulnerable bodies of the Albanians. The accompa- nying report discusses the invasion of private homes by paramilitary forces where people were either tortured or removed from families and then tortured. Domesticity, as the sign of what is at risk, and hence as the justification for intervention, locates the Albanians within terms recogniz- able to American audiences. In a region such as Kosovo/a, many reasons compel photojournalists to report on the violence that persists there despite juridical and humanitar- ian interventions by international agencies like the UN or military interven- tions like the NATO air strikes. In domesticating alterity, however, Ameri- can news coverage of Kosovo/a relied on conventions of photojournalism, in particular the figure of vulnerable white maternity, to depict the human casualties of violence in the Balkans. News coverage that represents Albanians only as victims ignores their struggles and experiences while promoting narratives of Western benevolent support for needy and inno- cent refugees. Representations of crises outside the United States, as in this case, are typically mediated through the lens of national concerns, such as security or economic interests. As Koshy writes, "On human rights issues, in particular, the statist perspective obscures and distorts the perception of the problem and the construction of the solution . . ." (1999, 21). Thus, what is at stake in media coverage is the relationship between how social crises are represented and how they are managed within a transnational context. Given this critique of photojournalism, how can photographers main- tain the moral imperative of political visibility? The challenge of reportage in this case is made particular acute by the problematics of representing trauma. How can photographers visualize trauma without inevitably turning people into spectacles? If photographers attempt to avoid the spectacle of embodied suffering, what happens if we do not have an embodied victim to pity?

#### Debate has always been constructed though the masculine feminine dichotomy. Feminine debaters are forced to distance themselves from their femininity in order to be taken seriously and be competitive within the activity. However, when they do that too much, they are too bitchy. It is a game that becomes impossible to win. Instead, we need to challenge the dichotomy, allowing feminine debaters to embrace their individual identities.

(Bjork et al 99, Rebecca S., University of Utah, Dauber, Cori, University of North Carolina, Dix, Lisa, University of tah, Hobbs, Lisa, University of North Carolina, Kidder, Beck, University of Michigan, Ouding, Jenni, University of Michigan, and Rhyne, Joy, University of North Carolina, “Women in Debate: Reflections on the Ongoing Struggle,” http://web.archive.org/web/20011012220529/members.aol.com/womynindebate/article3.htm)//RB

Debate has been an overwhelmingly positive experience for me. That is not to say that there have not been negative aspects. I think that it is important for every woman in debate to be honest with herself. We are unfortunately the victims of sexual harassment and discrimination, but I do not believe that means we are destined to inferiority. It is imperative that we fight against rigidly defined gender roles in order to become full and equal participants in the debate community--that is not to say that women must deny their femininity to be successful debaters. Instead, I think each woman should be true to her own identity; if her femininity is an important part of her psyche, then she should by no means feel compelled to deny it or try to hide it in exchange for increased debate achievements .As a Southern woman, I think the pressures I felt within the debate community were great. At the beginning of my collegiate debate career I was not very focused on the competitive aspects of debate. My partner and I would win some debates, but what was most important to me at that time was socializing with other debaters. I do not encourage other women in debate to adopt such an attitude, but I also do not think that women who have such an attitude should be stigmatized. I found that as one of the few females on the debate circuit I was accepted socially by almost every other debater I met, whether they were junior-varsity participants or one of the top first-rounds. I was able to have fun with these people and it did not seem to matter that I was often much less successful in debate than they were. In fact, I think that it was easier for them to "hang out" with me because I was not in direct competition with them. When I changed partners and became part of a first-round team, things changed. I can recall countless occasions when friends of mine virtually ignored me in discussions about debate rounds or issues and addressed all of their questions to my male partner. This kind of behavior marginalized my worth as a debater. It always amazed me that other debaters (who were my friends) could totally ignore me as a "debater"; I was only truly recognized in a social context. I think the social side of debate is important--some of my best friends are debaters--but every debater should have the opportunity to develop both the social and the competitive sides of debate.I do not mean to imply that women in debate have little hope of becoming true equals to the men of debate or that they are destined to occupy only a social role and will forever remain at the peripheries of debate success. However, I do believe that feminine women face special challenges because they seem to fit the traditionally defined gender roles of our society at large. Women are not taught to be competitive; such ambitions are reserved for men. Argumentation itself has traditionally been associated with men because they are thought to be more rational and logical than women, who are supposedly driven by their emotions. In society, these views have started to change. Women have become successful in these so-called "male areas" and I think that debate as well will increasingly come to reflect these changes. A woman can be feminine and still excel at argumentation and logical reasoning. I fundamentally disagree with those in the debate community who would urge women to become more "masculine" in order to achieve a higher level of debate success. Giving into stereotypes will only serve to perpetuate such myths. As a debater, I resisted such pressures, held on to my femininity, and still managed to have a successful debate experience. I encourage other women in debate to do the same. We must fight the pressure and be true to ourselves; there is no fundamental reason why only "masculine" women can succeed in debate.As a final note, I think that it is important for all of us to encourage more women (and minorities as well) to participate in collegiate debate. I know that many female high school debaters decide against debating in college because they feel the activity is too hostile to women. I think that this is a tragedy and that coaches and debaters alike should discourage such attitudes. After all, our society is sexist, but does that mean women should avoid becoming active participants and leaders? Of course not. In the same way, women should not shy away from collegiate debate. I can honestly say that I have acquired many valuable skills through my involvement in debate. Giving up is not the answer. Raising awareness will certainly help, but I think the key really lies with the women in debate themselves. We must decide to stay involved, encourage other women we know to participate, and most importantly, refuse to settle for anything less than real equality and complete autonomy. LISA DIXKaren Finley, one of my favorite poets, writes with power and knowledge of her experiences as a woman. Her poem entitled "I Was Not Expected To Be Talented" is for me a powerful expression of my feelings about being a woman in debate. The poem goes like this ...Just smile, act pretty, open the door, and clean the toilet. You say one day at a time well, it's a slow death! Remember the homeless, the poor, the suffering. Well, I'm suffering inside!...You know why I only feel comfortable around the collapsed, the broken, the inebriated, the helpless and the poor-'CAUSE THEY LOOK LIKE WHAT I FEEL INSIDE! They look, they look, they look like what I feel inside! You see, I WAS NOT EXPECTED TO BE TALENTED. I am using this poem to relate to my experiences in debate as a woman. I feel that it is important for me to be as honest as I can about my experiences, yet at the same time to relate a message that is positive for women who are entering the activity. The story I'm about to tell is a coming to terms about my "place" in debate as a woman. I am a policy debater at the University of Utah. I did not debate in high school, although I did do some individual events. From my experience in high school, I think individual events were sort of the "woman's place." I was not expected to be talented in debate; however, I feel that women can be VERY talented if they are just encouraged to participate. This is the reason I am writing this paper. I believe that by subverting the notion of a "woman's place" in debate, and by being able to define our own "place" as women, more women will be encouraged to participate in debate at the high school and collegiate levels.The first time I was aware of my "place" in debate as a woman was at a regular season tournament. I was at the awards ceremony listening to the top twenty speaker awards; not one of them was a woman. Women were winning awards at the novice and junior levels, but for varsity women to win speaker awards was out of the question. I thought to myself, at least we were winning some awards, but my coach quickly told me that not very many women ever win speaker awards past the junior and novice levels. I guess I am very reluctant to accept that novice and junior debate is the only "place" for women. I am not taking anything away from novice and junior women debaters; my argument is that these women deserve a chance to win on the varsity level as well. Another experience that reminded me quickly where my "place" in debate is was in a round at the beginning of last season. A male debater put his arm around me during cross examination and said, "chill out, babe." I quickly thought to myself, "I am not your babe," but I said nothing and immediately sat down. I felt very objectified, humiliated, and angry. By treating me as a sex object, that male debater quickly put me in my "place."Women in debate have to deal with a double standard. If we are not feminine enough we are thought of as "bitchy," yet if we are too feminine, we are not taken seriously. I urge all women to hold on to both. We need to construct ourselves outside of the masculine/ feminine dichotomy-we should be able to have a place in debate because we are talented. At the 1992 National Debate Tournament, my partner (who is a woman) and I noticed that there were only four women teams at the tournament (76 teams total), and none of the women teams advanced to the double octafinal round. In fact, only four women cleared at all. Not one woman won a speaker award. I am proud of those women who were in the out-rounds. I am also proud of all the women who are in debate. It is time for women to demand a "place." It is past time for women in debate to be considered talented. I feel that if women are encouraged on the high school level to start and stay with debate, we will not be the minority or the marginalized. Only then can we truly get past being placed in a subordinate position; we will be able to define our own "place" in debate on our own terms.

#### To have a temporary, isolated sense of power over all events and circumstances, is a lovely illusionary privilege and perhaps the prime and most beautifully constructed conceit of being human and especially of being youthfully human, but it is a privilege that must be surrendered with that same youth, with ill health, with accident, with the loss of loved ones who do not share our untouchable powers; powers eventually and most emphatically given up, as we approach our last breath.

#### The assigning of vulnerability disproportionately on feminine subjects creates gendered hierarchies and gendered violence. And, because masculine subjects need to be invulnerable, they respond with violence or potential violence with violence, making war inevitable and unending.

**Peet and Sjoberg, 2020**(Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida; the Late Jessica Peet taught IR at the University of Florida and USC. Introduction to *Gender and Civilian Victimization in War*(Print Book), SPP)

As scholars, the "lenses" we use "foreground some things, and background others" in our research (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999). Our research questions start with the ideas, concepts, and variables we see as most important in global politics. For example, the scholars who have written on intentional civilian victimization have started with the ideas, concepts, and variables they see as most important in global politics, including regime type, international law, strategy, and culture. Like other scholars in IR, feminist work uses "lenses" to foreground variables of particular interest, specifically sex, gender, and sexuality; gender identity; and gender hierarchy, using "gender lenses" to view global politics (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999: 2). Looking through gender lenses is a way "to focus on gender as a particular kind of power relation, or to trace out the ways in which gender is central to understanding international processes" (Steans 1998: 5). While women's oppression is a primary concern for feminists, "the driving force of feminism is its attention to gender and not simply to women .... [T]he concept, nature and practice of gender are key" (Zalewski 1995). Feminists, then, "ask what assumptions about gender (and race, class, nationality, and sexuality) are necessary to make particular statements, policies, and actions meaningful" (Wilcox 2009). In our analysis of civilian victimization, we focus on how the concept, nature, and practice of gender influences states' and other war-fighting parties' decisions to target civilians and ask what assumptions about gender are necessary to make intentional civilian victimization appealing, despite the non-combatant immunity norm. With this focus, we also look at the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, and nationalism in constituting both the idea of the civilian and her vulnerability. In order to fully grasp why those are important questions, we need to spend a little time understanding what feminists mean by 'sex' and by 'gender' in this context. Many people see sex as biology - male and fem ale sex organs make people men or women. 4 In the conventional wisdom, then, gender is directly related to, and maps onto, sex - men are masculine and women are feminine. However, feminist scholarship has "questioned the conventional assumption that gender differences (and subordination) are rooted in biological differences between women and men" (Scott 1987; Sjoberg 2006a: 32). Instead, feminist scholars suggest that the relation between sex and gender is presumed rather than natural, where masculinity and femininity are separable from maleness and femaleness. Masculine characteristics, like strength, protectiveness, rationality, aggressiveness, presence in public life, domination, and leadership, then, are perceived as related to maleness, while in reality they are not reserved for men. Conversely, traits associated with femininity, like weakness, vulnerability, emotion, passivity, privacy, submission, and care, are assumed to be the domain of women, while that is not always or even normally the case. Genderings can be read into and back onto sex, which is malleable rather than set, and co-constituted with gender (e.g., Butler 1990, 1993). Applying this understanding, gender cannot be operationalized as a 'yes' or 'no' (or 'male' or 'female' question), or as a matter of degree. It also cannot be accounted for by asking questions about 'what women do' differently than 'what men do' in global politics.5 Instead, it is more of a constellation of significations, where masculinities and femininities are mutually constituted (along with race, class, sexuality, etc.) in specific, hierarchical relation to one another - where ( often) masculinities are prized and powerful, while femininities are seen as undesirable and therefore subordinated. In this context, we can talk not just about men and women and masculinities and femininities but of masculinism and feminization. Masculinism is the prizing of masculinities and the exclusion and/ or devaluing of femininities in social and/ or political contexts. Masculinism leads to feminization - the devaluing of femininities by putting down or putting aside people, groups, or ideas associated with femininities and by associating devalued or marginalized people, groups, or ideas with femininities (V. Peterson 2010; see also V. Peterson and Runyan 2010). 6 V. Spike Peterson describes feminization as devalorization: Not only subjects (women and marginalized men), but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, "ways of knowing" ... can be feminized - with the effect of reducing their legitimacy, status and value. Importantly, this devalorization is simultaneously ideological (discursive, cultural) and material (structural, economic) .... This devalorization normalizes - with the effect of "legitimating" - the marginalization, subordination, and exploitation of feminized practices and persons ... the "naturalness" of sex difference is generalized to the "naturalness" of masculine (not necessarily male) privilege, so that both aspects come to be taken-for -granted "givens" of social life (V. Peterson 2010). In this vein, a key tenet of feminist theorizing about the global political arena is that it is gender -hierarchical (Sjoberg 2009). Though masculinities and femininities are detectable across known human history, they are not static, temporally, geographically, or culturally. Quite the opposite, the dominant 'masculinity' or 'femininity' is different at different times, and in different places and cultures. While "the exact content of genders varies with various and shifting socio-political contexts, ... gender subordination (defined as the subordination of femininities to masculinities) remains a constant feature of social and political life across time and space" (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 9). Feminist research in IR, then, asks how these complex notions of gender constitute and influence the realities of everyday life in global politics . In this book, we are particularly interested in how gender influences belligerents' (especially states') decisions to attack civilians in war in conjunction with other parts of the 'puzzle' of intentional civilian victimization. Thinking about gender and intentional civilian victimization Revisiting the narratives that began this introduction, it is possible to see gender influencing intentional civilian victimization in what happened to Hassan and Benedicte and their contemporaries. Referencing experiences like Benedicte's, Judith Gardam has explained that rape is never truly aimed at or affecting just one person (1993: 363). Instead, "rape functions as a strategy to deliver a blow against a collective energy by striking at a group of high symbolic value" (Pettman 1996: 190). By raping Benedicte, government forces were attacking non -lvoirians by attacking "their" women, as "xenophobic speech [was] aimed specifically at women from the 'enemy' community," encouraging rape and sexual violence (Amnesty International 2007). As a result, sexual violence became "an intentional strategy to terrorise, demean, and defeat an entire population, as well as a way of engendering hate and destruction" between the rebels and the government in Cote d'Ivoire (Amnesty International 2004). In the 1990s war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, women suffered the brunt of civilian victimization, as a result both of apparently gender -neutral tactics and of a systematic campaign of genocidal rape. Reports of mass rape began appearing in newspaper headlines in August of 1992 (Hansen 2001: 55). Women were raped, both individually and as proxy for the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina also being 'raped.' The rape of civilian women was also the rape of ('their') nation, an idea that was reiterated by Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations addressing the Security Council in 1993: Excellencies, Bosnia and Herzegovina is being gang-raped ... I do not lightly apply the analogy of a gang rape to the plight of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we know, systematic rape has been one of the weapons of this aggression against the Bosnian women in particular. (Metrovic 1994: xii) In this statement the rape of Bosnian women is metaphor for the destruction and 'rape' of a nation, literally and figuratively. This sort of "rape happens, not as a consequence of thoughtless, provocative, or unfortunate behavior, but as a question of national warfare" (Hansen 2001: 59). Lene Hansen explains that, in Bosnia, [r ]aping "the nation's women" is not only an act of violence against individual women; it also works to install a disempowered masculinity as constitutive of the identities of the nation's men. The interconnection between individual/ collective and national/ gendered might also be illustrated by the way that a woman impregnated by rape can be represented as a passive "national" container of a child imagined to be the future bearer of the rapist's nationality. In this way, an individual rape can be read for its collective, national significance through the complex sign of the child's imagined future identity as an embodiment of the enemy state. (Hansen 2001: 60) Women were also targeted for violence that was not explicitly sexual. Some Serb policy statements emphasized depriving individual households of nutritional and medical resources necessary for reproduction as a way to target the opponent ethnicities. Even the targeting of men had gendered connotations and implications. Planning for the Srebrenica massacre (where an estimated 8,000 men were killed, selected as men for victimization), the killing was discussed as a strategy for reducing the availability of men, who were characterized as fertilizers and protectors for women. Planners referred to their strategies as "cleaning houses" such that women would pose "less resistance to repopulation" (referring to forced impregnation) without 'their' men. 7 Narratives like this could be and have been told of many wars, genocides, conflicts, and terrorist attacks around the world. In this book, we present evidence that when belligerents intentionally victimize civilians, they are actually attacking women because of women's actual and symbolic position in the life, livelihood, and nationalist narratives of the opponent's state and/ or nation. While most people who read Benedicte and Hasan's stories assume that Benedicte's experience was a gendered form of civilian victimization and Hasan's experience was tragic but a case of 'normal' or ungendered civilian victimization, we argue that it is not just in sexual violence against civilians that civilian victimization is gendered. Instead, when civilians are attacked in war, often 'civilian' is in important ways a proxy for women, not as female bodies but for how they are positioned in and symbolic of nation and state. Wartime sexual violence is {like other civilian victimization tactics) a way to get to the 'heart' of the opponent by destroying both crucial resources and the very parts of their society which legitimate the fighting of the war in the first place - pure, innocent women that good men fight just wars to protect (see, e.g., Elshtain 1987). Along these lines, we theorize intentional civilian victimization through gender lenses. Expanding on feminist work about nationalism and war generally, and the noncombatant immunity principle specifically, we contend that the very same logic that makes belligerents so eager to 'protect' their innocent women from wars also encourages them to attack the women who are seen as belonging to their enemies. In war stories, just warriors fight the good fight to protect their innocent women and children from those foreign or outside men who would attack them (Huston 1983). Just warriors, then, legitimate not only wars generally but also their masculinities specifically by protecting women back home (Sjoberg 2006b). Attacking the women that motivate the opponent to fight - the women that symbolize his state and/ or nation and whose protection legitimates his war - attacks both the will to fight a particular war and the logic of war-fighting. In these terms, as we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, intentional civilian victimization can be seen as a product of the gendered narratives that legitimate and sustain nationhood and the practices of the making and fighting of wars. We are, of course, not arguing that women and only women are killed in the victimization of civilians. Such an argument would be both inaccurate and oversimplified. We are instead arguing that 'civilian victimization' is, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, an attack on women, where 'civilian' is in important ways a proxy for women. But this proxy is not a simple, one-to-one mapping where belligerents think 'civilian' but mean 'women' (as women), even to the extent that belligerents are willing to admit attacking civilians. Rather the proxy is a complex indicator of state/nation, based on actual and perceived strength. Belligerents attack (women) civilians for the same reason they claim protection for their own - because the 'protection racket' is an underlying justification for states, governments, and their wars (see, e.g., S. Peterson 1977). Insomuch as women are indicators, signifiers, and reproducers of state and nation, belligerents attack women to attack the state and nation. We contend that such an explanation, when compared to the others that have been presented up to this point, provides both greater theoretical leverage towards understanding the problem of civilian targeting and greater empirical explanatory power for the particulars of cases of civilian victimization in war. In the remainder of this introduction, we outline how this book makes that argument and presents both quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence to support it.

**Our method is to embrace vulnerability. Only a recognition and embodiment of vulnerability can reshape foreign policy in a manner that does not replicate the hierarchical logic of the protection racket. Whyte says that “vulnerability is not a choice” and he is right.**

**Väyrynen, 2019** (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” *Peacebuilding*, 7:2, 146-159, SPP)

As outlined above, early feminist peace and conflict researchers, such as Elise Boulding and Sara Ruddick, insisted on the importance of the relational body when studying peace. I also argued above that local turn scholarship is limited in its understanding of the everyday and mundane practices of peace. In my view, both the relational body and mundane practices require a more nuanced reading of power, governance and the vulnerabilities that practices of power produce, since the body is always both ‘active and acted upon’.35 In short, practices of governance that are targeted at the body also produce the body.36 Yet the fleshy living body also has agency, which makes it an ‘engaged body-subject’.37 In other words, the body is never a passive target of practices of governance: it also has a capacity to escape these practices.38 Eighty-year-old Kaisu told her story in a Finnish documentary film in 2010.39 She was among the Finnish women accused of having fraternised with German soldiers during the Second World War. She moved to Germany with the withdrawing German troops and was repatriated to Finland after the war. The following is my description of Kaisu’s narrative: VIGNETTE 2 Kaisu was among the women whose bodies were securitised and transferred to the camp immediately on their arrival on the Finnish soil. She calls it the ‘quarantine camp’ as if there had been something contagious in her body that needed purification. Hence medicalisation also takes hold of her body even in her most intimate memories. Her young body had been securitised and medicalised as it was seen to constitute the contagious risk of knowing too much. In the documentary, her body is stiff, but strong when she sits on the porch of the barracks, in which she thinks she was incarcerated sixty years ago. She is smoking a cigarette with a firm hand. Her body and her solemn voice convey her strength. Kaisu recalls how the Security Police had suspected her of being a German mole. She is very proud of the fact that she did not cry during the interrogations: ‘In front of Hautojärvi [the interrogation officer] I did not cry’. In the narrative, her resistance is not just geared towards the interrogation officer, but also towards the Finnish state, whose security apparatus suspected and humiliated her. In her upright body, she resists the forces that sought to silence her.40 When considering mundane peace, Judith Butler’s observation that one way of managing populations is to distribute vulnerability among people unequally is crucial.41 Biopower – power that is about managing the births, deaths, reproduction and illnesses of a population and which is ultimately utilised by the state ostensibly in the protection of life – establishes a norm that allows for measurement, evaluation and hierarchical ranking. As such, it constitutes a mechanism of control and distributes vulnerability and invulnerability among the population.42 In Kaisu’s case, her body was rendered vulnerable – shaped as that of an outcast – through the mechanisms of governance in the post-war Finnish national order. The vignette demonstrates that power is multiple and relational, as it establishes socio-historical relationships that render some bodies more vulnerable than others. Biopower increases efficiency and capacity at the level of individual bodies and whole populations, yet it also distributes vulnerability and invulnerability. This is particularly acute during times of economic, social and political transformation, such as peacebuilding and reconstruction, when social relations must be re-imagined and re-structured. Butler theorises peace and argues that peace is a way of indicating one’s dependency on others and being acknowledged. She not only theorises peace as individual vulnerability but says that it needs to be institutionalised: I think that peace is the active and difficult resistance to the temptation of war; it is the prerogative and the obligation of the injured. Peace is something that has to be vigilantly maintained; it is a vigilance, and it involves temptation, and it does not mean we as human beings are not aggressive. It does not mean that we do not have murderous impulses. This is a mistaken way of understanding non-violence. . . . Peace is a certain resistance to the terrible satisfactions of war. It’s a commitment to living with a certain kind of vulnerability to others and susceptibility to being wounded that actually gives our individual lives meaning. . . I think it needs to be institutionalised. It needs to be part of a community ethos. I think in fact it needs to be part of an entire foreign policy.43 For Butler, therefore, the recognition of vulnerability can lead to more adequate, peaceful responses to different forms of violence and can counter the tendency to react to violence with more violence.44 Alyson Cole has noted that Butler’s view on vulnerability paves the way to ‘nonviolent interaffectivity’.45 Vulnerability does not, in this view, imply weakness or inferiority; rather, it is a human condition, ‘a basic kind of openness to being affected and affecting in both positive and negative ways, which can take diverse forms in different social situations (for example, bodily, psychological, economic, emotional, and legal vulnerabilities)’, as Erin Gilson summarises Butler’s views.46 Understanding oneself as vulnerable involves an understanding of the self as shaped by its relationships to others, the world, power and its environs. This has, in my view, implications for the everyday, as our embodiment and vulnerability are embedded in the everyday – in its historicity, forms of power, materiality and concreteness. Vulnerability is not just a way of referring to the capacity to be wounded, however. It is also a ‘way of indicating one’s dependency on another, a set of institutions, or a circumambient world to be well, to be safe, to be acknowledged’, argues Butler, in the spirit of early feminist peace and conflict researchers’ work.47 While the vulnerable body is often thought to be private and non-political, when in contact with other bodies, the politics of vulnerability comes to the fore – firstly, in the form of the unequal distribution of vulnerabilities, and secondly, in the form of accountability, recognition and acknowledgement. In other words, the way in which vulnerability is recognised, accounted for, acknowledged and responded to is at the core of the political. ‘The political’ is hence an existential relation that we all live out, on a daily basis, in ways that create, re-produce, transcend and challenge differences, hierarchies, discriminations and vulnerabilities between subjectivities and political positions. Furthermore, vulnerable bodies are agentic, as receptivity, accountability and vulnerability are actually the presuppositions of agency, not its opposites.48 In short, vulnerability is enabling for our being in the world; that is, vulnerability is a ‘condition of potential that makes possible other conditions’, including peace. It can be argued that Kaisu’s bold appearance in the documentary film was a political event of claiming back her silenced body and evoking recognition of the existence of the bodies of her kind. Her vulnerable body thereby carried an agentic capacity capable of challenging the existing hierarchies, discriminations and differences. Although vulnerability can be seen as a shared human condition, it is lived and experienced in different ways, as well as distributed unequally, as argued above. The ways in which we live and are affected can be understood only in light of the particularity of embodied, social and mundane experiences. It is in this way that feminist and critical theorising of the body, the everyday and vulnerability open up new pathways to re-theorise peace. Peace is something that becomes expressed and takes place through acts and points of everyday contact between variously situated and variously vulnerable bodies – namely, in corporeal events where accountability, response-ability, recognition and acknowledgement emerge. The pluralistic and critical approaches indicated in my agenda are more sensitive to the changing patterns and dynamics of peace than many abstract, ontologically solid or violence-dependent approaches.

#### The only choice we have as we mature is how we inhabit our vulnerability, how we become larger and more courageous and more compassionate through our intimacy with disappearance, our choice is to inhabit vulnerability as generous citizens of loss, robustly and fully, or conversely, as misers and complainers, reluctant and fearful, always at the gates of existence, but never bravely and completely attempting to enter, never wanting to risk ourselves, never walking fully through the door.

# 2AC

## Cap

#### Economic competition is based in hegemonic masculinity—the aff controls the internal link to their impacts

Elias and Beasley 09 [Elias, Juanita *associate professor in international political economy* and Beasley, Christine *professor of politics at University of Adelaide*. “Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization: “Transnational Business Masculinities” and Beyond”. *Globalizations, 6(2)*. **2009**.]

For key critical masculinity scholars **it is globalization—specifically a multinational-led neoliberal globalization—that is recognised as ‘the most obviously important’ issue in the future of the field researching masculinity.** Specifically, **this is understood in terms of ‘the relation of masculinities to those emerging dominant powers in the global capitalist economy, the transnational corporations’** (Connell et al., 2005, p. 9). Connell’s particular contribution to this field is that **globalization, in creating what has been termed a ‘world’ or ‘global gender order’, involves the re-articulation of national hegemonic masculinities into the global arena. Specifically he refers here to ‘transnational business masculinity’, which he describes as definitively taking the leading role as the emergent gendered world order,** an order **associated with the dominant institutions of the world economy and the globalization of the neo-liberal market agenda.** **The leading role of transnational business masculinity re-articulates older and more locally based bourgeois managerial hegemonic masculinities** (Connell, 2005b, pp. 84, 76-7; Connell, 2005a, p. 263; Connell and Wood, 2005). In this account **transnational business masculinity is seen to occupy the position of hegemonic masculinity on a world scale**—that is to say, a dominant form of masculinity that embodies, organizes, and legitimates men’s domination in the world gender order as a whole (Connell, 2000, p. 46). This notion of hegemonic masculinity is, however, understood as embodying more that just a Gramscian-style mechanism for gaining consent. Rather, the political legitimating meaning of hegemonic masculinity quickly slides towards its meaning as the ‘dominant’ masculinity and how an actual group of men ‘embodies’ this dominant positioning, including how this group exhibits particular personality traits. Connell asserts that ‘**world politics is now more and more organized around the needs of transnational capital’, placing ‘strategic power in the hands of particular groups of men—managers and entrepreneurs’—who self-consciously manage their bodies and emotions as well as money, and are increasingly detached from older loyalties to nation, business organisation, family and marital partners** (Connell, 2005a, p. xxiii; Connell and Wood, 2005, p. 359). Drawing upon Connell’s work the sociologist **Joan Acker endorses this view that hegemonic masculinities are embodied in the specific characteristics of multinational business-men suggesting that we think of ‘Rupert Murdoch, Phil Knight or Bill Gates’. Adding ‘[t]his masculinity is supported and reinforced by the ethos of the free-market, competition and a “win or die” environment. This is the masculine image of those who organize and lead the drive to global control and the opening of markets to international competition’** (Acker 2004, p. 29). **These men are**, in Connell’s account, **dispositionally highly atomistic—competitive and largely distanced from social or personal commitments. They embody a neo-liberal version of an emphasized traditional masculinity, without any requirement to direct bodily strength** (Connell, 2005a, pp. xxiii, 255-6; Connell, 2005b, p. 77).

#### Perm do both—Ideals of subjectivity and precarity define modern neoliberalism—historical materialist accounts fail—aff’s rearticulation of the subject is key

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It is my contention that Foucault’s “post-Marxist” insights about the intrinsic link between productive practices of power and forms of the subject must remain central in our critical analyses of the neoliberal turn. While in many Marxist accounts neoliberalism is understood simply as an intensification of capitalist exploitation, which is heightening the fundamental class antagonism between capitalists and laborers, from a Foucauldian perspective it must be understood as a new configuration of power relations that produces new forms of the subject. We have to recognize the historically specific ways that the instability and the persistent crises of capitalism have been negotiated in recent decades through neoliberal forms of governmentality – new political technologies of power and social regulation. Many socialist writers have lamented that the retreat from class analysis in the academy in the eighties and nineties was one of neoliberalism’s most effective weapons because it prevented class-consciousness from developing as the appropriate response to the rise of neoliberalism.[[3]](http://theoryculturesociety.org/johanna-oksala-on-foucault-marx-and-neoliberal-subjects/#_ftn3) While the spread of neoliberalism is clearly inseparable from the structural logic of capitalist accumulation, to view the subjects it produces simply as class subjects who lack the appropriate consciousness of their situation is nevertheless problematic in my view. While it is important to acknowledge that in his lectures on neoliberalism, The Birth of Biopolitics(2008), Foucault describes technologies and rationalities rather than their actual empirical outcomes, empirical and experiential evidence gives weight to the theoretical claim that the neoliberal reorganization of Western societies has resulted in new forms of the subject – a new understanding of ourselves. Social volatility and economic risks have become increasingly central for profit making and the financialization of everyday life requires new kinds of subjects and social networks (Floyd 2009, 196). Neoliberal governmentality has dramatically extended the reach of the markets and market rationality and thereby produced the corresponding subjects who are compelled to behave as market actors – consumers, individual investors and entrepreneurs – across several dimensions of their lives. As Foucault shows, neoliberal techniques scramble the traditional opposition between capitalists and workers in the sense that subjects are increasingly conceived and conceive themselves as entrepreneurs of the self, who attempt to maximize their “human capital”. Whether we focus on the reforms of pension plans and healthcare, revisions of copyright laws or the restructuring of universities, we are increasingly required to view ourselves as market-actors and to behave accordingly.[[4]](http://theoryculturesociety.org/johanna-oksala-on-foucault-marx-and-neoliberal-subjects/#_ftn4) These new forms of governmentality and social regulation are misrecognized insofar as they are identified as “merely” cultural or superstructural.[[5]](http://theoryculturesociety.org/johanna-oksala-on-foucault-marx-and-neoliberal-subjects/#_ftn5) The historically specific practices of power in which we must engage daily in order to go about our lives are not just symbolic, cultural or discursive practices as Foucault’s Marxist critics sometimes claim. They are essentially material, social and economic practices that are organized through neoliberal rationality and embedded in law and political institutions, but also in everyday social relationships. Hence, we are not confronted merely with ideological fiction that could be dispelled through the development of appropriate class-consciousness; we are confronted with a new kind of social reality. What the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberalism downplays in my view, however, is the necessary “failures” of neoliberal governmentality to constitute entrepreneurial subjects – the neoliberal constitution of “others”. The obstacles in the way of developing class consciousness are also “objective” in the second sense that we are witnessing other, radically new forms of subjectivation that are brought about by the global, neoliberal turn: the unemployed and the undocumented subjects, as well as the neocolonial, disposable subjects of the global South. It is widely acknowledged by numerous socialist writers that the composition of the workforce has dramatically changed in the last decades due to the globalization and neoliberalization of our economies. The industrial working class has been shrinking in all Western countries at a rapid rate, and has been largely replaced by post-industrial, service-sector workers, who are largely female and in part-time or precarious employment. Instead of social relations based on relatively stable forms of wage-labor, the growth of insecurity and negative flexibilization have come to increasingly characterize all work. Moreover, the majority of the poorest and the most oppressed people in the world today are not wage-laborers. They are people who have to eke out a precarious existence in the informal economy because capitalism appears to have no use for them at all. In other words, the forms of exploitation have not only assumed radically new forms, but it has become increasingly unclear what the class relations are and how we are situated in their intersections. It is imperative to also theorize these new forms of the subject and the political potential they hold for radical social transformation. That requires acknowledging the limits of both Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism, as well as traditional Marxist class analysis, and moving beyond them.

#### Vulnerability DA--Neoliberalism depends on the narcissistic fantasy of mastery that disavows vulnerability as dependence—alt reproduces neoliberalism without the aff

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It is a hallmark of US neoliberal political life that the more people are rendered vulnerable and dispensable, the more the state of vulnerability becomes figured as shameful. As many have noted (see, for example, [Centeno and Cohen, 2012](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib19)), increased income inequality has led the privileged to rationalize their privilege, which in turn has led to decreasing empathy for the poor. [Lamont (2000)](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib51), who interviewed white and black working-class men in New York in the 90s, found that neoliberal economic realities and the decline of traditional collective sources of solidarity had rendered white working-class men quite vulnerable. One way they dealt with their heightened feelings of vulnerability was to draw boundaries between the deserving and the undeserving poor, the latter of whom they associated with blackness (see also [Wacquant, 2001b](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib85)). Indeed, by the 90s in the US, the white imaginary offered two predominant socially reviled subject positions to poor African Americans: the omnipotent male criminal, who terrorizes vulnerable whites with his nefarious entrepreneurial skills, and his split-off other side, the female welfare dependent, who, since Reagan, has held all of the country’s disavowed need and has been used as a signifier of the failures of big government. As I shall argue, a typical form of splitting endemic to neoliberal practices and ideologies pits omnipotent narcissistic versions of autonomy against degraded narcissistic versions of dependence. This instance of a racist white imaginary well exemplifies how a radical split between autonomy and dependence can be projected seamlessly onto a racialized and gendered divide.

#### Breaking the fantasy of mastery with an affirmation of vulnerability is critical to overcoming neoliberal subjectivity

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As noted earlier, [Binkley (2009](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib9), [2011a](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib10), [2011b](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib11), [2014](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib12)) and other non-psychoanalytic thinkers focus on neoliberal subjective practices that demand a shift from comfort with dependence to repudiation of dependence. In a psychoanalytic frame, however, which recognizes no possibility of overcoming dependence, the task is to comprehend the psychic effects of a cultural lack of attunement to dependency needs and a cultural encouragement to split off and project dependency needs and vulnerability. Such effects, as we have seen, include intense shame about dependence (see [Jimenez and Walkerdine, 2012](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib43)), omnipotent versions of autonomy, and narcissistic processes that include oscillations between grandiosity and self-deprecation with regard to the self, and idealization and devaluation with regard to the relation with others. These narcissistic states and oscillations are motored by the fantasies subtending the fetish structure of a perverse society that disavows a reality marked by gross failures of accountability and proper caretaking by those in authority ([Layton, 2010](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib58)). The fantasies endemic to narcissistic neoliberal subject formation are produced in part by the radical split between autonomy and connection described earlier (and enacted differently by different groups): in the autonomy fantasy, we imagine ourselves self-sufficient and omnipotent, needing no one (the entrepreneurial self); in the fantasy marked by neoliberalism’s degraded state of dependency, we fantasize that we will be loved and taken care of without having to make any effort. [Chang and Glynos (2011)](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib20) and [Glynos (2014a](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib33), [2014b](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib34)) have well elaborated the ways that overinvestment in these fantasy logics operates in contemporary UK political culture, issuing in oscillations between policies that reproduce dependency and policies that punish dependency.

**Marxism operates from a starting point that ignores sexual difference and footnotes any feminist struggle**

**Hartmann, 2006** - Heidi Hartmann is a feminist economist and the founder of the Institute for Women's Policy Research, a scientific research organization formed to meet the need for women-centered, public policy research, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, HEIDI I. HARTMANN, *United States 1945- . Economist. Founding Director of the Institute for Women's Policy Research (1987).* Capitalism and Women's Work in the Home, 1900-1930 *(1976),* Women's Work, Aden's Work: Sex Segregation on the Job (1981), Comparable Worth: New Directions for Research *(1985),* Women, Work, and Poverty: Woman-Centered Research for Policy Change *(2006).*

T**he "marriage" of marxism and feminism has been like the marriage husband and wife depicted in English common law: marxism and feminism are one, and that one is Marxism.** **Recent attempts to integrate marxism and feminism are unsatisfactory to us as feminists because they subsume the femi­nist struggle into the "larger" struggle against capi­tal.** To continue our simile further, either we need a healthier marriage or we need a divorce. The inequalities in this marriage, like most social phenomena, are no accident. **Many marxists typical­ly argue that feminism is at best less important than class conflict and at worst divisive of the working class. This political stance produces an analysis that absorbs feminism into the class struggle**. Moreover, **the analytic power of marxism with respect to capital has obscured its limitations with respect to sexism.** We will argue here that while marxist analysis provides essential insight into the laws of historical develop­ment, and those of capital in particular, **the categories of marxism are sex-blind.** **Only a specifically feminist analysis reveals the systemic character of relations between men and women.** Yet feminist analysis by itself is inadequate because it has been blind to his­tory and insufficiency materialist. **Both Marxist anal­ysis, particularly its historical and materialist method, and feminist analysis, especially the identification of patriarchy as a social and historical structure, must be drawn upon if we are to understand the development of western capitalist societies and the predicament of women within them**. In this essay we suggest a new direction for marxist feminist analysis. I MARXISM AND THE WOMAN QUESTION The woman question has never been the "femi­nist question." **The feminist question is directed at the causes of sexual inequality between women and men, of male dominance over women. Most marxist analyses of women's position take as their question the relationship of women to the eco­nomic system, rather than that of women to men, apparently assuming the latter will be explained in their discussion of the former. Marxist analysis** of the woman question has taken three main forms. All **see women's oppression .in our connection** (or lack of it) **to production**, **Defining women as part of the working class, these analyses consistently subsume women's relation to men under worker's relation to capital**. First, early marxists, including Marx, Engels, Kautsky, and Lenin, saw capitalism drawing, all women into the wage labor force, and saw this process destroying the sexual division, of labor. Second, contemporary marxists have incor­porated, women into an analysis of evervdav life in capitalism. In this view, all aspects of our lives are seen to reproduce the capitalist system and we are all workers in the system. And third,, marxist femi­nists have focused on housework and its relation to capital, some arguing that housework produces surplus value and that houseworkers work directly for capitalists. . . . While the approach of the early marxists ignored housework and stressed women's labor force par­ticipation, the two more recent approaches em­phasize housework to such an extent they ignore women's current role in the labor market. Never­theless, **all three attempt to include women in the category working class and to understand women's oppression as another aspect of class oppression**. **In doing so all give short shrift to the object of feminist analysis, the relations between women and men.** **While our "problems" have been elegantly analyzed, they have been misunderstood**. The focus of Marxist analysis has been class relations; the object of marxist analysis has been understanding the laws of motion of capitalist society. While we be­lieve marxist methodology can be used to formulate feminist strategy, these marxist feminist approaches discussed above clearly do not do so; their marxism clearly dominates their feminism. Marxism enables us to understand many as­pects of capitalist societies: the structure of pro­duction, the generation of a particular occupational structure, and the nature of the dominant ideology. **Marx's theory of the development of capitalism is a theory of the development of "empty places."** Marx predicted, for example, the growth of the proletariat and the demise of the petit bourgeoisie. More pre­cisely and in more detail, Braverman among others has explained the creation of the "places" clerical worker and service worker in advanced capitalist societies.2 **Just as capital creates these places indifferent to the individuals who fill them, the cat­egories of marxist analysis, class, reserve army of labor, wage laborer, do not explain why particular people, fill particular places. They give no clues about why women are subordinate to men inside and outside the family and why it is not the other way around.** **Marxist categories, like capital itself, are sex-blind. The categories of Marxism cannot tell us who will fill the empty places. Marxist analysis of the woman question has suffered from this basic problem.**

## AT: Set Col

#### Perm – do both – enables a recognition that what is shared between the story of Middle Eastern conquest and Native displacement is a vulnerability that props up and defends a paternal American savior

Lubin 2008 (Alex, Professor of American Studies at the University of New Mexico, “’We Are All Israelies’” in *South Atlantic Quarterly*)

The comparative imaginaries that have linked the U.S. West to the Orient reemerge in the George W. Bush administration’s desire to “smoke” Osama Bin Laden “out of his cave.”25 The invocation of the Western drama of settler colonialism has always animated American thinking about and activity in the Middle East, and Bush is merely tapping into a well of affective politics that links the United States to the Middle East as well as provides sup- port for increased surveillance and the suspension of rights domestically. Yet, in the contemporary era of neoliberal globalization, the United States’ comparative rendering of the Middle East through its own settler colonial past has been multiplied and transformed into a “global war on terror.” That is, the United States’ unparalleled superpower status enables it to universalize and globalize its comparative politics into a global “clash of civilizations.”26 Comparisons animate the contemporary conflict against “terrorism” as U.S. war officials battle daily to shape the story of the Iraq war by comparing the contemporary battle against “Islamo-fascism” to the antiracist and anti- Fascist memory of World War II. In 2007, President Bush inadvertently cautioned legislators to continue absurdly high rates of war funding so as not to repeat the mistakes of Vietnam, when, according to Bush, the U.S. superpower was undermined domestically by an emasculated Left unable to endure the rigors of war. The comparative turn, hinging on the seem- ing nobility of World War II and the darkness of Vietnam, illustrates an uneasy empire’s attempt to maintain contradictions in the face of messy facts on the ground. Yet these comparisons are always fraught and invite unintended readings. Comparing Israeli and U.S. settler colonialisms seeks to shatter the patina of exceptionalism, as well as the “state of exception,” to use Giorgio Agamben’s term, that currently justifies the military, social, and cultural occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, staking a claim for similarity—not exactness—allows us to see particular sites of state and imperial rule not in isolation but as constitutive of larger global systems and circuits of power.27 Although most settler colonies come to an end through a suc- cessful anticolonial rebellion or through the absorption of the settler colony into the mother country, the legacy of colonial rule in places like the U.S. Southwest continues to haunt the postcolonial society. Comparing occu- pied Palestine to the postcolonial U.S. Southwest reveals each location in a new light: we are able to recognize colonial rule in the Middle East as well as the colonial present in the U.S. Southwest.

#### Imperial violence “here” and “there” represent different intensities of the same ideology

Maira 2008 (Sunaina, Prof. of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, Belly-Dancing: Arab Face, orientalist…” in *American Studies*)

In contrast to Britain or France, for example, the United States did not have a direct colonial relationship with the Middle East but has had a history of covert interventions and non-territorially based policies to assert its political, economic, and military interests and hegemony in the region, especially since World War II.11 Furthermore, the United States has a long history, since its wars in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in 1898, of “imperialism with- out colonies” or of “informal empire.”12 This neocolonialist model is rooted in what some call the strategy of “New Empire,” promulgated by Theodore Roosevelt and other early twentieth century figures who wanted to expand U.S. economic and military power without the burden—and stigma—of administering overseas colonies.13 However, Neil Smith argues that 1898 was not a sharp break between “formal” and “informal” modes of empire, but rather a transition in evolving forms of U.S. expansionism that continued to use territorialized forms of domination, globally and also domestically (confining Native Americans; enslaving African Americans; and importing Asian, Latin American, and Arab labor).14 This imperial expansion and conquest of new geographic and cultural frontiers was accompanied by the appropriation and exploration of “other” cultures, which shaped the crafting of a distinctly “American” national identity. Images of the “Orient” and processes of cultural appropriation are key to the everyday cultures of U.S. imperialism and imperial feelings, for they have long provided Americans with “opportunities for creating selves and settings of aesthetic appeal and social charisma” and with a “foil for the ‘progress’ that many Americans so assiduously pursued as their birthright and destiny.”15 Orientalist images of Muslim “infidels” and “barbaric” Arabs have histori- cally permeated U.S. popular culture, providing an antithesis for American national identity and helping to legitimate U.S. imperial expansion and racial domination, including its interventions and support for colonialist projects in the Middle East. American Orientalization of Muslims and Arabs has a long history that can be traced to the foundational Holy Land myths of the Christian settlers and the U.S. Navy’s war with the Barbary states (early “terrorists” in the Mediterranean) in the 1780s.16 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States ventured into trade with the Middle East during what Mark Twain described as the “Gilded Age,” and American missionaries, tourists, and merchants contributed to racist as well as romanticized notions of the “Orient” that was imagined as “exotic” as well as “backward.”17 These stereotypes crystallized in archives of American Orientalism that were shaped by historical events, including U.S. support for the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the creation of the state of Israel in the Middle East in 1948, the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran and installation of the Shah in 1953, the attack on Beirut in 1958, the OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s, the American hostage crisis of 1979, and the two wars on Iraq.18 Strikingly, the repertoire of American Orientalism has remained relatively stable as U.S. strategic, economic, and political interests in the Middle East have drawn it more deeply into the region.

#### Only the AFF resolves the internal link to imperialism and colonialism. We challenge the Western Savior narrative that presents the US as the savior of “our” and “their” women as an excuse for colonial expansion.

Teresa **Heffernan**, Professor Saint Mary’s University, Canada. “Feminism Against the East/West Divide: Lady Mary's Turkish Embassy Letters” Eighteenth-Century Studies Volume 33, Number 2, Winter **2000**

In an episode of Cervantes's Don Quixote (1604) entitled "The Captive's Tale," a Moorish woman and a Spaniard arrive at an inn where Don Quixote and various guests are lodged. After reassuring the guests, who are disturbed by the presence of the veiled woman, that although his companion is "Moorish...in body and dress," she is "in her soul...a very good Christian," the Spaniard begins to tell of his adventures and she is persuaded to remove her veil. 10 While fighting for "his God and king" against the Turks at the battle of Lepanto (1571), the Spaniard recounts, he was captured and imprisoned in Algeria. Coming to his rescue, a wealthy Moorish woman promised to free and marry him in return for taking her to Christian lands. This woman, his traveling companion, "the most beautiful princess in the whole kingdom," according to the Spaniard, betrayed her father, denounced her people, and changed her name from Zoraida to Maria, warning her Spanish savior "'Do not trust [End Page 203] any Moor; they are all deceitful.'" 11 The Christian victory at the battle of Lepanto, was, according to the Spaniard, the moment "when the insolent pride of the Ottoman's was broken for ever," proving to "all the nations" that the Ottoman empire was penetrable; his story of this veiled woman's unveiling seems to support this claim.¶ As the balance of power shifts and Islam begins to lose ground, the West asserts its dominance by speaking for and producing a silenced Orient, much as the Spaniard speaks for his silent Moorish companion. Moreover, this tale of conquest and domination, which involves the emasculation of the Eastern father and the "rescue" of the daughter, underscores a seminal change in the relations of East and West. No longer is this story just about the Christians against the infidels, as in the Crusades. Rather, Zoraida's father, on discovering his daughter's complicity in the betrayal, accuses her of joining the captive not for reasons of faith, but in order to indulge in the "immorality" of the West and to satiate "her wicked desires": "Do not imagine that she has been moved to change her faith out of a belief that your religion is better than ours. No, it is because she knows that immorality is more freely practised in your country than in ours." 12 Caught between the captive's reading of her in terms of a sexual conquest and her father's reading of her in terms of sexual perversion, Zoraida as the (un)veiled woman is doubly silenced. This tale, ostensibly about religious difference (the daughter wants to convert to Christianity), undergoes an important shift in this scene as the religious tension between West and East is recast into its modern form. In this East/West divide, depending on which side articulates the dispute, the West's moral decay is pitted against the East's spirituality or, alternately, Western freedom and reason are pitted against Eastern fundamentalism.¶ Despite the commercial and diplomatic alliance between Britain and Turkey (which encouraged Queen Elizabeth to solicit the help of the Sultan against the idol-worshipping Spanish), like the captive's tale, many of the earliest travel narratives about the Orient written by the merchants of the Levant Company, established in 1581, stressed the cultural divide between East and West, keeping "intact the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness." 13 Looking back over the life of the Company in 1893 and paying homage to its "heroic" colonial past, Theodore Bent writes in his introduction to an edition of the diaries of two early merchants (Dallam and Covel), The Levant Company, "besides the amount of wealth it accumulated for this country, did infinite service in the development of art and research, geography and travel, the suppression of slavery, and the spread of civilization in countries which would still have been unapproachable, had not the continued efforts of the 244 years [the life of the Company] been towards civilization and humanity." 14 As a burgeoning publishing industry begins to develop around these tales of the "exotic" east in the late seventeenth century, in these narratives, like in the "Captive's Tale," the construction of the (un)veiled woman is central to the depiction of the East as barbaric. These colonial narratives thus justified the economic domination and exploitation of foreign markets with scandalous stories that testified to the essentially uncivilized behavior of distant neighbors. In his diary that details his travels in the Levant (1599), Thomas Dallam mentions catching a glimpse of the Signor's concubines through a grate in a "very thick wall" surrounded by "very strong iron"; he lingers, on pain of death, over the spectacle of these bejeweled captive women, perversely commenting that the sight "did please me wondrous well." 15 In an entry of his diary dated 23 May 1676, John Covel tells a sordid tale about a slave of great beauty, [End Page 204] who is ravished by an admirer. The Sultan, overcome "with madnesse that he lost one so sweet," beheads the man and takes the girl for his harem. 16 Bon Ottaviano writes of the eleven or twelve hundred virgins that make up the Sultan's harem in his 1625 account of the Ottoman Court. He further gives details of the brutality these women faced at the hands of the Grand Seignior, claiming that in some cases the punishment involved them being bound hand and foot, put into a sack, and thrown into the sea in the dark of night. Furthermore, he tells us that these "young, lusty, lascivious wenches" are allowed radishes, cucumbers, and gourds only in slices to prevent them from engaging in any unnatural or unclean acts. 17 Robert Withers, who claimed Ottaviano's 1625 account as his own, embellished this already exaggerated and inaccurate narrative with more lurid details about life in the harem, rashly claiming to have penetrated it. Finally, Jean Dumont comments in A New Voyage to the Levant (1696) on the Sultan's wives who, he reports, are guarded by white and black eunuchs "who never permit'em to enjoy the least Shadow of liberty." 18¶ These largely fictitious (given the fact that male travelers had no access to women's quarters) and, at the very least, grossly distorted accounts of the abusive treatment of the veiled woman are standard tropes of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century travel narratives to the Levant. At once voyeuristic and indignant, these travel narratives distracted attention from the gender inequities at home, presented the Orient as a place in need of rescue, and secured the idea of Europe as free, fair, and civilized. These narratives also allowed the male reader to experience vicariously the role of hero or savior, in the colonial vein of "white men saving brown women from brown men," while satisfying fantasies of penetration and domination of the East. 19 Furthermore, despite the similarities in the subordinate positions of women in the East and West, the veiled woman, as portrayed in these narratives, becomes one of the most powerful symbols of the "irrationality" and "backwardness" of Islam. Jean Dumont, claiming there is "no slavery equal to that of the Turkish Woman," suggests that these customs are the result of a mind that "is at the bottom nothing else but a pure Insensibility and a Weakness that is altogether inexcusable in any reasonable creature." 20¶ This seventeenth- and eighteenth-century orientalist literature that foregrounds the trials of the (un)veiled woman is already part of the story of the West's shift to modernity. While the West was preoccupied with the struggle of liberating itself from the tyranny of the father and articulating itself as secular, a story in which paternal rule is replaced by a fraternal order and reason displaces faith, Islam was perceived as arrested, irrational, and backward, still enslaved by despots. The modern understanding of the opposition between a traditional, religious, and conservative Islam that values community, faith, and spirituality and a modern, secular, and progressive society, which is founded on liberty, reason, and materialism, in short, the contemporary East/West divide, is already evident in these tales. Like Zoraida, the (un)veiled woman, captive in this narrative, can only be "saved" from her culture or "submit" to it.

## Academy

### Feminism Specific

#### We can use educational forums and research to solve for structural issues and the issues in the Academy

**Lynch 1999** (Kathleen, University of Dublin, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 30, No. 1, January, 1999, pp. 41-69)

Feminist scholars have been especially effective in challenging the core epistemological and methodological assumptions of mainstream social scientific practice. They have challenged patterns of bias in research design, including the absence of research on questions of central importance to women; the focus on elitest research topics; the naive understanding of objectivity; the improper interpretation and overgeneralisation of findings; and inadequate data dissemination (Jayaratne and Stewart, 1995, p. 218). Not only have feminist theorists been to the fore in the critique of positivism, they have also been leaders in developing a theory of emancipatory action through education and research ( Harding, 1987; Humphries and Truman, 1994; Lather, 1991; Lentin, 1993; Mies, 1984; Smith, 1987; Stanley and Wise, 1983; Weiler, 1988). They have encouraged women to engage in action both in and through education, and through research; they have also attempted to document the type of the procedures which must be followed in order to create an emancipatory research approach. Lather claims that: 52 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW ... the development of emancipatory social theory requires an empirical stance which is open-ended, dialogically reciprocal, grounded in respect for human capacity, and yet profoundly sceptical of appearances and “common sense”. Such an empirical stance is, furthermore, rooted in a commitment to the long-term, broad-based ideological struggle to transform structural inequalities (Lather, 1986, p. 269). The challenge posed by critical and feminist theories for research in terms of reflexivity, dialogue and co-operation with marginalised people, are considerable. An even greater challenge is how to establish collaborative practices between theorist/researcher and marginalised peoples which will ensure that the understandings arrived at can work towards a transformative outcome. To confront the latter challenge is to confront the forces of interest within the academy itself.

### AT: vagueness bad

#### Their obsession with blueprinted methods and separation of the theoretical from the material crowds out nuance and leaves the judge to default to normative Western modes of adjudicating critical thought – vote aff to subvert the university’s imperative for clarity

Hoofd 17 [Ingrid M. Hoofd (2017) “Higher Education and Technological Acceleration: The Disintegration of University Teaching and Research” Palgrave Macmillan, New York, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51409-7]//jz

Several years ago, the media and communications programme in NUS saw the need for an ethics module, and I was invited to create and teach this module. That this course became mandatory within this particular programme is, in light of the connection I outlined in Chap. 1between communication technologies and academic acceleration, no surprise: the integration of more and more complex media technology into society creates a host of new ethical dilemmas, and students, so the argument goes, should be taught how to manage these dilemmas and technologies in their ‘real’ jobs after university. This argument is of course not unique to this particular university. The shift from an industrial social order towards a society marked by new media technologies has resulted in a proliferation of debates and agendas on the teaching of moral guidelines in academia and other educational institutions, and in many ways follows Ortega y Gasset’s call to teach the students what they need to know by way of imparting only that cultural and moral knowledge that may function as a ‘method’ or roadmap. At Utrecht University, for instance, the Media and Culture Department in the Humanities Faculty at which I currently teach has attempted to heed students’ needs by responding to the advice from an external visiting committee demanding more transparency in teaching. The Department did so by implementing the requirement that end goals and methods are made explicit in module syllabi and student theses, and that courses are to focus on the transmission of clear skills rather than ‘obscure theory.’ But while such attempts at transparency are seemingly well meant and generous to the students, they ultimately divorce methods IDEALISTIC SELF-DELUSIONS AND THE LIMITS OF NOSTALGIA 73and skills from their grounding theoretical (and hence always subjective) perspectives, much like Ortega y Gasset implies that the teaching of mere ‘roadmaps’ is an ultimately neutral or positive affair. Methods, as its etymology indeed suggests, are convenient roadmaps in Ortega y Gasset’s sense, but are always specifi c to a certain theoretical tradition and hence can always be questioned for their limitations. What is more, the emphasis on methods seems to arise from a fear of the confusion and partial subjectivity of student assessment on the basis of the inter-subjective teacher– student relationship within a certain tradition, and hence appears as an attempt to stamp out the ‘noise’ emanating from the Lyotardian ‘demise of great narratives’ in the postmodern European context. This obsession with methods can therefore be interpreted as akin to the onslaught of cybernetics and quantifi cation, which seeks to suppress the complications of thinking as dialectical in the university at large from the larger speedelitist context which this cybernetic machinery serves. Staff and student work in turn increasingly resembles a fi nally immoral—because blind to its reproduction of inequalities—form of automated production and an ever more hastily churning out of research and writing. Student theses, for instance, having to bow to the demands of a standardised assessment form in which supposedly crucial aspects of the thesis are presented as separate entities (for instance, the method employed needs to be rendered explicit and is assessed separately from the theoretical framework in the form), leads to narrow ‘assembly-line’ write-ups that merely seek to ‘tick the boxes’ without any critical or holistic considerations around rhetoric and perspective. More disturbingly, students that attempt a more daring or original piece of writing for their theses tend to get penalised when, for instance, not explicitly stating the method employed, even if management claims that the form is not meant to be prescriptive. This deplorable practice is therefore reminiscent of the ‘drilling’ and disciplining of the student (and the lecturer or supervisor), as the compulsory transparency of goals and methods lead to a situation that becomes completely blind and disrespectful to how the outcome of the pedagogical student–teacher relationship can and should never be fully known in advance in order to remain a scene of insightful transformation for the student and teacher away from the cybernetic compulsion of the neoliberal economy. In other words, if the pedagogical scene wishes to be as hospitable and promissory as possible so that radically new understandings may emerge (and the student can truly grow), it is imperative that module goals remain partly oblique and emergent, and that methods 74 I.M. HOOFDare always also questioned and unpacked for their partial and subjective (often European and masculine) theoretical underpinnings and traditions. After all, the term ‘theory’ is derived from the Greek θεωρειν or ‘being a spectator in a theatre,’ and hence always implies not only a partial or subjective position, but also an element of contextual inter-subjectivity. The formulation of strict methods is therefore one particular instance of a problematic transcendence via an erasure of the non-neutral grounds of theory. The faculty examination board at Utrecht thus attempts to ‘eliminate the noise’ of teacher and student subjectivity and respond to the demands of the market, while failing to understand that not only such inter-subjective ‘noise’ is precisely what makes teaching, learning, and pedagogical communication possible, but also that the main ‘culture’ of the humanities traditionally is one of questioning methods and critiquing all forms of non-neutral automation in order to invite a radically different future. The acceleration of the aporia can therefore be keenly felt around these pedagogical demands from the management (and beyond) as well as in my supervision and teaching at Utrecht University; an increasingly unsure student body demand being taught ever clearer ‘methods’ and ‘skills,’ while at the same time, some of these students get ever more self-doubting and even display a recalcitrance with the university as such, being unsure how to properly understand their own fears and doubts as a logical product of the aporetic demands the university and the lecturer makes on them. What is more, the rendering transparent of methods and goals while eliding the controversies underlying them has in many cases the paradoxical outcome of making the students understand less, as they, for instance, logically cannot comprehend why all the great texts of the humanities tend not to have an explicit methods section, while they have to focus so much on methods in their theses. Eventually therefore, this attempt at complete transparency does the students and the staff a disservice, even if it seems to dutifully cater to their needs and uses. Interestingly also, while the harking back to the teaching of theoretical traditions in media studies may seem an antidote to the obsession with clear methods and roadmaps, the acceleration of the aporia emerges even stronger in such well-meant attempts to rethink the pedagogical scene as one of Bildung via theoretical—yet eventually also largely white and masculine—culture. In order to counter the obsession with methods and end goals, several of my colleagues and I at Utrecht University set up a task force for rethinking student assessment and pedagogical goals. Our line of reasoning largely is that a more appropriate and generous teaching and IDEALISTIC SELF-DELUSIONS AND THE LIMITS OF NOSTALGIA 75assessment should instead focus on the teaching of the main grounds, theories, and traditions in the humanities at large, so that an ethic of critique and questioning can once more be foregrounded in the media and culture curriculum, as it was in the past. While this at least allows the students to address methods and texts in a critical fashion, the question of course remains whether such a revision—while certainly remaining more hospitable to subjective student and staff otherness than the blind quest for objective module transparency and methodological automation—not also remains wedded to a nostalgic and ultimately problematic Enlightenment agenda. Such a nostalgia for the grounds of (critical) theory hence also appears as a complicit product of the acceleration of higher education, insofar it also performs the Janus-faced logic of academic optimism in light of larger social desperation. What is more, the art of critique (which comes from the Greek κρινειν or ‘to separate’) also requires that aspects are split out or distinguished from one another—left from right, East from West, and neo-liberal from liberal—whereas such divisions are nonetheless intimately entangled with and constitutive of one another, so that technological conditions that collapse the semiotic and functionalist spheres, the simulated playing out of such illusory differences lead to their accelerated reproduction. The problem is thus one of conceiving a truly radical form of questioning or critique by looking closer at the ‘theatrical’ aspect of θεωρειν, while admitting that such a questioning itself performs such theatricality just as much. It is for this reason that, for instance, Gary Genosko addresses the problem of radical theory in Baudrillard’s work as similar to the problem of how to conceive of ‘political theatre’ in “The Drama of Theory,” about which more in Chap. 5 . So in short, I suggest that the debates and agendas that see the solution in a rigorous implementation of moral or methodological roadmaps almost always concern the issue of how to teach a form of refl ection fi t to deal with the moral confusion and supposed ‘loss of values and direction’ (in line with Ortega y Gasset’s lament of fragmentation) due to the arrival of the information age; any illusion of grounding university teaching in some superior European cultural and theoretical tradition runs the risk of closing off alterity, so that it must also question its own grounds. This also becomes clear in the ethics course I had to set up for the communications programme in Singapore, to which I will now turn.

### affect inevitable/necessary/RC

#### Neoliberalism is an affective event – in order to challenge it, our resistance must be affective too

Zembylas 19 [Michalinos Zembylas (2019): The affective dimension of everyday resistance: implications for critical pedagogy in engaging with neoliberalism’s educational impact, Critical Studies in Education, DOI: 10.1080/17508487.2019.1617180]//jz

Resistance is a central concept of the social sciences – a concept that has been widely used in feminist, cultural, poststructural, postcolonial and critical theories (Johansson & Vinthagen, 2016). Despite its extensive use, however, there is considerable disagreement and ambiguity as to what exactly it denotes (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004, p. 549). In their frequently cited review of the origin and status of the concept in the social sciences, Hollander and Einwohner point out that resistance has been used in diverse, imprecise and contradictory ways. One can make a similar argument about critical pedagogy, namely, that the use of the concept of resistance in this field has also been diverse and contradictory, depending on the theoretical framework within which resistance has been framed (e.g. see Kirylo, 2013). It is safe to argue, then, that there is no unified way of defining resistance in critical pedagogy besides a general understanding of this concept as individual or collective acts of opposition, yet what constitutes opposition is not always clear. While debates in the social sciences over the meaning and implications of the concept of resistance have proliferated in recent years, one aspect that has not been adequately explored is the notion of affect (Hynes, 2013). As Hynes has pointed out, CONTACT Michalinos Zembylas m.zembylas@ouc.ac.cy Open University of Cyprus, P. O. Box 12794, Latsia 2252, Cyprus CRITICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION https://doi.org/10.1080/17508487.2019.1617180 © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group since Hollander and Einwohner published their review in 2004 there have been significant shifts in social theory, and most notably affect theory, that call for a reconceptualization of what counts as resistance. ‘Affect’ can generally be understood as relational and embodied intensities that circulate as ‘forces of encounter’; in this sense, affect encompasses and exceeds more individualized conceptions of emotion (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010). What has conventionally been termed ‘resistance’, then, may be reconceptualized in terms of a flux of affects that produces political effects which challenge understandings of power or control (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Hence, recognizing the affective dimension of resistance complements earlier understandings of power and resistance on the basis of a simplistic opposition of human agency and social structure. As Alldred and Fox (2017) suggest: ‘power and resistance are differing aspects of the affective flux between relations in particular assemblages; all events are consequently sites in which both “power” and “resistance” may be discerned’ (p. 1170). In other words, it is suggested that there is need to pay attention to resistance as an affective event, rather than merely as an individual or collective acts of opposition. In particular, resistance against neoliberal reforms in education – e.g. high stakes testing, accountability, standards, and audit regimes (Giroux, 2008; McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2005; Taubman, 2009) – involves significant affective repercussions for teachers and students (Zembylas, 2018b; Bialostok & Aronson, 2016; Hanley, 2015; Moffatt et al., 2018). While there are many definitions of neoliberalism, generally it denotes emphases on productivity, economic liberalization policies, and the significance of the individual (see Springer, Birch, & MacLeavy, 2016). Neoliberalism itself, then, is an affective event, as collective affects emerging from neoliberal policies and practices (e.g. fear, anxiety, anger) are inextricable aspects of the sites, networks and flows of neoliberalism in societies (Anderson, 2014, 2016). Scholars of critical pedagogy have analyzed the pedagogies of the neoliberal project, whose aim is to produce apolitical consumers and future citizens (Odysseos & Pal, 2018), yet the affective dimension of resistance against neoliberalism’s educational impact has not been adequately theorized. The main objective of this article, then, is to discuss the affective dimension of resistance in critical pedagogy in a way that would recognize neoliberalism’s affective repercussions. The point is not merely to show that affect is involved in the emergence of resistance in critical pedagogy, but rather to expand the articulation of resistance in neoliberal education through the lens of affect theory. Specifically, I am interested in theorizing how critical pedagogy can cultivate ‘everyday’ or ‘invisible’ acts of resistance (Scott, 1985, 1989, 1990) that constitute forms of ‘counter-conduct’ (Foucault, 2009) in ways that acknowledge, engage with, and further enhance teachers’ and students’ critical engagement with the affective aspects of resistance and neoliberalism.1 In other words, I theoretically bring together critical pedagogy, affect, everyday resistance, and counter-conduct to examine the following questions: How might we understand resistance in critical pedagogy as a form of affective work? What are the pedagogical implications of recognizing the affective dimension of resistance, particularly in relation to cultivating counter-conductive practices towards neoliberalism?

#### Their understanding of resistance refuses an analysis through affect theory – this dooms their movement to failure as they fall victim to the psychic impacts of neoliberal violence

Zembylas 19 [Michalinos Zembylas (2019): The affective dimension of everyday resistance: implications for critical pedagogy in engaging with neoliberalism’s educational impact, Critical Studies in Education, DOI: 10.1080/17508487.2019.1617180]//jz

In this section, I briefly illustrate how resistance is an affective movement of becoming, rather than an individual act, with consequences for students’ and educators’ bodies, theory, research and practice in education. While others have acknowledged the role of emotions and affect in making sense of how neoliberal changes in education are experienced by students and educators (e.g. see Bialostok & Aronson, 2016; Hanley, 2015; Moffatt et al., 2018), my illustrations – which come from my own research over the years (e.g. Zembylas, 2010, 2015, 2018b, 2018c; Bozalek & Zembylas, 2018) – intend to demonstrate not only how neoliberal policies in education use affects (e.g. fear, anxiety) to produce certain subjectivities (e.g. see Finn, 2016; McKenzie, 2017; Sellar, 2015; Staunæs, 2011), but also how educators and students engage in micro-political movements of affective resistance. To do so, I am using the idea of policy prolepsis introduced by Webb and Gulson (2012) as a methodological tool to identify the particular ways neoliberal policies in education induce and prompt particular behaviors and desires in educators and students.2 Policy prolepses, according to Webb and Gulson, are a category of becoming-policy that shape policy interpretations and practices within the spaces of desired, yet incomplete, policy initiatives and interpretations. ‘Policy prolepses operate through affective tones’ (ibid., p. 91) and ‘are coded affectively’ (ibid., p. 92), positioning policy interpretations as well as subjects themselves. What follows, then, are two brief illustrations of policy prolepsis that show the complexities of affective resistance produced in neoliberal education and its implications. The first example is concerned with how the becoming-policy of standardized professional standards in schools operates affectively in paradoxical and unexpected ways; the second example is concerned with identifying the ambivalent affective assemblages of educators’ and students’ resistance against neoliberal policies at the university level. In the first example, it is shown how the politics of standardized professional standards in schools instill fear, anxiety, stress and anger in teachers, who generate 8 M. ZEMBYLAS micro-political ways of resisting the affective atmospheres invoking normalization of teachers’ pedagogies (see Zembylas, 2010, 2018b). For example, **teachers engage in false compliance, agreeing at a rhetorical level with some aspects of professional standards, while resisting them in practice or denouncing standards in small circles of trusted colleagues**. Importantly, teachers acknowledge the emotional ambivalence of engaging in false compliance: the assemblages of fear and anxiety on the one hand, and the affective atmospheres of solidarity with colleagues, on the other. Clearly, resistance is not always progressive or emancipatory, as teachers themselves often recognize that their subjectivities are caught up in the affective conditions created by such policy interventions, producing tensions, paradoxes and ambivalences in their lives. One may, in fact, explore the numerous (anticipated and unanticipated) micro-political ways of resistance by teachers that might change the rhythms of schooling, producing alternative affective spaces that sometimes enable new embodied encounters and relations (e.g. between teachers and students or between teachers and their colleagues), while other times simply reinforce the negative atmosphere of fear or anger. Illuminating the counter-conductive elements of teachers’ resistances can reveal more specifically how counter-conduct is always prone to the entanglement of governing and surveillance practices (Odysseos & Pal, 2018). Hence, teachers’ affective resistance towards standardizing processes in schools finds itself caught between a negative affective atmosphere (e.g. fear or anger) that could be reproduced and, at the same time, the production of new and unexpected ways of resistance against the material and affective forces that impinge on teachers’ bodies. In all of these different possibilities, an analysis of the affective dimension of resistance requires that we focus upon the micro-politics of the (intended and unintended) affective assemblages in which teachers are a part of. My second example pertains to university students’ protests in 2015 and 2016 against neoliberal and colonial education policies in South Africa, calling for decolonizing higher education and greater access to education, which has resulted in disruptions of examinations and academic programs (Zembylas, 2018c; Luescher & Klemenčič, 2016; Nyamnjoh, 2016; Pillay, 2016).3 I want to draw attention to students’ collective affects (e.g. anger) which circulated through affective economies that operated across universities in the Western Cape (Bozalek & Zembylas, 2018). Collective affects were invigorated by a growing protest against neoliberal and colonial policies in higher education. The anger instilled in students by such policies was transmitted onto local university communities by circulating images of protests through the media. In particular, protests have become a prominent feature of public and university life in South Africa. The process of students’ occupation of university premises, in some cases, and the visibility it gave, especially through violence and the damages caused to university property, made it a transfiguring moment in the lives of the participants and the local community. Hence, there were voices who acknowledged their concomitant responsibility as a result of performing damage to public property that cost considerable amounts of money at a time of scarcity of resources. In our research, for example, there were students and educators who noted how, and in which ways, their subjectivities were produced within assemblages that included ambivalent affective economies – on the one hand, an assemblage of anger against neoliberal policies; on the other hand, CRITICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION 9 an assemblage of disappointment and skepticism for the use of violence as a form of protest, thus questioning the moral legitimacy of (violent) resistance. Counter-conduct offers a compelling concept to understand the form of students’ protests as refusals of subjectivities and as acts of disobedience against being conducted as ‘consumer-students’ (Odysseos & Pal, 2018). However, the framework of counter-conduct, also allows us to grasp counter-conducts as affective mechanisms that may either forge new ways of resisting neoliberal policies or could become co-opted by the politics of violence. Through this tension, it is shown that there are ambivalent affective atmospheres circulating in counter-conductive practices of students and educators that could neither be ‘simply oppositional nor always fully articulated as part of a clear and long-term strategy of resistance’ (Odysseos & Pal, 2018, p. 17). These observations illuminate the affective ambivalence and paradoxicality of resistance against neoliberal policies; in other words, there are limitations in resistance efforts that signal clearly that such attempts may end in failure, possibly reproducing the risks that neoliberalism preys upon. This brief illustration also shows that any such analysis needs to remain attuned to exploring neoliberal policies in education as complex affective sites of producing and contesting subjectivities of students and educators – sites that are open to evading, resisting and redirecting neoliberal and colonial imperatives (Odysseos & Pal, 2018).

### individualized action good/spills up

#### Their understanding of individual resistance/our speech act is reductive – affective dissonance galvanizes resistance beyond specific identity or ideology but towards ending violence

Zembylas 19 [Michalinos Zembylas (2019): The affective dimension of everyday resistance: implications for critical pedagogy in engaging with neoliberalism’s educational impact, Critical Studies in Education, DOI: 10.1080/17508487.2019.1617180]//jz

My analysis has shown that whatever form neoliberalism is taken to be in schools and universities, the neoliberal present has important affective implications. The affective economies of neoliberalism that are produced in schools and universities create particular ‘capacities to affect and be affected’ for teachers and students alike. It is thus extremely important to develop methodological and theoretical tools that critically trace the capacities of teachers and students for affecting and being affected in their engagements and negotiations with neoliberal education, and specifically how these capacities are normalized, embodied or enable alternative counter-practices (Zembylas, 2018b). Hence, what is required is a continued critical engagement with neoliberalism’s educational impact in ways that take into consideration the affective potentialities of resistance. Considering the affective potentialities of resistance in critical pedagogy can be the starting point for alternatives visions of educational policies and practices that challenge forms of neoliberal education. I would argue, then, that what is needed in the study of resistance in critical pedagogy is what Thrift (2008) calls a micro-biopolitical approach (Thrift, 2008) which understands the complexities and ambivalences of neoliberal affects and norms that operate at the mundane, ordinary, and everyday level in schools and universities and the consequences that are produced (Zembylas, 2018b). This micro-biopolitical approach on conceptualizing resistance in critical pedagogy is valuable not only because it pays attention to the affective consequences of mechanisms and techniques of neoliberal education in schools and universities, but also because it invokes what Braidotti (2013) terms ‘affirmative critique’ (see also Staunæs, 2016). An affirmative critique in critical pedagogy, for example, is the sort of critical engagement with ideas 10 M. ZEMBYLAS and things that creates affective spaces for alternative counter-conduct practices against neoliberal education. In other words, recognizing the affective dimension of resistance in critical pedagogy creates openings for an affirmative critique that has the potential to transform teachers’ and students’ capacities to affect and be affected. In considering the approach I am suggesting here to affect and resistance in critical pedagogy, one can indeed raise several questions and concerns such as: How may critical pedagogy itself function as an ‘apparatus of power’ (Anderson, 2014) which uses affect to mobilize resistance towards certain ideologies or structures such as neoliberalism? How are these mobilizations of resistance connected to broader collective conditions and processes of resisting certain ideologies or structures at the macro-political level? How do teachers’ and students’ practices and bodily capacities reproduce or enrich certain mobilizations of resistance through their encounters? How can those practices and bodily capacities be reproductive, adaptive or resistant, whether intentionally or not? (e.g. see McKenzie, 2017). There are no definitive answers to these questions, but they must be posed to show the complexities and ambivalences emerging from attempts to link affect and resistance in critical pedagogy. Hence, I would argue that any viable theorization of resistance in critical pedagogy must not be limited to ‘conventional’ understandings of resistance but must emphasize how affects condition the ways neoliberalism emerges, circulate and are transformed by forms of resistance waged by teachers and students. Greater acknowledgment of the ways in which schools and universities play a fundamental role in the affective conduct of individuals, encouraging and directing the self-perceptions, economic behavior and socio-political actions of students, citizens, and workers (Odysseos & Pal, 2018) will renew theorization of resistance in critical pedagogy in two ways. First, by gesturing toward the particular ways in which affects come to have force and socio-political significance, critical pedagogy disconnects resistance from a psychologized perspective or a perspective that defines resistance in dualistic terms as a matter of either human agency or social structure. This would mean, for instance, **recognizing that resistance is not a set of individualized actions but rather it is very much embedded in the affective infrastructures of neoliberal education**. To create renewed affective relations and assemblages as counter-conduct in schools and universities, then, would essentially mean to invent new affective practices that instigate empowerment and resistance against the various manifestations of neoliberal education. As Alldred and Fox (2017) conclude: It is therefore more accurate to see power and resistance as dual fluxes that permeate all assemblages, a shifting balance that is never finally settled. Defining a certain affect as an assertion of power or an effort at resistance is less important than assessing the capacities that these affects produce. (p. 1171) For example, it is argued that ‘affective solidarity’ is necessary for a sustainable politics of transformation (Hemmings, 2012). Hemmings proposes an approach that moves away from rooting transformation in politics of identity and towards modes of engagement that start from the affective dissonance experience can produce. Although affective dissonance with the experience of neoliberalism’s educational impact, for instance, cannot guarantee a resistant mode, ‘that sense of dissonance might become a sense of injustice and then a desire to rectify that’ (Hemmings, 2012, CRITICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION 11 p. 157). The recognition of affective dissonance as the point of departure for a possible affective solidarity among teachers and student highlights that **affective dissonance with neoliberalism’s educational impact may be a productive basis from which to seek solidarity with others – not based on a shared identity or ideology, but on feeling the desire for transforming the injustices inflicted by neoliberal policies and practices**. Second, the recognition of the affective dimension of resistance in critical pedagogy helps us understand the affective present in and beyond schools and universities as a series of processes and practices in ‘the everyday’ in which the focus is on the actions that are mobilized to produce something rather than on their representations or what they supposedly mean. By examining the consequences of affects at the micropolitical level, resistance can be understood in terms of the ways actions produce capacities to affect and be affected, that is, ‘in terms of the forces circulating in assemblage and the consequent capacities that are produced in assembled relations, including human bodies and subjectivities’ (Alldred & Fox, 2017, p. 1171). Calling upon theoretical insights in critical pedagogy that recognize and examine the affective dimension of everyday resistance is likely to challenge the ‘invisible’ infrastructures of neoliberal education in schools and universities. All in all, the call for a critical pedagogy to acknowledge the affective dimension of resistance marks an important and necessary moment that allows critical pedagogy to be further enriched in attempts to address the challenges faced by teachers and students in neoliberal education. Schools and universities are at a critical juncture whether and how they will be able to develop pedagogies and ideas that neither return to an idealized, pre-neoliberal past, nor expect a sudden revolution but instead resist against the self-formations involved by neoliberalism (Odysseos & Pal, 2018). What I have offered here is an attempt to illuminate the affective dimension of resistance and its implications for critical pedagogy through theoretical insights that enhance individual and collective capacity for counter-conduct in neoliberal contexts. Being attentive to the complexities and potential ambivalences in teachers’ and students’ forms of resistance enhances our analysis of how critical pedagogy more broadly, and schools and universities more specifically, are themselves implicated in transformations of neoliberal education (Odysseos & Pal, 2018).

## AT: Anti-Blackness

#### Systems of power are interlocking and forcing competition links to white masculine rationality

**Collins, 1990**. (Patricia Hill Collins, Associate Professor of African American Studies, University of Cincinnati, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment, 1990, p. 225)

Additive models of oppression are firmly rooted in the either/or dichotomous thinking of Eurocentric, masculinist thought. One must be either Black or white in such thought systems – persons of ambiguous racial and ethnic identity constantly battle with questions such as “what are you, anyway?” This emphasis on quantification and categorization occurs in conjunction with the belief that either/or categories must be ranked. The search for certainty of this sort requires that one side of a dichotomy be privileged while its other is denigrated. Privilege becomes defined in relation to its other. Replacing additive models of oppression with interlocking ones creates possibilities for new paradigms. The significance of seeing race, class, and gender as interlocking systems of oppression is that such an approach fosters a paradigmatic shift of thinking inclusively about other oppressions, such as age, sexual orientation, religion, and ethnicity. Race, class and gender represent the three systems of oppression that most heavily affect African-American women. But these systems and the economic, political, and ideological conditions that support them may not be the most fundamental oppressions, and they certainly affect many more groups than Black women. Other people of color, Jews, the poor, white women, and gays and lesbians have all had similar ideological justifications offered for their subordination. All categories of humans labeled Others have been equated to one another, to animals, and to nature (Halpin 1989). Placing African-American women and other excluded groups in the center of analysis opens up possibilities for a both/and conceptual stance, one in which all groups possess varying amounts of penalty and privilege in one historically created system. In this system, for example, white women are penalized by their gender but privileged by their race. Depending upon the context, an individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed.

#### Violence against the black body occurs through a process of socialization that goes beyond race – must examine the role gender plays

Martinot 7 (Steve, Adjunct Instructor at San Francisco State University,He has been a human rights, union, and community activist for most of his life." Motherhood and the Invention of Race," Hypatia 22.2, 79-97, Project Muse))

An article in The Nation from December 3, 2003, entitled "Criminalizing Motherhood," tells an old story. It is the story of a prosecution, now considered by the state as a precedent; yet it reveals a social logic that has long inhabited U.S. jurisprudence and which the state continues to rehearse and perform. In the cold clang of its historically practiced procedure, that logic is at once recalled and forgotten as a principle governing the United States since its inception. Regina McKnight is doing twelve years in prison for a stillbirth, carving out a dangerous intersection between the drug war and the anti-choice movement. In the eyes of the South Carolina Attorney General's office, McKnight committed murder. Her crime? Giving birth to a five-pound, stillborn baby. As McKnight grieved and held her third daughter Mercedes' lifeless body, she could never have imagined that she was about to become the first woman in America convicted of murder by using cocaine while pregnant. [End Page 79] The absence of any scientific research linking cocaine use to stillbirth didn't matter. Nor did it matter that the state couldn't conclusively prove that McKnight's cocaine use actually caused Mercedes' stillbirth. What mattered was that South Carolina prosecutors were hell-bent on using McKnight as an example. Thanks largely to the efforts of the former Republican Attorney General, Charlie Condon, now running for U.S. Senate, South Carolina is the only state in the nation with a child-abuse law that can be applied to "viable fetuses." . . . McKnight, now 26, was the first to be imprisoned on a murder conviction under the "viable fetuses" law. In October McKnight lost her best shot at release when the Supreme Court decided not to review the case, allowing the conviction to stand by default. (Talvi 2003, 4) The article only allusively suggests that McKnight is black, but it does mention that she is a seasonal tobacco worker, homeless, and at the time of her pregnancy, grieving the death of her own mother, who was run over by a truck. For white jurisprudence, it is neither her homeless exposure to the elements, nor the malnutrition attendant upon underpaid agricultural labor, nor the exhaustion of long work hours, that took her baby's life, but a toke in an unguarded moment. It is not the health of the mother that the state is concerned with; the provision of better labor protections and conditions would have directly enhanced the baby's biological well being. And neither is it McKnight's misery, since that is precisely what the state uses against her by prosecuting her for drug use rather than providing her with prenatal medical care. Whatever defense she might have wished to offer concerning her homelessness, her bereavement, or the duress of her daily toil, were discounted in advance. McKnight's health is an extraneous concern and her humanity irrelevant. Yet insofar as the state has shown no interest in the health or viability of either mother or child, its juridical concept of 'viable fetus' becomes simply a rhetorical device to deliver women into the thrall of its control, to render them functions of the state. In prosecuting McKnight, the state's agenda is to use motherhood to control women and to mark the difference of race. The state's control of women's pregnant bodies has a strong racial component—black women's bodies are, and have always been, used in the United States as a mechanism to reconstitute the state as white. In Killing the Black Body, Dorothy Roberts offers a meticulous history of the control of black childbearing imposed by various forms of white power throughout the history of the United States (slavery, Jim Crow, sterilization campaigns, the war on drugs, and so on). Roberts lists a number of cases where the state's discovery of a pregnant black woman's drug use becomes an excuse to demand abortion by threatening [End Page 80] the mother with a jail sentence.1 She argues that, with a few exceptions, black pregnant women were drug tested and reported to the district attorney by hospitals, while white pregnant women were not (1997, 158). And these cases serve as a precedent for all women: what the state does to black women it can do to all women. For Roberts, reproductive rights are a question of social justice, not simply of individual rights (1997, 6). Reproductive rights are double edged: people have the right to bear children as equally as they have the right not to. Social justice locates these rights in a woman's relation to herself: in her body and her social and economic well being. Where and when the law seeks to control motherhood, it doubly derogates those rights. In McKnight's case, social justice is withheld twice, in the state's abrogation of responsibility for her health as a person and a pregnant woman, and in her prosecution as a black woman with a lost pregnancy in the face of the state's failure to protect her. At the end of the trial, a black woman sits in prison, a white prosecutor self-righteously proclaims an important precedent to have been set, and a committee in New York loses an attempt to rectify this miscarriage of justice. Yet for the state to consider McKnight's prosecution as a precedent, it has to commit an act of historical amnesia. Far from a precedent, it reenacts a scene that for three hundred years has seen the sacrifice of thousands of men and women who remain unnamed, the "strange fruit" of a "manifest destiny," to that same state sanctity. McKnight's conviction is entirely in keeping with the legacy of the history of black agricultural labor—from plantation bond labor to the debt servitude enforced by Jim Crow chain gangs to a contemporary migratory labor force facing a highly racialized prison industry. An entire history of segregation and wanton racialized violence is retold in this small legal act. Black people are criminalized through their blackness for the purposes of decriminalizing and valorizing not only the state's abrogation of responsibility to them as citizens but also its imposition of dehumanizing conditions upon them. In McKnight's case, the statements of a white state embodied in the prosecution's arguments are given value and intelligibility by that same history and the history of black agricultural labor. What I refer to as historical amnesia does not erase the history it forgets; it transforms that history into a cultural logic, a means of valorizing its actions and truth claims as natural. As amnesia, it disguises its historical antecedents in order to obviate recognition of former injustices, such as social structures called slavery or segregation, in order to open space to set legal precedents. Thus, it reduces history to a background template by which to establish a sense of familiarity for its injustices, to make them appear acceptable. But at the same time, it reveals the historical sources of its own structure of thought, its sense of the permissible, and the internal cultural logic of the white mind that understands these injustices [End Page 81] as acceptable. In discounting McKnight's arguments, her condition, her very being beyond the scope of argument, data, or morality, the state renders her an instrument for itself. The cultural logic of its operations takes on a proprietary value. No amount of data or argumentation for the rights of black mothers and other women of color will challenge this structure or prevent its reenactment. Indeed, it is only by erasing or dismissing data that might challenge the state's claims that the state bestows validity on its indictment, and its unobstructed call to an unspoken historical logic. Here, I want to investigate the nature and meaning of the structures that make the injustices against McKnight both recognizable and permissible to the white state. McKnight must be criminalized in order to decriminalize the state's maintenance of brutal labor conditions. What I wish to investigate is the relation of the hegemonic white male mind to history, in order to reveal what lies behind its self-valorization, its ability to dispense with argument, and to reside in the emptiest of statements while discounting (through criminalization) any defense against itself. The state is not white by fiat; it is white as a cultural condition given by events that reconstitute its history in the present. To fully understand the structure of the relation between the state's actions and the devaluation and criminalization of black bodies, we must revisit not only the historical legacy these contemporary actions repeat but also the cultural logic that historical legacy created and maintained. We are not speaking of the historical repetition of racism here, but of something more profound. The fact that the state picks out black people to victimize is a pragmatic use of racism. However, for the state to decriminalize itself through the criminalization of its victims becomes a question of social identity, and of a certain social sanctity acquired through that identity. It is the construction of a sanctity for whiteness, and for white racialized consciousness that goes beyond racism, and empowers it. In the eyes of that consciousness, a sense of justice or humanity toward McKnight as a black woman would be an unrecognizable act. What gives the state's injustice familiarity is a structure of racialization, whereby the state renders itself white by its acts against black people, in general, and black women, in particular. This structure of racialization threads its way through U.S. history against people of color as a cultural norm. The modes of impunity and the form of criminalization of the victims may change, but the underlying structure remains the same. To grasp the inner construction of this specific structure of racialization, we must return to the seventeenth-century English colony in Virginia, to the evolution of the slave system, and, as I will argue, to the invention of race, whiteness, and white supremacy. Of particular import will be a law passed in 1662 establishing matrilineal servitude status. In a strange reversal of English law, where the status of the children followed the status of the father, this new law declared that the children's social status followed the servitude status of the [End Page 82] mother. This law constituted an important step in the evolution of a structure of racialization in the colony, as it groped its way toward a system of slavery and an identification with whiteness. The victimization of McKnight reveals the re-racializing project of the state; but to see this, we must understand the history that first discloses the raw evolution of racialization.

#### The neg defines oppression through the binary of whiteness in opposition to blackness – this essentialized view of oppression leads to the prioritization of race over all other forms of oppression and perpetuates gendered violence

DWP 13 (Dearest White People, internet blog cultural poltics, "The Black Mythical Norm: Intersectionality and the Nationalist Construction of “Blackness”," April 16, dearestwhitepeople.wordpress.com/2012/04/16/black-mythical-norm/)

In “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference,” Audre Lorde defines what she calls a “mythical norm” in the United States, which is usually “white, thin, male, young, heterosexual… and financially secure” (Lorde, 2009, p. 517). With regards to this default American, Black Nationalism strives to build racial solidarity around the black community’s common deviation from the norm: Black people are not white. However, this essentialized view of black people often leads to prioritization of race over all other “deviations” by those black individuals whose identities are most closely aligned with the norm. In this nationalist construction of blackness, the black, thin, male, young, heterosexual, financially secure person becomes the “default” black person. According to Mark Anthony Neal, this nationalist construction of “blackness” led to the creation of the “Strong Black Man” figure, which Neal posits “can be faulted for championing a stunted, conservative, one dimensional, and stridently heterosexual vision of black masculinity” (Neal, 2005, p. 24), often to the detriment of those persons within the black community whose experiences with racial oppression intersect with other oppressive forces based on gender, sexuality, class, age, or any other deviation from the nationalist-constructed notion of “blackness.” This paper will explore the ways in which the nationalist-propagated image of the “Strong Black Man” interfaces with intersectionality of racial, gender, and sexual oppression, and attempt to grapple with the question: “who is Black enough?”¶ The notion of not being “black enough” reverberates throughout black feminist and masculinist writings. In “Where We Live,” Essex Helphill states, “I’m as black as anyone, but not by the criteria the nationalists construct” (Belton, 1995, p. 214). In the same piece, in reference to the Million Man March, Isaac Julian laments, “It’s about another spectacle of middle-class black straight men claiming ownership of blackness” (Belton, 1995, p. 214). Audre Lorde echoes this sentiment, proclaiming, “Black women who once insisted that lesbianism was a white woman’s problem now insist that black lesbians are a threat to black nationhood, are consorting with the enemy, are basically unblack” (Lorde, 2009, p. 521). In “Having Their Say,” Rudolph Byrd speaks to the connections between the oppression of women and homosexuals in the black community, stating, “I decided not to waste any more time with those folks because I understood that I could never be Black enough for them… And so it was my experience with homophobia and the rejection of my blackness that caused me to empathize with women” (Cole & Guy-Sheftall, 2003, p. 51). Alongside attacks on queer individuals for not living up to nationalist constructions of “blackness” come accusations of betrayal and treachery toward black feminists and womanists who dare speak out against black male sexism. As Lorde asserts, “Black women’s literature is full of the pain of frequent assault, not only by a racist patriarchy, but also by black men. Yet the necessity for and history of shared battle have made us, black women, particularly vulnerable to the false accusation that anti-sexist is anti-black” (Lorde, 2009, p. 520).¶ Despite feeling marginalized from within their own black communities, women and men who don’t fit into essentialized notions of “blackness” often don’t wish to separate themselves from those black males who propagate sexist, heterosexist, and misogynistic attitudes. Unlike self-identified white marginalized individuals who advocate fractionalization from their white heterosexual male oppressors, black people faced with intersecting systems of oppression are still able to feel united with black nationalists in their struggle against racial oppression. This may be because the white “community” in the United States is no community at all, but rather merely a built-in privilege that has been so long characterized as “default” that it allows white women, lesbians, gay men, and transgendered individuals to define their identities in terms of their own experience, without ever needing to contemplate race. In contrast to this, women, lesbians, gay men, and transgendered individuals in the black community must view their condition through the lens of their experiences with multiple layers of oppression, which means that a separationist attitude within their racial category is not so simple. As stated by the Combahee River Collective, “Our situation as black people necessitates that we have solidarity around the fact of race… We struggle together with black men against racism, while we also struggle with black men about sexism” (The Combahee River Collective, 2009, p. 504). The collective struggle against racism, although ripe with complexity, is not one that many Black people seek to abandon, regardless of potentially harmful nationalist sentiments.¶ Because the intersectionality of oppressions facing black people who deviate from the essentialized, or default, image of “blackness” occur simultaneously, it is often difficult for individuals who must cope with many intersecting systems of oppression to separate their basis of oppression into categories and prioritize them in the same way that a black heterosexual male may be able to. The ability and willingness to prioritize identities has much to do with power relationships both among black people and relative to white people. As black nationalists rally together to combat forces of racism, they often strategically seek to do so in ways that run parallel to the white patriarchal power structure. As Isaac Julien argues, “It’s a question of power. Black men have been rendered powerless by the dominant society, and it’s that drive to have power at any cost, no matter what is silenced or dismissed” (Belton, 1995, p. 213). Upon deeper analysis of this quote, it becomes apparent that although much of the black community has been “rendered powerless,” the heterosexual black man in particular has been marginalized by the white supremacy system alone. Because the system of patriarchy allows heterosexual black men to focus on only one of their identities as the object of oppression, these individuals are elevated to a place of power within the black community where they are able to feel anger toward those black people whom they see as raising “other” identity issues that complicate what Angela Davis aptly called “narrow nationalism” (Davis, 1992, p. 320). According to Audre Lourde, “Within black communities, where racism is a living reality, differences among us often seem dangerous and suspect. The need for unity is often misnamed as a need for homogeneity, and a black feminist vision mistaken for betrayal of our common interests as people” (Lorde, 2009, p. 519).¶ One of the greatest pitfalls of Black Nationalism and essentialism is that as a strategy for white acceptance and assimilation into white American culture it is premised on the black community’s acceptance of other power constructs such as patriarchy and heteronormativity. Norm R. Allen, Jr. calls this strategy “Reactionary Black Nationalism.” Allen, Jr. posits, “‘On the one hand, Reactionary Black Nationalists advocate self-love, self-respect, self-acceptance, self-help, pride unity’—all valuable and needed attributes for members of black communities and institutions—but also promote ‘bigotry, intolerance, hatred, sexism [and] homophobia’ among other things” (Neal, 2005, p. 23). This hypothesis is furthered by evidence of acceptance in the nationalist community of what Louis Farrakhan called “defects of character.” Just as Farrakhan was forgiven for his self-described “heart… dark with hatred” (Farrakhan, 1996, p. 11), as apparently shown in his blatant sexism and heterosexism, and Eldridge Cleaver is still held in high regard despite his misogyny and homophobia, Reactionary Black Nationalists’ chauvinist sentiments are “largely ignored or seen as excusable in a world where ‘race’ often trumps ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’ as meaningful issues within the black community” (Neal, 2005, pp. 23-24). By prioritizing race in the context of oppression, black heterosexual males silence voices within the black community that they see as obstacles to their strategy of gaining acceptance and power for “black people” as defined by their own construct.

#### Their desire for purity and authenticity limits the possibility for the creation of complex communication communities that limits the praxis for engagement and normalizes dehumanization of victims of heterosexism

Hoagland 7 (Sarah, Professor of Philosphy and Women Studies at Northeastern Illinois University in Chicago, Collective Member of the Institute of LEsbian Studies and of the Escuela Popular Norteña, "Heterosexualism and White Supremacy," Hypatia 22.1, 166-185, Muse)

We Are Everywhere . . . Or Not at All Communities, of course, can become oppressive in critical ways, particularly when their practitioners think of them as institutions rather than contexts (looser and more ambiguous), for example, when those assuming "leadership" act in terms of purity and authenticity (note Lugones 2003, chap. 7). What brings lesbians together in community? Not fear, which is the current basis of U.S. solidarity, nor is it common oppression. To begin with, there is our desire. Desire and creativity are a central part of our possibilities, ingenious lesbian creativity, making so much—bookstores, coffee houses, poetry, publishing houses, music, bars, sports teams, record companies, theory, music festivals, jewelry, methods of healing. And what are possibilities of lesbian communities? In addition to loving women, because we are everywhere, there is enacting a praxis of engaging through difference rather than similarity, at first brought as a structural challenge by Audre Lorde. And that, it seems to me, grounds our possibilities, our work—not working for state-constructed "rights" but developing complex communication (Lugones 2006). I despair at the multilevels of heterosexualism and white supremacy by which our actions and imaginations are framed. It undermines possibilities of lesbian community and all the work in community building we have to do. In taking up el pasar discontinuo de la cachapera/tortillera del barrio a la barra al moviemiento (the discontinuous passing of the cachapera/tortillera from the barrio to the bar to the movement),9 María Lugones notes "la tortillera exists en la comunidad only as a pervert. Perversion constitutes her and marks her as outside of countenanced relationality. . . . En la comunidad, under the reigns of nationalism, la cachapera is silent, her meaning is made by others" (Lugones 2003, 174). Within African-American communities, out lesbians can be seen not as black, but as a white perversion (Carruthers 1979). [End Page 180] Yet "instead of cultivating her company toward impure shatterings of colonized communions, la cachapera becomes the Latina/Lesbian," moving into the territoriality of the Lesbian Movement—white locales, movement that does not move into Latino communities. So "Latina/Lesbian is an oxymoron, an absence of relation. Latina/Lesbian lacks a hyphen" and so hybridization. "The movement of the tortillera into the Lesbian Movement is a fantastic flight because she comes out to a forced speaking in a bifid tongue; because the eyes that see her coming out, remake her in their own imagination" (Lugones 2003, 174–76). And so the Latina/Lesbian who was working to make a place for herself in the campus Feminist Majority, not to mention the campus GLBTA, finds herself alone once again. At the "Heterosexism and Empire" workshop, one Vietnamese lesbian questioned, given the history of gendering in her country, what it would mean for her to talk about being masculine or feminine. A Korean transperson talked about the effects of Christian missionaries in her immigrant community. And a Palestinian woman noted there was an assumption that if people are queer, they are not going to be Muslim. Communities are the places of our possibilities, the places from which we grow. Moreover, my capacity to be a lesbian involves a relationality proscribed by dominant fragmentation, by heterosexualism. It animates through praxis of engagement.10 If tortilleras, bulldaggers, marimachas, swing girls, desi dykes, among many others, can only act out in lesbian community and are forced into the closet among family and local community; if la tortillera is cut off from a critical community, from a central source that nourishes her, if she can only be lesbian outside a critical place of her possibilities, and once outside only as someone acting out, if her possibilities of utcatha are negated, then as María Lugones suggests, she is a phantasm. And if she is a phantasm, then so am I. What, finally, concerns me is community, lesbian communities. That's what heterosexualism and white supremacy destroy. Lesbian activism has shifted from community building where we developed resources and came together to create, to make something happen, shifted from coming together in collective work to develop communities that undermine oppression, shifted from all that to asking and depending on the state to frame what is significant in our lives. I don't doubt the sincerity of those who are fighting hard for rights; I despair the appropriation of lesbian imagination, the loss of Sinister Wisdom. [End Page 181]

## AT: Middle Passage

#### Feminization of the Atlantic helped justify the middle passage – proves that codes of masculinity are relevant to the K and that we can access their impact thru the aff and perm

**Tinsley** assistant professor in the departments of English and African American studies at the University of Minnesota **2008** Omise'eke Natasha “Black Atlantic, Queer Atlantic Queer Imaginings of the Middle Passage” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies project muse

If Gilroy’s **Atlantic** is frigid, Benítez-Rojo’s **Caribbean overflows with hyperfeeling female sexuality.** **Recentering the resistantly nonphallic Peoples of the Sea**, Benítez-Rojo **foreground**s **a vaginalized Caribbean as he proclaims: The Atlantic is today the Atlantic (**the navel of capitalism**) because Europe,** in its mercantilist laboratory**, conceived of the project of inseminating the Caribbean womb with the blood of Africa; the Atlantic** is today the Atlantic . . .because it **is the painfully delivered child of the Caribbean, whose vagina was stretched between continental clamps**. . . . After the blood and salt water spurts, quickly sew up torn flesh and apply the antiseptic tinctures, the gauze and surgical plaster; then the febrile wait through the forming of a scar: suppurating, always suppurating.13 **Here sexual violence and painful reproduction are simultaneously abstracted and reinscribed in regional imaginations; projected onto the water** by which Caribbean women arrived in the archipelago, **they conceive a disturbing image that spreads women’s metaphoric legs in unsettling ways. Yet the suppurating wound can heal, almost magically. A few pages later, the vaginal sea opens into a metaphor for liberatory pleasure and pleasurable liberation** as Benítez-Rojo imagines the region’s femininity **as “its flux, its diffuse sensuality, its generative force, its capacity to nourish and conserve** (juices, spring, pollen, rain, seed, shoot, ritual sacrifice).”14 **Bleeding, orgasming, or both**, Benítez-Rojo’s cunnic Caribbean overexposes the¶ sexualized bodies that Gilroy denies. **Like the sea, the space between women’s legs is at once insistently present and insistently ethereal; like the sea, the space between women’s legs becomes a metaphor to mine. These tropes of the black Atlantic, of Peoples of the Sea, do call to me as powerful enunciations of crosscurrents of African diaspora identity, and I evoke them in respect and solidarity**. And yet as Gilroy, Benítez-Rojo, Edouard Glissant,¶ and **others call on maritime metaphors without maritime histories and evoke**¶ **sexualized bodies as figures rather than experiences, their writing out of materiality**¶ **stops short of the most radical potential of such oceanic imaginations**.15 There¶ are other Atlantic and Caribbean histories that these scholars could have evoked¶ to make sense of the present, other material details of maritime crossings they¶ could have drawn on to make their metaphors richer conceptual tools**. As Africans**¶ **became diasporic, Atlantic** and Caribbean**, sex and sexuality did not only impact**¶ **imaginations; they impacted bodies. Not at all an opening to infinite possibilities,**¶ **the sea was initially a site of painful fluidities for many Africans**. The first sight¶ of the ocean was often a vision of fear, as Equiano remembers when slave traders¶ marched him to the coast:¶ I was beyond measure astonished at this, as I had never before seen any¶ water larger than a pond or a rivulet, and my surprise was mingled with no¶ small fear. . . . The first object which saluted my eyes when I arrived on the¶ coast was the sea, and a slave ship, which was then riding at anchor, and¶ waiting for its cargo. These filled me with astonishment, which was soon¶ converted to terror.16¶ **Once loaded onto the slave ships, Africans became fluid bodies under the force**¶ **of brutality.** Tightly or loosely packed in sex-segregated holds — men chained¶ together at the ankles while women were sometimes left unchained — surrounded¶ by churning, unseen waters, these brutalized bodies themselves became liquid,¶ oozing. Ship’s surgeon Alexander Falconbridge records days when “wet and blowing weather having occasioned the portholes to be shut and the grating to be covered,¶ fluxes and fevers among the negroes ensued. . . . The deck was so covered¶ with the blood and mucus which had proceeded from them in consequence of¶ the flux, that it resembled a slaughterhouse.”17 Lara adds to this imagination in¶ a character’s vision of a slave ship: “Women’s menstrual blood stained the floor¶ around her, pus crusting at the edges of the chattel wounds. . . . She could feel¶ her body rise in a wave of urine and blood, the stench so wretched as to make her¶ choke on her own breath.”18 **On this Atlantic, then, black body waters, corporeal**¶ **effluvia, and the stains of gendered and reproductive bodies were among the first**¶ **sites of colonization.**¶ But this bloody Atlantic was also the site of collaboration and resistance.¶ In the early eighteenth century, ship captains like John Newton and James Barbot¶ repeatedly record with horror how despite such conditions slaves conspired to¶ rebel against captors. At the same time, unnamed rebellions took place not in¶ violent but in erotic resistance, in interpersonal relationships enslaved Africans¶ formed with those imprisoned and oozing beside them.

#### The structure of racial politics is inherently unstable and contradictory especially at key historical moments like the War on Terror—the aff’s targeting of specific leverage points in the political imaginary is the best strategy for overcoming the sedimentation anti-blackness

Winant 15 Winant, Howard. "The Dark Matter: Race and Racism in the 21st Century." Critical Sociology 41.2 (2015): 313-24. rishi

Structural racism – an odious stinkpile of shit left over from the past and still being augmented in the present – has been accumulated by ‘slavery unwilling to die’,4 by empire, and indeed by the entire racialized modern world system. The immense waste (Feagin et al., 2001, drawing on Bataille) of human life and labor by these historically entrenched social structures and practices still confronts us today, in the aftermath of the post-Second World War racial ‘break’. Our antiracist accomplishments have reduced the size of the pile; we have lessened the stink. But a massive amount of waste still remains. So much racial waste is left over from the practice of racial domination in the early days of empire and conquest, to the present combination of police state and liberalism! Indeed it often seems that this enormous and odious waste pinions the social system under an immovable burden. How often have despair and hopelessness overcome those who bore this sorrow? How often have slave and native, peon and maquiladora, servant and ghetto-dweller, felt just plain ‘sick and tired’ (Nappy Roots, 2003), encumbered by this deadening inertia composed of a racial injustice that could seemingly never be budged? How often, too, have whites felt weighed down by the waste, the guilt and self-destruction built into racism and the ‘psychological wage’? Yet racial politics is always unstable and contradictory. Racial despotism can never be fully stabilized or consolidated. Thus at key historical moments, perhaps rare but also inevitable, the sheer weight of racial oppression – qua social structure – becomes insupportable. The built-up rage and inequity, the irrationality and inutility, and the explosive force of dreams denied, are mobilized politically in ways that would have seemed almost unimaginable earlier. Racism remains formidable, entrenched as a structuring feature of both US and global society and politics. Indeed it often seems impossible to overcome.We are so used to losing! We can’t see that the racial system is in crisis both in the US and globally. Large-scale demographic and political shifts have overtaken the modern world (racial) system, undermining and rearticulating it. During and after the Second World War a tremendous racial ‘break’ occurred, a seismic shift that swept much of the world (Winant, 2001). The US was but one national ‘case’ of this rupture, which was experienced very profoundly: racial transformations occurred that were unparalleled since at least the changes brought about by the US Civil War. Omi and I (1994) – and many, many others – have proposed that the terrain of racial politics was tremendously broadened and deepened after the War. The increased importance of race in larger political life not only grounded the modern civil rights movement but shaped a whole range of ‘new social movements’ that we take for granted today as central axes of political conflict. In earlier stages of US history it had not been so evident that ‘the personal is political’ – at least not since the end of Reconstruction. From the explicit racial despotism of the Jim Crow era to the ‘racial democracy’ (of course still very partial and truncated) of the present period … : that is a big leap, people. In the modern world there were always black movements, always movements for racial justice and racial freedom. The experience of injustice, concrete grievances, lived oppression, and resistance, both large and small, always exists. It can be articulated or not, politicized or not. These movements, these demands, were largely excluded from mainstream politics before the rise of the civil rights movement after the War. Indeed, after the Second World War, in a huge ‘break’ that was racially framed in crucial ways, this ‘politicization of the social’ swept over the world. It ignited (or reignited) major democratic upsurges. This included the explicitly anti-racist movements: the modern civil rights movement, the anti-apartheid movement, and the anti-colonial movement (India, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.). It also included parallel, and more-or-less allied, movements like ‘secondwave’ feminism, LGBTQ (née gay liberation) movements, and others. In short, the world-historical upheaval of the Second World War and its aftermath were racial upheavals in significant ways: the periphery against the center, the colored ‘others’ against ‘The Lords of Human Kind’ (Kiernan, 1995). These movements produced: •• Demographic, economic, political, and cultural shifts across the planet •• The destruction of the old European empires •• The coming and going of the Cold War •• The rise of the ‘new social movements’, led by the black movement in the US And this is only the start of what could be a much bigger list. A Crisis of Race and Racism? ‘[C]risis’, Gramsci famously wrote, ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass’ (Gramsci, 1971: 276). Using the Gramscian formula, I suggest that there is such a crisis of race and racism. On the one hand, the old verities of established racism and white supremacy have been officially discredited, not only in the US but fairly comprehensively around the world. On the other hand, racially-informed action and social organization, racial identity and race consciousness, continue unchecked in nearly every aspect of social life! On the one hand, the state (many states around the world) now claims to be colorblind, non-racialist, racially democratic; while on the other hand, in almost every case, those same states need race to rule. Consider in the US alone: race and electoral politics, race and social control, race and legal order … Why don’t our heads explode under the pressures of such cognitive dissonance? Why doesn’t manifest racial contradiction provoke as much uncertainty and confusion in public life and political activity as it does in everyday experience? Are we just supposed to pretend that none of this is happening? Can anyone really sustain the view that they are operating in a nonracial, ‘colorblind’ society? The ‘colorblind’ claim is that one should not ‘notice’ race. For if one ‘sees’ race, one wouldn’t be ‘blind’ to it, after all.5 But what happens to race-consciousness under the pressure (now rather intense in the US, anyway) to be ‘colorblind’? Quite clearly, racial awareness does not dry up like a raisin in the sun.

#### . we must affirm the plurality of different anti-colonial epistemic frameworks in tandem to break the supposed universalism of imperial thinking

Stamenkovic 13 (Marko, PhD Student at Universityof Ghent and member of the International Association of Curators of Contemporary Art, "On Colonial Blind Spots, Ego-politics of Knowledge and 'Universal Reason'," December 2013, pages 9-12 rishi

Similarly, what Mbembe proposes is to work out our own ways towards another vision of the world, perceived from another viewpoint. Such a vision is but a significant example of today’s counter-hegemonic theoretical strategies, produced locally yet with the causality and implications of global necrocolonial politics in mind. However, this vision is not conceived and shall not be accepted as another particular local knowledge, constructed in defense of a yet another pseudo-universal form of thinking that aspires to become the new epistemic sovereignty. We have to understand it as an alternative to the existent pseudo-universalism of imperial thinking and, by doing so, to work towards establishing a possible counter-hegemonic theoretical coexistence among various knowledge-worlds in their plurality. Mbembe’s own arguments have inscribed his theory of necropolitics into contemporary philosophy as one possible and legitimate variant of global knowledges. That is the main reason why to understand necropolitics means to approach it as the other of biopolitics: not as its clone but as its inevitable half in the ‘Siamese twin’ situation. In this regard, I treat the theory of necropolitics as an intentionally pseudo-universal option characterized by the strategic propensity to claim its own ‘universality’ on behalf of the global anti-imperialist South, and justly so: because its pseudo-universalism is aware of universalist mythology and its counter-effects: an obscurity imposed by the regime of singular universe of knowledge in the modern/colonial/capitalist/racial world-system (Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodríguez, 2002). Necropolitical theory thus appears as a disguised decolonial option behind which the South enters into a profound dialogue with the obdurate Northern epistemic mytheme. Positioned side by side, they must keep this dialogue open. If the biopolitical armature (the dominant structure of knowledge-communication) is gradually dismantled through such a dialogue, this will allow for a truly emancipatory potential of theoretical propositions, earlier dismissed, to be exposed again (or, in many cases, for the first time ever). In that sense, Mbembe’s ‘return of death’ to philosophy is part of the global and unavoidable process that is not only characterized by one single anti-imperial paradigm (‘necropolitical’, for that matter) but rather by numerous possible paradigms unrelated to necropolitics itself. Within such complexity, a single imperial epistemology is an insufficient option to cope with the numerous modalities of knowledge, or the pluriverse of local knowledge(s). Hence, to have the epistemological pluralism legitimized – and to have such legitimacy recognized and globally accepted side by side with the imperialist epistemology – is not only a worthwhile but an urgent task. It is so for the global anti-imperialist South as much as for the rest of the world.

## AT: Baudrillard

#### There is no all-encompassing system of value that makes everything people do the capitalisms—your impact claims are overdetermined and vague—the affirmative’s creation of new codes is an effective form of politics.

MacCannell and MacCannell 1993 (Dean and Juliet, Sociology and English professors respectively at UC-Irvine, *Forget Baudrillard?* p. 141-143)

We are suggesting that Baudrillard took his analysis of the simula- crum up to the site of the new forms of capitalist exploitation that have introjected class structure into postmodernity. But he did not name the new sites of exploitation or initiate critical examination of them. His failure in this regard places his work at great risk. Historically it may contribute as much to the new forms of exploita- tion and their cover-up as to their exposure and eventual overthrow. He cannot 'read' or 'see' Mickey Mouse because Mickey stands in precisely the same relation to code creation as Baudrillard's theory taken in its entirety. Ultimately, both Baudrillard and Mickey Mouse insist on a generalized sense of the possible existence not of codes, which would be subversive, but of The Code, a single frame- work, already in existence, for everything. The Code, and correla- tively the pretence of the absence of need for any new code, is the only field for the putative free play of simulacra, or the appearance of a figure of lack which can be universally worshipped. If there were a code, it truly would accommodate human life to the impos- sible, to death, to ultimate pleasure, to the real. I f there were a code it would be equally and freely available to all human beings. Group, class, status, category, would disappear or be rendered insignificant. No wonder it is fervently desired by the prematurely utopian adherents of every political position. It would be stable and open to all for all time until the radical end of time that is supposed to be the Last Judgement.¶ Postmodernity affirms the possibility of The Code in the form of¶ pure repetition, the simulacrum, and the 'random cannibalization of styles of the past', as Jameson put it. But postmodern capitalism is also committed to apparent diversity of consumer goods within the framework of a single Code, a commitment that produces a certain tension if not a contradiction and dialectic. Apparent diversity is achieved by the marketing of diverse codes the source and origin of which are officially unrecognized and repressed.¶ We suggest that what is being exploited by postmodern capital- ism are the codes of those in the starkest of human situations, who have confronted 'the worst' most radically in their 'lifestyles' (=codes) or modes of relating to death and fulfilment. What is most successfully 'marketed' today are simulacra of whole ways of existing, adaptations of 'gang youth', punks, 'primitive' Brazilian Indians (At Play in the Fields of the Lord), homeless people, bag ladies, hookers, war victims, AIDS sufferers (the list is extended daily), their codes, the means they have worked out for dealing with the worst. We further suggest that Lacan was correct in his assertion that the 'panic' of the drive has displaced the Symbolic of¶ desire for the contemporary or postmodern subject. There is no more 'needs fulfilment' in postmodernity. Capitalism, driven beyond its capacity to provide, has seen to that. All that it can promise us now is an endless series of futile attempts to accommo- date that which carmot be accommodated: the satisfied need, ultimate jouissance, death. Its radical failure of symbolization leaves its believers 'eyeball to eyeball' with The Real. Postmodern capitalism is the realm of 'enjoyment', where the human subject is commanded 'to enjoy' but carmot, where pleasure that cannot be experienced spills over into The Thing, where our 'things' obscenely and menacingly enjoy themselves at our expense.¶ But there are those among us who deal directly with the absolute- ness of loss, those who know there is no substitutability, no itera- bility, no supplement. They have carved out an existence on the empty gound between the possibility of the symbolization of desire and the dream of a single Symbolic-Paternal Order. They are the only possible source of a critical viewpoint on postmodern capital- ism and of the creative energy needed to move it. We are disappointed with Baudrillard for not having found the site of post- modern exploitation, for giving us instead nostalgia for the medieval Church in the form of the now commonplace postmodern assertion of its absence. But if Baudrillard spends all his time with¶ commodities-as-simulacra, with God as simulacrum, with things that can have no relation to need, there must be a reason for it. He is avoiding the ground that has been departed by the cause of desire, the ground where new codes are created as a matter of necessity. This is the reason he did not find Mickey Mouse. Mickey is there on the ground of departed desire as a defender of its borders, to block those who have not entered and to cover up the creative adaptations of those who have. Mickey permits us to imagine that there is a universal code of which he is the emanation and emissary, while his owners, if not his animators, know there are as many codes - ripe for the plucking - as there are human groupings. What Mickey does not permit us to imagine is his code: that his head, with the two ears that never change their location or position, that his head is not only the maternal breast and the castrated balls, but a motion picture projector. What this Mickey- projector reproduces is not a universal code for iteration as has been claimed. It is rather a faithful reproduction of the absolute loss human life is based upon; of the theft of its creativity, its reduction, and abject resignation in the face of The Real.

#### Breaking the fantasy of mastery with an affirmation of vulnerability is critical to overcoming neoliberal subjectivity

Layton 14 Lynne Layton, Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis and Editor, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 253 Mason Terrace, Brookline, MA, 02446, USA. E-mail:[layton@rcn.com](mailto:layton@rcn.com)“Some psychic effects of neoliberalism: Narcissism, disavowal, perversion” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 161–178. doi:10.1057/pcs.2014.5; published online 15 May 2014 rishi

As noted earlier, [Binkley (2009](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib9), [2011a](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib10), [2011b](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib11), [2014](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib12)) and other non-psychoanalytic thinkers focus on neoliberal subjective practices that demand a shift from comfort with dependence to repudiation of dependence. In a psychoanalytic frame, however, which recognizes no possibility of overcoming dependence, the task is to comprehend the psychic effects of a cultural lack of attunement to dependency needs and a cultural encouragement to split off and project dependency needs and vulnerability. Such effects, as we have seen, include intense shame about dependence (see [Jimenez and Walkerdine, 2012](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib43)), omnipotent versions of autonomy, and narcissistic processes that include oscillations between grandiosity and self-deprecation with regard to the self, and idealization and devaluation with regard to the relation with others. These narcissistic states and oscillations are motored by the fantasies subtending the fetish structure of a perverse society that disavows a reality marked by gross failures of accountability and proper caretaking by those in authority ([Layton, 2010](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib58)). The fantasies endemic to narcissistic neoliberal subject formation are produced in part by the radical split between autonomy and connection described earlier (and enacted differently by different groups): in the autonomy fantasy, we imagine ourselves self-sufficient and omnipotent, needing no one (the entrepreneurial self); in the fantasy marked by neoliberalism’s degraded state of dependency, we fantasize that we will be loved and taken care of without having to make any effort. [Chang and Glynos (2011)](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib20) and [Glynos (2014a](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib33), [2014b](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v19/n2/full/pcs20145a.html#bib34)) have well elaborated the ways that overinvestment in these fantasy logics operates in contemporary UK political culture, issuing in oscillations between policies that reproduce dependency and policies that punish dependency.

#### Baudrillard’s theory cannot distinguish between the productive politics of the aff and the mass snooze of commodification—the affirmative disproves the simulation thesis by producing content that ruptures and interrupts the droning message of the war on terror.

Rojek 1993 (Chris, Senior Editor in Sociology at Routledge *Forget Baudrillard?* P. 120

Yet to imply that poetry excludes politics is surely eccentric Observing and communicating cannot be satisfactorily understood as unchanging constants. There is an historical dimension to them, as unchanging constants. There is an historical dimension to them. Baudrillard’s sociology is fatally immune to this because it is bluntly ahistorical. So it ignores how observing and communicating have changed and minimizes the stratified difference sbetween communicators and observers. Baudrillard correctly stresses that the distraction factories of the gflobal communications industry confuyse our sense of change and our awareness of difference. But the minimalist picture of humans as ‘monitroing screens’ or ‘terminals in mass communication networks’ which his sociloygy supplies is an unsuitable answer to this confusion. It does not even take seriously the circulation processes which his work identifies. For circulation involves not only repetition but also reaction. Benjamin’s sociology allows for reaction. His discussion of mass reproduction and the global circulation of images, bodies and commodities does not negate a political response; on the contrary it demands one. The decline of aura, the homogenization of culture and the manipulation of the masses are all things which Benjamin opposes. There may be a note of melancholy in his assessment of the prospects for successfully opposing these historical tendencies but he does not waver in his commitment to struggle and resistance. In contrast, Bduarillard discusses mass reproduction , homogenization, and manipulation as immoveable facts of life. One relates ot them through irony, play, seduyction and movement. Commitment in Baudrillard’s aleatory, reversible universe is always a sign of stuborrness. It closes down one’s range of response to the isness of hyperreality.

#### **Revealing counter-hegemonic knowledge for a ballot participates in ongoing displays of academic masculine posturing for who can deconstruct the most**

Haraway 88 (Donna, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” *Feminist Studies* 14, no. 3 (Fall 1988), spp)

The only people who end up actually believing and, goddess forbid, acting on the ideological doctrines of disembodied scientific objectivity-enshrined in elementary textbooks and technoscience Booster literature- are nonscientists, including a few very trusting philosophers. Of course, my designation of this last group is probably just a reflection of a residual disciplinary chauvinism acquired from identifying with historians of science and from spending too much time with a microscope in early adulthood in a kind of disciplinary preoedipal and modernist poetic moment when cells seemed to be cells and organisms, organisms. Pace,Gertrude Stein. But then came the law of the father and its resolution of the problem of objectivity, a problem solved by always already absent referents, deferred signifieds, split subjects, and the endless play of signifiers. Who wouldn't grow up warped? Gender, race, the world itself-all seem the effects of warp speeds in the play of signifiers in a cosmic force field. In any case, social constructionists might maintain that the ideological doctrine of scientific method and all the philosophical verbiage about epistemology were cooked up to distract our attention from getting to know the world effectively by practicing the sciences. From this point of view, science-the real game in town- is rhetoric, a series of efforts to persuade relevant social actors that one's manufactured knowledge is a route to a desired form of very objective power. Such persuasions must take account of the structure of facts and artifacts, as well as of language-mediated actors in the knowledge game. Here, artifacts and facts are parts of the powerful art of rhetoric. Practice is persuasion, and the focus is very much on practice. All knowledge is a condensed node in an agonistic power field. The strong program in the sociology of knowledge joins with the lovely and nasty tools of semiology and deconstruction to insist on the rhetorical nature of truth, including scientific truth. History is a story Western culture buffs tell each other; science is a contestable text and a power field; the content is the form. Period. So much for those of us who would still like to talk about reality with more confidence than we allow to the Christian Right when they discuss the Second Coming and their being raptured out of the final destruction of the world. We would like to think our appeals to real worlds are more than a desperate lurch away from cynicism and an act of faith like any other cult's, no matter how much space we generously give to all the rich and always historically specific mediations through which we and everybody else must know the world. But the further I get in describing the radical social constructionist program and a particular version of postmodernism, coupled with the acid tools of critical discourse in the human sciences, the more nervous I get. The imagery of force fields, of moves in a fully textualized and coded world, which is the working metaphor in many arguments about socially negotiated reality for the postmodern subject, is, just for starters, an imagery of high-tech military fields, of automated academic battle-fields, where blips of light called players disintegrate (what a metaphor!) each other in order to stay in the knowledge and power game. Technoscience and science fiction collapse into the sun of the irradiant (ir)reality-war. It shouldn't take decades of feminist theory to sense the enemy here. Nancy Hartsock got all this crystal clear in her concept of abstract masculinity. I, and others, started out wanting a strong tool for deconstructing the truth claims of hostile science by showing the radical historical specificity, and so contestability of every layer of the onion of scientific and technological constructions, and we end up with a kind of epistemological electroshock therapy, which far from ushering us into the high stakes tables of the game of contesting public truths, lays us out on the table with self-induced multiple personality disorder. We wanted a way to go beyond showing bias in science (that proved too easy any how) and beyond separating the good scientific sheep from the bad goats of bias and misuse. It seemed promising to do this by the strongest possible constructionist argument that left no cracks for reducing the issues to bias versus objectivity, use versus misuse, science versus pseudo- science. We unmasked the doctrines of objectivity because they threatened our budding sense of collective historical subjectivity and agency and our "embodied" accounts of the truth, and we ended up with one more excuse for not learning any post-Newtonian physics and one more reason to drop the old feminist self-help practices of repairing our own cars. They're just texts anyway, so let the boys have them back.

## AT: Framework

#### The counter-interp is to center feminist action research in debate- FAR

Reid 04, (Colleen Reid, Simon Fraser University, “Advancing Women’s Social Justice Agendas: A Feminist Action Research Framework”, published in IIQM) GP

Participatory research and contemporary feminism share a number of major underlying features centering on the analysis of political economy and praxis (Maguire, 1993). The notion of praxis challenges the theory-practice relationship and raises problems associated with value-free science. The term “praxis” originates from the Greek word prasso meaning “doing” and “acting,” in contrast with the theoretical designs of epistemology; theoria 3 (Audi, 1995). Lal (1996) refers to pedagogical praxis the erasing of the boundaries between theory, methodology, and practice, and between field and home (Lal, 1996). Other researchers define praxis as a dialectical process of collective reflection and action (Israel et al., 1994; Kirby & McKenna, 1989), the joining of theory and action so that each is informed by and changes through its relation with the other (Ristock & Pennell, 1996), and the integration of knowing and doing (Kirby & McKenna, 1989). For praxis to be possible, theory must not only illuminate the lived experience of social groups, it must also be illuminated by their struggles (Lather, 1991). Theory is thought of as experience-based (Park, 2001), and reflection itself is embedded in praxis, not separate from it. Action upon reality and analyses of that learning may change awareness of the nature of problems and the sources of oppression (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001). The processes of uncovering marginalized knowledges, giving priority to these knowledges, and enabling the collaborative development of action strategies are simultaneously theoretical and methodological. Woven within and between each of the following characteristics of a FAR framework is the notion of praxis theory, methods, and practice in dynamic interplay. A Feminist Action Research framework FAR guidingPrinciples Through integrating participatory research with feminist theory and research, the following guiding principles for FAR emerged: inclusion, participation, action, social change, and researcher reflexivity. Inclusion The first principle of feminist action research is inclusion. To include is to cause to be a part of something, to consider with, or to put into a group (Morris, 1982). Feminist action researchers contend that no social practices or activities should be excluded as improper subjects for public discussion, expression, or collective choice; no one should be forced into privacy (Young, 1990). Gender and women‟s daily experiences are central in the construction of theoretical frameworks and feminist action research methods. Women‟s experiences are central in several ways in understanding patriarchy as a system of domination and oppression, in identifying key issues and questions in all phases of the research process including action and evaluation, and in giving explicit attention to how women and men as groups benefit from the project.4 Feminist action researchers expose the inadequacy of androcentric research and its partial, inaccurate, and incomplete representation of human experience when women are muted (Maguire, 2001). By beginning with the experiences and research needs of women who have traditionally been silenced, the process of knowledge production is transformed and the ideological power base is challenged (Kirby & McKenna, 1989). Feminist action researchers seek to connect the articulated, contextualized personal with the often hidden or invisible structural and social institutions that define and shape our lives. Feminist action researchers attempt to make possible the development of strategies and programs based on real life experience rather than theories or assumptions, providing an analysis of issues based on a description of how women actually experience those issues (Barnsley & Ellis, 1992). Participation Inclusion is a precursor to the second principle of feminist action research participation. To participate is “to take part, join, or share with others” (Morris, 1982). Feminist action researchers are committed to making women‟s voices more audible and facilitating women‟s empowerment through “ordinary talk” (Maguire, 2001).

#### Prefer the C/I-Debates about operational aspects of military policy trade off with analyses of cultural constructs that justify the use of force- FAR allows us to still approach emerging technology but through a constructive frame

**Levy 15** Levy, Yagil. Prof. Yagil Levy. Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication at Open University of Israel "What is Controlled by Civilian Control of the Military? Control of the Military vs. Control of Militarization." Armed Forces & Society (2015): 0095327X14567918. rishi

Along these lines, Feaver and Gelpi showed that militarily inexperienced leaders in the United States, more than militarily experienced ones, extended the use of force to deal with interstate conflicts that did not present a substantial threat to national security. 21 Desch acknowledged that, ‘‘the most prevalent civil-military relations problem of the post-Vietnam era has not been keeping the dogs of war on the leash, but rather getting them off of it’’.22 In other words, civilians may be more warprone than the military.23 It follows that civilian control may even promote the use of force when war-prone civilians successfully mobilize the society for war and even push the reluctant military to battle.24 Therefore, **effective civilian control can rein in the military but not the use of force**. Here, therefore, is the gap in the literature. Students of militarism do not link the propensity to use force to the broader issue of what type of civilian control may restrain the use of force, aside from the cultural process of demilitarization. Furthermore, students of militarism have not extended the theme of civilian control from controlling the military to controlling the civilian institutions that legitimize the use of force. Similarly, even students of civilian control who acknowledge that civilian control and military restraint do not necessarily go hand in hand have not questioned the extent to which we should decouple the two different processes as different modes of control rather than different effects of control. In other words, they have not scrutinized the mechanisms legitimizing the use of force decoupled from the mechanisms monitoring the armed forces. Given this gap in the literature, in the following section I present a revised conceptualization of civilian control by introducing the distinction between control of the military and control of militarization. Two Modes of Control Control of the Military A distinction should be made between control of the military and control of militarization. **Control of the military refers to the extent to which the citizenry, through civilian state institutions, sets limits on the freedom of action of the military in the areas of activity that have political implications, such as military doctrine and policies, operational plans, weapons systems, organization, recruitment, and promotion of officers. Such limits correspond with political objectives and the resources required to attain those goals that civilians (in a democracy, popularly elected civilians) shape autonomously. These goals are regarded as expressing the will of society as a whole. The military, in turn, abides by these civilian directives**.25 To a large extent, relations of exchange are formed, in which the military subordinates itself to civilian rulers in exchange for the resources (material and symbolic) that the state possesses and provides to the military.26 It follows that control of the military should be broadly conceptualized and should not be limited to the relations between elected civilians and generals. Viewed in this vein, although authoritarian regimes effectively control their militaries (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are good examples), control of the military is deficient without the engagement of the citizenry. **Control over the military operates mainly through institutional mechanisms that have an effect on the manner in which policy makers activate the military**. In addition to the monitoring of the military by elected civilians, collective actors working outside the formal institutions, mainly social movements and interest groups, often affect institutional policy making through lobbying, protests, court appeals, and the media. Ultimately, what is important is not whether the troops are deployed to fight or remain in their barracks but the political process that leads to the decision about the deployment, pertaining to the broader political implication of military activity as presented earlier. As a highly developed theme, control of the military is not the focus of this article but control of militarization and its relationship with the control of the military is. Control of Militarization While the control of the military is aimed at controlling the organization and its supervisors, **the control of militarization is concerned with controlling the mechanisms for legitimizing the use of force.** Drawing on Burk’s ‘‘way of war,’’27 Johnston’s ‘‘strategic culture,’’28 Mann’s ‘‘militarism,’’29 and Beetham’s ‘‘political legitimacy,’’30 **the legitimacy to use force relates to the extent to which the state’s legal mode of using armed force against an external adversary is socially accepted as a normal, pervasive, and enduring strategic preference. Such legitimacy encompasses social beliefs about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses, and the efficacy of the use of force**. Legitimacy can be evaluated along a spectrum whose most extreme pole at one end is pacifism. Pacifism opposes the use of force to resolve international disputes. In the middle of the spectrum, the use of force is legitimized when it is instrumental in defending what is perceived as the nation’s security. The other extreme pole is militarism, meaning that the legitimacy for using force is unquestionable or barely questionable. Militarism ranges from regarding the use of force and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity,31 an approach that typifies many industrialized democracies (and therefore is the definition used in this article), to an irrational value system that espouses war as a goal in itself.32 The degree of this legitimacy can be determined by monitoring public opinion and political debates. However, **public and elite opinion and rhetoric can be more deeply analyzed as a multilayered structure, which reflects deeper cultural constructs that are less easily detectable. Focusing on the level of legitimacy for using force moves beyond the narrow focus on the military’s institutions, influence, and resources, and the attitude toward the use of force to address militarized political cultures that are often generated outside of the military. Assuming that militarism is a socially and politically driven phenomenon, the military is not necessarily the most salient part of the political culture nurturing militarism**. When it is more restrained than warmongering politicians, the influence of the military does not result in militarization. Hence, **an exclusive focus on the military may be misleading**. The control of militarization involves the political discourse in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role. This discourse aimed at subjecting the elected civilians’ use of force to a deliberative process that takes place within the public and political arenas and addresses the legitimacy to use force. Several conditions promote this deliberative process: 1. Relative slowness in decision making to guarantee that decisions are made through argumentation in which everyone’s opinion is in principle equally valuable and equally fallible. As Huysmans held, such deliberation takes time and can always be questioned again. Thus, speedy decision making in response to a perceived threat thwarts this principle, strengthens the executive branch of government, and suppresses dissent.33 2**. Debates should not be confined to the operational aspects of military policies but should extend to the broader logic behind and rightness of such policies. In other words, the debates should focus on the very legitimacy for using force and its utility in promoting the public good**.34 Thus, **the focus is on affecting the political cultures legitimizing the use of force, rather than taking this legitimacy for granted**. Therefore, during the debates there should be a thorough consideration of nonlethal or less belligerent policy alternatives. 3. **Access to information is not obstructed by manipulation, such as threat inflation**.35 4. Relatedly, debates should be conducted through an open discourse in which the dominant discourse does not hinder the political opposition from challenging decision makers.36 Such a dominant discourse often takes the form of asserting the need for unity in times of crisis, thereby muting dissenting voices.37 By extension, **challenging the decision makers should also challenge the power relations in society that affect the legitimacy of using force and may create barriers to deliberation.** In general, deliberation alone does not necessarily ensure a more democratic outcome unless actors have other power resources as well, such as the ability to mobilize to overcome entrenched interests.38 This is why free and fair elections, along with constitutional mechanisms such as checks on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law and impartial courts, are preconditions for the deliberative process.39

### 1% Risk Wrong

#### Their impact calculus values imperial lives over those of the colonies – threats to the empire are always heightened to overlook and justify continued colonial violence. Due to the hegemony of white masculinity, you should flip the script in this round and start with 0% risk of the disad instead of 100%

Mignolo ‘7 (Walter, argentinian semiotician and prof at Duke, “The De-Colonial Option and the Meaning of Identity in Politics” online)

The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the dispensability of human lives from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5

### FIAT K

#### Interpreting FIAT as simulation of USFG action destroys our agency in relating to the resolution – turns deliberation and advocacy and reifies hegemonic ideologies- FAR forces debaters into engaging in praxis and method planning

**Antonio 95** (Robert, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”, American Journal of Sociology, Volume 101, No. 1)

Treating words as mirrors of reality provides a comforting illusion of "certainty." This tendency obscures the social bases of language, reifies social conventions, and weakens capacities to imagine and create alternative conditions. Linguistic "abbreviations" cement obligatory social ties where "mutual agreement" about "feelings" is absent and the tendency to "let go" must be stemmed. Nietzsche held that language serves social selection of the herd, keeping experiences, desires, impulses, and actions of weak persons within boundaries, inscribing strong individuals as collective enemies, and redirecting ressentiment into regimentation. Accordingly, cultural rationalization makes this process of liquidating particularity more effective and universal (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 100—102, 216—17; 19686, pp. 357-58, 380). Since Nietzsche was himself a master writer, his polemics about words per se are hyperbolic.11 The real target is Socratic culture's exceptionally abstract languages, rampant conceptual reifications, and impoverished aesthetic sensibilities. Nietzsche believed that the obsession with rational representation makes the body an inert target of disciplinary control. Adoration of concepts, theory, and reason makes the abstract signifier the ultimate object of knowledge. Purely formal concepts are treated as the "highest," "real," and "true" things, while sense experience is relegated to the degraded status of "appearance." Platonic ideas, Chris- tian soul, Kantian things-in-themselves, and Newtonian atoms and time are all foundational reifications that "dehistoricize" the corporeal world and erect illusions of firm "grounds" for those who cannot face life without God and tradition or bear the weight of its connective choices and its "great dice game" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 287-90; 19686, p. 549; 19686, pp. 35-37). Destroying Socratic culture's "objective" foundations (i.e., God and Truth), the latest phase of cultural rationalization greatly amplifies feel- ings of uncertainty. The consequent desperate searching and clinging produces frenetic reification; fanatical new prejudices, religions, and politics appear alongside the most sterile intellectual formalisms. Mass culture's hastily formulated languages blur all difference and ambiguity (e.g., parties "transform their principles into great at fresco stupidities"). The proliferation of abstract signifiers, arising from diverse locations and detached from any sense of stable referents, contribute to increasingly mechanical, diffuse, and mindless regimentation. In this fashion, Nietzsche severed the links that modern theorists saw between rationalization and enhanced communication, social integration, and legitimate authority (Nietzsche 1983, p. 215; 1986, pp. 161-62; 1966, pp. 216-17; 19686, pp. 357-58, 380-81). According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations over identify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing over concern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?  A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Nietzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant.

### Hegemon DA

#### The reading of framework is a patriarchal move that attempts to push “unproductive” knowledge to the private or domestic sphere – reject the neg the damage has already been done

Tomlinson, 10  (Barbara, “Feminism and Affect at the scene of argument”, Ch 1 – transforming the terms of reading)

Contemporary U.S. political and academic discourse abounds with a recurring set of formulaic claims that feminist scholars (and feminists in general) are angry, unreasoning, shrill, humorless, ugly, man- hating, perverse, and peculiar. This “trope of the angry feminist” is designed to delegitimize feminist argument even before the argument begins**, to undermine feminist politics** by making its costs personal, and to foreclose feminist futures by making feminism seem repulsive to young women. The trope is a convention, a plot trick, a setup, a narrative structure, a character type. 2 Its incessant repetition constitutes part of a cultural training program that makes antifeminism and misogyny a routine element in everyday speech and written argument. Instigated by expressly po liti calopposition to feminism, deploying affectively charged strategies that float free of evidence, clichés like the angry feminist put animosity— not argument— at the center of politi cal discussions, interpellating readers as always already antifeminist. The repetition and circulation of such tropes produces a cumulative overdetermined quality that makes them seem already true before the moment of argument. One never encounters the feminist’s argument for the first time because it comes already discredited. Because the trope of the angry feminist encourages unacknowledged ways of interpreting feminist affect, its inveterate irruption is consequential in journalism, entertainment, po liti cal, and quasi- intellectual arenas, as I describe in this introductory chapter. It is perhaps even more consequential in its influence on academic discourses, the subject of the remainder of the book: **affect in academic discourses on social justice is often policed through “ideologies of style” that purport to be neutral but operate to entrench current conditions of power.** In this book I argue that **we have failed to theorize adequately the role of such pervasive affective and ideologically encapsulated arguments in academic and political discourses**. In consequence, we do not recognize that our conventional reading practices mislead us about ways to comprehend and counter them. I argue that transforming the terms of reading can reframe the problem, and propose for that purpose a critical toolkit that I call “feminist socioforensic discursive analysis.” My argument here constitutes a provocation to transform the terms of reading, to reframe interpretation of affect in both feminist and antifeminist writing. Th e trope of the angry feminist is a familiar conceit, like many similar phrases **deployed to delegitimize social criticism**, one that draws on a deep well of related clichés, affective rhetorical strategies, and familiar tropes. Th ese discursive moves circulate as instantiations of power. Th e trope of the angry feminist presents itself as fresh each time it is uttered, its repetitious banality framed as mere reflection of the repetitious banality of the feminist’s argument. Th is leads to the absurd but po liti cally effi cacious situation where readers are weary of arguments they have never heard. These argumentative tactics often succeed in part because our normal reading and writing practices lead us to object or counterargue in ways that fail to come to grips with the specific nature of the rhetorical situation that the tropes instantiate. **Our conventional reading practices reinscribe ways of thinking that seem “logical” or “fair” because they are so familiar**; **they lead us to treat the tropes as surface features of discourse that serve to “skew” debate from its direct and proper form. These conventional practices, permeated by unacknowledged power relations, encourage us to respond to the tropes “normatively,” with reproaches about textual etiquette, textual responsibility, or textual appropriateness, to complain about inadequate evidence, to provide counterexamples, or to condemn the person proffering the trope, as though its use violates an agreement about the proper nature of civic discussion,** and as if there is a mechanism of accountability. None of this is the case. Responses that might chastise, correct, or even complain about the trope of the angry feminist are inadequate in part because they rest, ultimately, on an imaginary ideal: a discursive arena regulated by impartial principles in which utterances are adjudicated by unbiased observers. Framing political and even academic discussion in this commonsense way treats rhetoric as a neutral technology to be deployed or evaluated in isolation from its conditions of production, the situations of speakers, or the general societal power relations that give utterances friendly to prevailing power relations an overdetermined “reasonableness” while **rendering most oppositional arguments automatically suspect**. Our reading practices already rest on uninterrogated and deeply gendered and racialized models of textuality, argument, authorship, politeness, and emotion. Under such conditions, affect is a potent tool of dominance, infusing the reading situation to teach us what power is, who has it, how to get it, how to be rewarded, and how to avoid the punishments power can deliver. Louis Althusser (1971) argues that concrete individuals become constituted as “subjects” through ideology, but the most powerful ideological influences do not come to us in the form of ideological pronouncements. Th at would make them visible, controversial, and refutable. Instead, he argues, **the most powerful ideologies exist in “apparatuses,” in practices, and these practices are always material.** Reading, writing, and argument are social practices sedimented with ideologies of legitimacy, propriety and fairness so powerful and pervasive that we presuppose their value rather than examining their effects.

### SSD

#### Reject SSD- our model is better as we aren’t forced to engage in logics of securitization and invulnerability. Not only is forcing debaters into unethical logics actively violent in the debate space but also hinders discussion of feminist action research as praxis can only be achieved half the time

#### Their conception of switch side normalizes opposition as a narrative of completeness that shuts out feminist considerations of IR

Sjoberg and Chessman 2012 (Laura Sjoberg, PhD in IR from USC and Professor at UF, and Christian Chessman, JD UC Berk, "The Biopower of Occupation: Insights for ‘Knowledge Exchange’in (Gender and) IR,” November 17, 2012 http://genderinglobalgovernancenet-work.net/events/critical-reflections-on-the-researcher-practitioner-relationship-2/attachment/sjoberg-and-chessman-biopower-of-occupation (rishi)).

The second contribution we argue that “Occupy” as method could make to feminist research is in understanding research more generally as being stable in its liminality rather than anchored by a static certainty about ontology, epistemology, method, or field politics. One way to think about this might be thinking about IR as art, as Christine Sylvester suggests: It takes an eye for sex and gender to see the art of it all. Even then it is difficult. Surrounded by enchanted positivism, which promises progress in knowledge – yes, this is the way! – only a long learning curve has brought us to the point of X-raying and carbon-dating the facts presented as timeless tendencies, as ‘objective’ IR. If we do not journey along the learning curve, we end up trying to draw without looking, observing, and reckoning with life. (Sylvester 2002, 273) Sylvester is arguing that seeing the world in a way that is linear, rational, and exclusively scientific neglects a number of concerns which are normatively important to feminisms, which find their substance in the political, the personal, and the critical. At the same time, anchoring research in liminality contradicts the discipline’s anchoring in a positivist social science based on approximating certainty. As researchers, liminality-as-research-goal is another uninhabitable space in IR – one which might be physically inhabited as an embodied disruption of positivist social science – one which might be a space of otherness and a space of protest all at once – both providing new intellectual turf for IR and disrupting its operationaliity. 29 Occupying Research to Occupy (Feminist) IR We are interested in a number of ways that both research practice and the political landscape of the field might change as a result of the introduction of the methodological principles for performing research and navigating the field that we glean from the ideas and practices of the ‘Occupy’ movement. In our view, one of the most useful questions such an interpretation can ask is how the space of the need to ‘do/think things differently’ becomes/became less inhabitable/uninhabitable space in the discipline of IR/the practice of governance, and how to inhabit that uninhabitable space, methodologically for IR theory and practically for the world of governance? In the paper (ready for posting soon), we think of it in terms of the “perfect operationality” (in Baudrillard’s terms) of a simulacrum of ‘what IR is’ (or, in your terms ‘how to govern’) where the system and its normalized ‘opposition’ form a tight narrative of completeness that makes ‘otherness’ to it impossible. That narrative completeness relies on bodies being where they are ‘supposed’ to be (in Foucauldian terms about biopower being an enforcer of sovereignty), and re-placement of bodies (occupation) interrupts the narrative completeness of the imperium by demonstrating the inhabitability of uninhabitable space.

### Deliberation

**Their model of deliberation relies on a hegemonically masculine model of rationality and stasis point that attempts to push “unproductive” knowledge to the private or domestic sphere –**

Tomlinson, 10 (Barbara, “Feminism and Affect at the scene of argument”, Ch 1 – transforming the terms of reading)

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It is perhaps even more consequential in its influence on academic discourses, the subject of the remainder of the book: **affect in academic discourses on social justice is often policed through “ideologies of style” that purport to be neutral but operate to entrench current conditions of power.** In this book I argue that **we have failed to theorize adequately the role of such pervasive affective and ideologically encapsulated arguments in academic and political discourses**. In consequence, we do not recognize that our conventional reading practices mislead us about ways to comprehend and counter them. I argue that transforming the terms of reading can reframe the problem, and propose for that purpose a critical toolkit that I call “feminist socioforensic discursive analysis.” My argument here constitutes a provocation to transform the terms of reading, to reframe interpretation of affect in both feminist and antifeminist writing. 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# Case Stuff

## AT: FEM IR TURNS

### AT: K = Essentialism

#### No link and turn – we don’t assume men are inherently more aggressive than women – the military creates this essentialism to serve its interests. We critique discourses that sustain notions of masculinity intrinsically tied to violence

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 69 (SPP).

Some scholars have argued that men are more likely to make war than women, because men are naturally aggressive. Wars break out because men are in positions of political and military power. Francis Fukuyama's 1998 Foreign Affairs article is an example of this type of reasoning. If this logic were true, it could be argued that men are likely to misinterpret the actual offense-defense balance because their aggressive tendencies inspire them to seek out conflict. The relationship between gender and aggression, however, is more complicated. Claims of "natural" aggression in men are politically suspect because they imply it is impossible for men to be otherwise, and therefore ignore the many men who do not behave aggressively. Joshua Goldstein finds little evidence that increased levels of testosterone in men fuel wars, or that biological factors explain the near-monopoly men have had on war-fighting throughout history. Instead of blaming men's biological composition for state aggressiveness, feminists in IR have identified military training and the installment of martial values in men as a source of aggressive policies. Cynthia Enloe draws attention to the myriad strategies associating nationalism and masculinity that military recruiters have used around the world and through time to encourage men to enlist, from promises of a fast-track to "first-class citizenship" for racial minorities, to presumptions of cultural superiority for groups already privileged. In the case of World War I, a "crisis of masculinity" in Britain was incited by the physical ineligibility of much of the working classes for military service, resulting in widespread government intervention to produce a nation of men more suited for the rigors of war deemed necessary to maintain Britain's colonial empire and place in the world. Anxieties over the ability of men to defend the nation prompted attempts to reshape gender relations throughout society to encourage the reinvigoration of traditional gender roles. This evidence indicates that rather than being inherently masculine, the military serves as an important site for the creation and maintenance of gender identities in society. As Enloe points out, "If maleness, masculinity, and militarism were inevitably bound together, militaries would always have all the soldiers they believed they required."42 Viewing gender as an identity, as "a socially imposed and internalized lens through which individuals perceive and respond to the world,"43 does a better job at explaining the underestimation of the costs of war than theories of men's innate aggression.

### AT: K = Gender Binaries

#### Our theory of hegemonic masculinity does not rely on binaries but recognizes that a constructed conception of masculinity is privileged over other masculinities and femininities

Wadley, 2010. (Jonathan, PhD in IR from Florida and currently professor of IR and sexual politics at San Diego. “Gendering the State: Performativity and Protection in International Security,” in *Gender and International Security* edited by Laura Sjoberg, pp. 49-50, SPP)

Often, the qualities of gender norms are structured as dichotomous pairs. As signifiers of identity, they establish hierarchy among the actors upon which they are "written." They include, among other things: rationality/irrationality, civilized/barbaric, autonomous/dependent, active/passive, and powerful/weak-all of which map onto the dominant signifier pair of masculine/feminine. The examination of gender dichotomies such as these has been helpful in accounting for how unequal, relational identities have been maintained and how they have privileged some actors and marginalized others. However, there are limits to this kind of analysis. By viewing relational gender identities in dichotomous terms, one risks neglecting the variation that exists within those categories. Simply put, there are different and unequal types of masculinity and femininity. Within the range of masculinities, there are dominant and subordinate types. A hegemonic masculinity is an idealized, relational, and historical model of masculinity-one to which other forms of masculinity are subordinate. Although the qualities associated with it characterize a small percentage of masculine actors, its idealization and cultural pervasiveness require other actors to position themselves in relation to it. And while it is continually evolving, incorporating other forms of masculinity even as it subordinates them, it remains identifiable. By performing in accordance with a dominant model of masculinity, states can constitute (and thus, position) themselves relationally as powerful subjects. For Connell, this kind of positioning is at the heart of the concept of masculinity, to such a degree that the term "represents not a certain type of man but, rather, a way that men position themselves through discursive practices." Cynthia Enloe argues similarly that patriarchy is perpetuated by “men who are recognized and claim a certain form of masculinity, for the sake of being more valued, more 'serious,' and 'the protectors of/and controllers of those people who are less masculine.” A comparable process occurs among states. As with men, the more that states are able to constitute themselves in alliance with the norms of the hegemonic masculinity the more they will improve their position and boost their credibility. Thus, states have constant incentives to perform in ways that not only are masculine but that constitute them as a certain form of masculine actor, one who embodies the elements of the hegemonic masculinity. Performances that masculinize states by positioning them closer to the ideal of the hegemonic masculinity are likely to be most effective in the realm of security. This is because security performances are central to the production of the state as a unitary subject and because, so often, security performances are rendered intelligible by highly pronounced ideas about masculinity and femininity. War, in particular, demonstrates this claim. Long ago, Kenneth Waltz observed that in times of war the state is united (and, therefore, a single entity) to a greater degree than at any other time. Tickner makes a similar observation but concludes that gender plays a big role in producing state unity: the state becomes a citizen-warrior in times of war. Jean Bethke Elshtain and Susan Jeffords go one step further, arguing that collective identities are constructed through the types of men and women that war creates or brings out. But absent war, security performances are still crucial for state production and reproduction. By taking dangers, threats, and other signs of insecurity to be there objects, security performances reproduce the boundaries between a secure self and a dangerous other. Boundary reproduction is central to processes of statecraft, and security performances occur where the integrity of the state's boundaries are discursively challenged, often in an explicit manner. Whether such threats are internal or external, the effect is the same. Indeed, the distinction often collapses. One effect of successful security performances, then, is the appearance of the state as a unitary, continuous actor, and one who can claim legitimacy over those "internal" to it. An additional effect of successful security performances is the constitution of the state as an actor who is hierarchically dominant to certain other international actors, frequently states. Both of these can be accomplished by performing security in accord with the norms of the hegemonic masculinity. The relational quality of gender ensures that any performances that gave the state the appearance of personhood will necessarily position its personhood in relation to other states. Any gendered construction of the state, even if it does not live up to masculine ideals, will be "socially defined contradistinction from some model (whether real or imaginary) of femininity; thus, the gender norms that make a state intelligible as a subject also situate it relationally to other actors.

#### Masculinity and femininity are culturally constructed – masculine doesn’t inherently dominate the feminine

**Workman 96** (Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 5, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf)

The gender critique of war provides a generalized account of wars and the way they are fought. The gender critique tells us why we have wars at all. While it is suggestive with respect to the frequency, character, and scope of war, it does not try to account for the timing and location of specific wars. It tells us why war is viewed widely as an acceptable practice or way to resolve human differences (although this acceptance invariably is accompanied with obligatory protestations of reluctance). The gender critique of war, for example, cannot account for the timing and location of the 1991 Gulf War, although it can provide an explanation of the warring proclivities of modern Western states, especially the inconsistency between the peaceful rhetoric of the US and its incessant warring practices. It can account for the spectre of war in the aftermath of Vietnam, with the end of the Cold War, and with the election of George Bush. It is less able to account for the appearance of war in the Middle East in January of 1991. The opening intellectual orientation of the gender critique of war rests upon a constructivist view of human understanding and practice, that is, a view that anchors practices, including war, within humankind's self-made historico-cultural matrix. This view is contrasted starkly with those that ground human practices psychologically or biologically or genetically. War is not viewed as a natural practice as if delivered by the Gods; it arises out of human-created understandings and ways-of- living that have evolved over the millennia. More specifically, the assumption that men (the nearly exclusive makers and doers of war) are biologically hard-wired for aggression and violence is resisted, as is the related notion that women are naturally passive and non-violent. The explanation for war will not be found in testosterone levels. It is not the essential or bio-social male that makes war. War is the product of the gendered understandings of life—understandings of the celebrated masculine and the subordinated feminine—that have been fashioned over vast tracts of cultural time. And since war arises from human-created understandings and practices it can be removed when these understandings change. War is not insuperable. Indeed, the rooting of war in human created phenomena is recognized as a response to the political incapacitation associated with biologically determinist arguments: "Attempts of genetic determinists to show a biological basis for individual aggression and to link this to social aggression, are not only unscientific, but they support the idea that wars of conquest between nations are inevitable."8

## AT: UNIQUENESS PRESSES

### AT: Women are in politics

#### Their women in politics example doesn’t disprove our argument that dominant politics operates via displays of hegemonic masculinity

Maruska, 2010. (Jennifer Heeg, PhD in IR from Georgetown, Lecturer in Political Science and Texas A&M in Qatar, “When are states hypermasculine?” In Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 248-251, SPP)

Conclusion: hypermasculine politics: State behavior (by foreign policy elites and within popular culture) reflects hegemonic masculinity, which is just one type of masculinity that occurs at the top of a hierarchy of power relations. As previously discussed, various forms of masculinities manifest on the international stage, including hegemonic masculinity (of Western elites) and other, subordinated masculinities (such as gay men, men of color; and non-Western men), as well as many forms of subordinate femininity. Hegemonic femininity is perfectly sound as a theoretical concept, but it is present only when "feminine" values dominate the social structure under analysis. But insofar as states are "manly," the field of international politics is dominated by states with differing hegemonic masculinities. American hegemonic masculinity's most recent turn towards hypermasculinity is in stark contrast to Germany's focus on economic primacy. But it does not matter whether Gerhard Schroeder or Angela Merkel is at the helm: like all other states, Germany must behave in a manly way in order to compete against other manly states-and to survive in a feminine anarchy.67 The point is well theorized by now that "when women enter politics, particularly in areas of foreign policy, they enter an already constructed masculine world where role expectations are defined in terms of adherence to preferred masculine attributes such as rationality, autonomy, and power. "68 This is adherence to a generalized description of hegemonic masculinity. What I propose as hypermasculinity goes further than this, and refers to aggressive and bellicose behavior. It is possible that female heads-of-state may be more likely to adhere to a hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity, in order to minimize their anatomical female-ness. Television pundits make this point: Andrew Sullivan refers to Queens Elizabeth and Victoria, Margaret Thatcher, and now Hillary Clinton as "Warrior Queens. "69 The concepts of hegemonic masculinity, and subordinate masculinities and femininities, give this punditry (based on intuition and a specific reading of history) real theoretical heft. The field of international politics in the US is dominated almost completely by straight white men-or women who "act like men" (as is frequently said about Hillary Clinton)--or by non-white men and women who conform (by choice or necessity) to the culture of Washington. Even the 2008 election of President Barack Obama, unprecedented as it was, does not fundamentally alter this reality. After all, current First Lady Michelle Obama's senior thesis at Princeton reflected on her experiences as a Black American at an Ivy League university, stating that "the path I have chosen to follow by attending Princeton will likely lead to my further integration and/or assimilation into a White cultural and social structure that will only allow me to remain on the periphery of society; never becoming a full participant." Furthermore, she continues in the next paragraph, "as I enter my final year at Princeton, I find myself striving for many of the same goals as my White classmates." It remains to be seen, but while some may hope that the Obama administration ushers in an era where the particular strand of hegemonic masculinity is less hypermasculine than it was immediately following 9/11, international politics remains as imbued with hegemonic masculinity as ever. Acceptable behavior in international politics transcends the individual’s race or gender; to get to a position of power, all participants (gay, straight, male, female, light or dark-skinned) must conform to the "cult of [hegemonic] masculinity." As Carol Cohn has showed us in the field of nuclear strategy, "learning the language is a transformative, not an additive, process." Heads of state must be perceived as strong on national security; national security relies on war or the threat of war. This is hegemonic masculinity in the extreme. Hegemonic masculinity is international politics, and international politics is hegemonic masculinity. In the words of two feminist theorists "international politics is a process which is always already gendered and which is maintained as gender-neutral only in reducing gender to 'women' and their particular concerns."73 If gender is not widely considered to be useful as a line of inquiry into politics, it is only because politics are dominated so completely by the mindset of hegemonic masculinity. As R. W. Connell wrote:

### AT: Women’s Participation Increasing = Progress

#### Increasing representation of women defers structural change and abets the system

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in *feminist review* 109: 49-72, spp)

Essentialism has been no obstacle to the rapid uptake of the ‘rise of gender harmony’ in governance discourse on finance. Frequently described and represented as more responsible, nurturing, financially cautious and intrinsically less corrupt (see, for instance, Stern, 2001; World Bank, 2001), women have found themselves positioned in recent discussions of financial crisis as a solution to the excesses of male-dominated finance, in a show of essentialism that governance feminism has run with in its agenda for getting more women in boardrooms and on trading floors. Economic observers have frequently attributed the seeds of the global financial crisis ‘to a combination of reckless risk-taking and outright corruption’ and, just as ‘risk-taking has been laid at the door of masculinity, so too has corruption’ (Fogg, 2013). Accordingly, women ‘are simply more honest’, more trustworthy and public-spirited and less corrupt than men (ibid.). They are also ‘naturally’ more prone to long-term thinking or empathic and prosocial behaviour than men (ibid.). Policy-oriented studies have emerged to demonstrate ‘that including women is good for business’ and evidence has been marshalled to show that firms that promote women into management are more profitable, better organised, accountable, motivated and innovative (Prügl, 2012: 29). Making ‘women’s difference productive for the solution of the crisis’, such accounts have centralised women’s supposed patience, their consistence and their attention to detail (ibid.: 30). Importantly, however (and in case men begin to feel threatened by all this attention on women’s gifts), these accounts have redeemed men in finance by extolling women’s contributions to profit in conjunction with men’s tendency towards extremes, painting women as ‘competent associate[s] in a common endeavor’ (ibid.: 31). Iceland’s efforts to ‘signal a new culture within the banking system’ (Wall Street Journal, 2008), appointing female chief executives to the newly nationalised Icelandic banks, serves as a good example of the extent to which essentialist, and behavioural, explanations have monopolised contemporary accounts of financial crisis. According to Salam, the ‘macho men of the heavily male-dominated global finance sector’ created the conditions for global economic collapse’, assisted by ‘their mostly male counterparts in government’ (Salam, 2009: 68). Women, on the other hand, are less inclined to ‘risky’ behaviour on financial markets (except when menstruating; see Lite, 2008). As Elias (2013: 161) notes, women’s perceived carefulness as consumers (according to Global Gender Gap reporting) also makes them better placed as managers of household finances. According to the WEF, they are ‘driving the post-financial-crisis-economic-recovery’ not only though their ‘retail power’ but by ‘engaging in acts of consumption that enable them to break with traditional gender stereotypes in favor of an empowered gender identity as consumer’ (ibid.: 161–162). Governance feminism’s embrace of the neo-liberal market guarantees that it firmly avoids questions that might challenge the shape of the economic system that has led to crisis. Governance feminism, and governance feminism’s response to financial crisis, has been extensively silent on the gendered underpinnings of global governance, and global finance in particular, focusing instead on a particular (and perhaps unsurprising) support for institutional measures to enhance women’s participation. The increasing prevalence of descriptions of gender that directly correlate low gender gaps with high economic competitiveness is, as Elias (2013: 159) notes, a powerful instrument of governance, feeding into states’ obsessions with their national economic competitiveness and ‘thus legitimating neoliberal competitiveness enhancing policy agendas’. While it may be, then, ‘no bad thing that an organisation such as the WEF has placed gender prominently on its issue agenda’, since this can legitimate ‘a focus on gender issues within state and nonstate arenas and within international organisations’, the ‘inevitability about the way in which gender issues are instrumentalised in order to link women’s empowerment and gender equality straightforwardly to economic growth and competitiveness’ is, Elias notes, troubling. ‘By disappearing feminism in favour of technical measurement and celebrity humanitarianism’, governance feminism simply reiterates problematic visions of gender ‘whereby gender equality and women’s empowerment’ can be understood only in relation to their ‘ability to serve the market economy’ (ibid.: 166–167).

### AT: Pinkner

#### Pinker’s “violence down” argument ignores military modernization, nuclear arsenals, and sanitizes interventionism

**Robinson 19** (Nathan J., PhD student in Sociology & Social Policy. Nathan is interested in criminal justice policy, particularly in Louisiana. His research focuses on adult education in U.S. prisons and on the politics of indigent legal defense. At Yale Law School, he co-directed the Green Haven Prison Project and worked for the New Orleans public defender and the ACLU's National Prison Project. “The World’s Most Annoying Man” *Foreign Affairs* <https://www.currentaffairs.org/2019/05/the-worlds-most-annoying-man>)NFleming

Nuclear weapons pose a strong challenge to Pinker’s thesis of declining violence, one he never dealt with adequately. He argues in his books that the “long peace” since World War II was not the result of nuclear weapons, and argues that nukes are essentially “useless in winning wars and in keeping the peace” since no country would dare to use them: “Incinerating massive numbers of noncombatants would shred the principles of distinction and proportionality that govern the conduct of war and would constitute the worst war crimes in history. That can make even politicians squeamish, so a taboo grew up around the use of nuclear weapons, effectively turning them into bluffs.” Of course, this means the United States itself has committed the “worst war crimes in history” since it intentionally dropped nuclear weapons on two civilian populations. And while there is certainly a “taboo” on such behavior—Hiroshima horrified much of the world, though Americans tend to think it was fine—U.S. commanders contemplated using nuclear weapons in Vietnam, too. (Good thing Lyndon Johnson got a bit “squeamish,” although not so squeamish as to stop a war that killed two million Vietnamese people.) Realizing that the presence of thousands of weapons that can vaporize cities, and the giant U.S. war machine constantly researching terrifying swarms of autonomous flying death robots, rather undercuts the whole Most Peaceful Era Ever theory, Pinker points to the fact that “the United States has reduced its inventory by 85 percent from its 1976 peak.” He concedes, however, that “Cynics might be unimpressed by a form of progress that still leaves the world with 10,200 atomic warheads.” Indeed, cynics might! The big problem with Pinker’s violence thesis has always been that it declares victory prematurely. He is quite clear in saying he doesn’t think peace is necessarily here to stay, or that progress can’t unravel, and thinks this should silence critics who think he is overly optimistic. But the truth is that we’re just not far enough past the end of World War II to begin to comment on a general trend. The two global bloodbaths occurred within the lifetimes of people who are still alive. Over the course of human history, this is a nanosecond. It’s not a “long peace,” but a very short one. One should probably not be drawing any conclusions about what kind of era this is until we’ve seen a bit more of it, otherwise you might end up like the people who said World War One had been the war to “end all wars.” Others have pointed out that Pinker’s worldview requires him to minimize some pretty heinous violence, especially that perpetrated by the United States. (A good overview of this is found in the International Socialist Review.) He trumpets Democratic Peace Theory without much attention to the way the “democratic” U.S. has squelched popular uprisings abroad that threaten its interests. He even goes so far as to say: “Among respectable countries… conquest is no longer a thinkable option. A politician in a democracy today who suggested conquering another country would be met not with counterarguments but with puzzlement, embarrassment, or laughter.” Probably true, if they said “conquering.” If they said “liberating” or “spreading democracy to,” on the other hand, they’d be met with quite a different reaction! To avoid acknowledging U.S. aggression, he has to downplay the hideousness of the Vietnam War, and mostly blames “communists” for it, saying that “the three deadliest postwar conflicts were fueled by Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese communist regimes that had a fanatical dedication to outlasting their opponents” and “the American democracy was willing to sacrifice a tiny fraction of the lives that the North Vietnamese dictator was willing to forfeit.” This exoneration of the U.S. for the Vietnamese deaths is downright despicable, and Pinker needs to get himself much better acquainted with the reality of what we did. Naturally, Pinker is more critical of anti-nuclear activists than of the military industrial complex. “Stop telling everyone they’re doomed,” he warns. “The message that many antinuclear activists want to convey is ‘any day now we will all die horribly unless the world immediately takes steps which it has absolutely no chance of taking.” And after all, “the world has survived half-mad despots with nuclear weapons before, namely Stalin and Mao, who were deterred from using them, or, more likely, never felt the need.” Very reassuring. (He also points out that “war is illegal.”) Illustration by Mike Freiheit What’s maddening about Pinker’s body of recent work is that it attacks the very people who are doing the most to address the problems he says he cares about. Progress is made by progressives, as Jeremy Lent pointed out, and it’s yesterday’s “social justice warriors” that are responsible for the declines in racist language and corporal punishment that Pinker shows off as accomplishments of Our Great Liberal Democratic Capitalist Order. The Pinkers of times past were the one Martin Luther King was addressing in Letter From Birmingham Jail, who placed trust in the “benevolent forces of modernity” to make things better rather than actually taking part in a social movement. As my friend Sam Miller McDonald put it, “most of those good things that Steven Pinker likes to brag about came about because of the hard work and sacrifice of the kind of people Steven Pinker likes to complain about.” Indeed, Pinker is quite open that he doesn’t believe in “struggle.” He views political problems as “mistakes,” errors to be corrected through the application of rationality, rather than “conflicts” between values and interests. He wants to “depoliticize issues as much as possible” and “treat politics as science, engineering, or medicine.” This is why he refuses to see that certain kinds of power are zero-sum, that the interests of the boss does not coincide with the interests of the worker. That would mean that advancing the interests of the worker required a political fight, rather than simply the application of technology. This is the Obama worldview, and the Obama presidency proved why it doesn’t work. It turns out that interests do conflict, and that if you try to take actions that enrich working people and threaten corporate power, the people whose power is threatened will do everything they possibly can to destroy you. Steven Pinker’s works are worth examining for a few reason. For one thing, they show how deeply conservative a “liberal” worldview can be. Pinker is all for Equal Rights, Democracy, Sensible Regulation, Secularism, and the other great Liberal values. And yet like many liberals, he seems to detest the left more than the hard right. (He infamously praised the “highly literate, highly intelligent” alt-right. Then when he was criticized, he said: “A lot of people who are ignorant of the alt-right equate them with the skinheads and the Nazis carrying the tiki torches, I was referring to the alt-right strictly from its origins in internet discussion groups.” So, not Richard Spencer, but… Richard Spencer?) He simply accepts the right-wing narrative of various events. This often shows up in small framing comments. Bernhard Goetz was “a mild-mannered engineer” who “became a folk hero for shooting four young muggers,” not a vigilante who attacked four Black men after one of them asked him for money. (I’ve never looked up what Pinker thinks of James Damore, but I’m sure he thinks he was an intelligent young man fired for reporting the uncontroversial results of scientific studies.\*) He partly defends the Tuskegee syphilis study, calling it a “one-time failure to prevent harm to a few dozen people,” that “may even have been defensible by the standards of the day” (It was actually 400 people that the United States government allowed to believe they were being treated for syphilis when they weren’t, and it lasted 40 years.)

## AT Poetry Bad

#### Poetry is important to form a politics of engagement where we can challenges the contemporary issues of our world

Joan **Retellack** and Juliana **Spahr 06** (“Introduction: Why Teach Contemporary Poetries?” *Poetry and Pedagogy: The Challenge of the Contemporary*)

Educational institutions like to think they know where they are going and that's why the word pedagogy has an almost irretrievably pejorative cast. The old-fashioned specter of pedagogy as a kind of psychological and moral teleology marching toward ideals of compliant good citizenship had hardly been outmoded before its anti-authoritarian replacement began to look suspiciously benighted and equally manipulative. The student who must question all authority must become the ultimate skeptic and therefore, paradoxically, cannot assume a critical stance toward the pedagogy of self.expression s/he is offered as an instrument of freedom. In the maw of this dichotomy between power as knowledge and student-centered learning, the very things that matter-~-the informed imagination, the passionate intellect-\_can be swallowed whole. We are not attempting with this book to invent a new pedagogy, but to suggest that education must be in touch with the historical-contemporary intersection that forms the world in which we live. This can happen in many ways. What poetry has to offer is a compound experience in which the dynamic engagement of self and otherness, of formal discipline and experiment, is played out through the foregrounding of language. Every word, every combination of words, strikes us like a chord on multiple levels of intellect and emotion. Language is the site of cognitive modeling and intuitively nuanced play. The conceptual framework of this book draws on Wittgenstein's sense of language as a form of life, language games as the repertory of our human action--a repertory that profits from continual reinvention, and becomes stalled in thoughtless habitual usage. It also benefits from John Dewey's idea of art as experience and D. W. Winnicott's crucial distinction between the active imagination at play and the passive retreat into fantasy. Winnicott, like Dewey, believes that imaginative engagements with our world are responsible for not only our sense of reality but our zest for life. Winnicott argues that our most important life-affirming active principle is our capacity for that high-stakes engagement with the concrete materials of existence that we call play.\* Whether in literature or the sciences, it is the playful mind that experiments and discovers. Gertrude Stein's (playful) argument that in our arts we are literally composing the time in which we live brings into focus the poetical urgency of what we value most in our uses of language. Our contemporary experience is both alarmingly and exhilaratingly complex--chaotic, excessive, messy. It demands an intricately informed agency, new ways to perceive and invent patterns, the ability to make mean-ing in motion. It is polylingual and perverse, full of delightful and nefarious artifice. As editors of this volume, we believe that the contemporary poetries of which the many authors represented here write can enliven our capaci-ties to make sense of where we are, where we want to go in medias rest of the world as we find it. If poetries that are truly in touch with their times are the pleine air laboratories of the language, what are the pedagogical implications? The essays in Poetry and Pedagogy assume that the functional mandate of the humanist classroom is to bring students into engagement with that part of their world negotiated through texts. Few would deny that the contem-porary has been the chronic blind spot in all but scientific and fine arts cur-ricula. Think how many "twentieth century lit.'survey courses still can't fit much in after the mid 1950s. In fact, the greatest challenge facing the Liberal Arts has always been the contemporary. (Stein liked to say that the official "we" is always about forty years behind what is actually going on in the arts.) The question therefore is how to invent a living poetry class-room, one that invites students to experience and make meaning of the forms of their era. This at the very least requires cognizance of the plurality of poetries har come out of our blatantly "multi" world-multicultural, ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic. The essays collected here address the productive possibilities, pleasures, and risks of teaching intercultural poetries of the sort that have proliferated since the 1960s. Avant-gardes (i.e., innovative contemporary arts of all sorts) have tended to be not only pedagogical in their implications, but also international in their interests. An immediately obvious pedagogical impli-cation has to do with ways in which these poetries demand an active making of meaning on the part of the reader--a performative dimension that enacts a significant linguistic agency. In today's world that agency must be broadly informed and multifaceted. Having gone from the perhaps overly opti-mistic concept of the global village to increasing concerns about the politics of globalization, a contemporary poetics cannot be limited to the narrowly expressive 1-poem, nor the conceptual formalist poem, nor to fragmented language and syntax or paratactic riffs, nor to single rhythm, loudly declaimed spoken poetry. Any "I" from whom one has something to learn must be in conversation with an unsettling mélange of "others." The conversational intimacy of the internet, along with its nonmaterial location in cyberspace, has brought on a particular strain of the Brechtian formula for art that acti-vates agency: empathy and estrangement. These can also be viewed as qualities of the reflexive hybridization that has become a distinguishing mark of our times. However one construes all this, the fact is, from the early 1990s on, national and international conversations have flourished among any of the poets represented in this book. The geometries of their attention radiate in many directions.

1. Whyte 16 (David, “Vulnerability,” https://onbeing.org/blog/vulnerability/) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)